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ABSTRACT
A RISK- AND FUZZY SET-BASED METHODOLOGY FOR
ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION
MILITARY UTILITY ASSESSMENT DESIGN
Thomas James Meyers
Old Dominion University, 2007
Director: Dr. Charles B. Keating

The U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
(ACTD) and derivative, rapid acquisition programs offer timely solutions to critical
military needs by assessing the utility of technologies mature enough to be fielded
without application of traditional, defense system development processes. Military utility
assessments (MUA) are ACTDs’ most critical features, but the lack of a standard for
identifying assessment criteria tailored to specific demonstrations risks poorly informed
acquisition decisions and the military operations those decisions are intended to support.
The purpose of this research was to develop and deploy a methodology for
identifying measures of effectiveness integral to advanced concept technology
demonstration military utility assessment design. Within a context determined by
attributes of complex systems, the research observed twin premises that ACTD
assessment designs should accommodate: all risks possible when incorporating
demonstration prototypes within superior and complex, joint military operations
metasystems; and the ambiguities and other o f what have been termed “fuzzy”
manifestations of the cognition and language with which end-user, military operators
craft and express perspectives required to identify measures of effectiveness fundamental
to MUA designs. The effort pursued three research questions:
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(1) How might joint military operations metasystem models guide the identification of
ACTD measures of effectiveness?
(2) How might be developed and employed joint military metasystem models with which
can be identified ACTD measures of effectiveness?
(3) How useful might ACTD managers and analysts find the MUA design methodology
developed and deployed with this research?
The deployed methodology stimulated answers to these research questions by
uniquely combining tailored versions of established risk assessment methods with a fuzzy
method for resolving small group preferences. The risk assessment methods honored one
research premise while enabling the identification and employment of a joint military
operations metasystem model suited to MUA design needs of a simulated ACTD. The
fuzzy preference method honored the second research premise as it, too, promoted
metasystem model employment. The complete methodology was shown to hold favor
with a large segment of a community expert in managing and assessing the utility of
ACTDs emphasizing critical, joint military service needs.
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PREFACE
This dissertation advances a methodology developed with the hope that United
States military service members will benefit from its application. The methodology’s
tested application domain of advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTD) was
chosen to represent other domains to which it may also be applied for the benefit of joint
forces and missions: domains such as ACTD-derivative, joint capabilities technology
demonstrations; rapid prototyping efforts of the Department of Defense(DoD); formal,
DoD acquisition-related operational testing, and other domains prominently characterized
by a need to employ subject matter experts for the identification and emplacement of
measures of effectiveness able to drive meaningful assessments of the utility of systems
and processes proposed for military use.
The research with which was developed and demonstrated this risk- and fuzzy
set-based methodology for ACTD military utility assessment (MUA) design exploited
theoretical and methodological perspectives of a problem drawn from practice, and only
with those perspectives could the methodology be claimed to support practitioners.
While some might argue the methodology’s principal components of risk assessment,
fuzzy set theory, and complex systems as peripheral to the realm of everyday, military
operations, the researcher believes those components to undeniably and significantly
contribute to assessments of utility o f prototypes and methods proposed for the military.
Given the opportunity to do so through the use of this document’s practitioner guide and
fundamental themes, the methodology derived from this research effort will well support
current and future, U.S. military missions.
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This dissertation comprises five chapters and ten appendices constructed and
linked to offer readers a hopefully understandable and appealing blend of theoretical,
methodological, and practical concerns regarding ACTD and similar, MUA designs.
Chapter sections are likewise intended to clearly and comprehensively support chapter
themes.
The introductory chapter identifies a research purpose and questions prompted by
a MUA design standards deficiency noted by the DoD and external agencies as having
plagued the ACTD program since its 1994 inception. The first chapter also offers a
characterization of the ACTD program in terms of history and intent, together with the
intent and other attributes of demonstration MUAs. Corresponding emphasis upon the
complex nature of military operations that ACTDs are expected to markedly enhance
establishes a context observed as the MUA design methodology was developed,
deployed, and evaluated for its own utility.
The second chapter review of pertinent literature extrapolated ACTD program and
MUA intents in identifying nine elements of the literature bearing on the MUA design
standards problem. Relatively obvious elements like risk assessment, fuzzy set theory,
and fuzzy approaches to risk assessment are explained, as are those less obvious - such as
pairwise comparisons and small expert group characteristics - once the latter are logically
drawn from the former. The Literature Review chapter represents a thorough and
detailed effort to support the MUA design methodology explained in the following
chapter.
“Research Methodology” is the heart of the dissertation document. This third
chapter encompasses a rationale for and description of the MUA design methodology and
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its employment. It notably offers a description of the action research format used with
this particular research effort and intended to be used with all applications of the design
methodology. It also identifies and elaborates upon the five-phase design that governed
this work, and it cites the approach emplaced to ensure a research effort faithful to tenets
of reliability and validity.
The Results chapter illustrates the design methodology’s deployment, beginning
with deliberations of an action research group of one leader and three additional, military
operations experts, and concluding with judgments of the proposed methodology’s utility
rendered by a 20-member expert group of managers and analysts that represented a
sizable portion of all individuals ever to have pursued or supervised MUA designs for
U.S. multi-service demonstrations. Results chapter data evince the methodology utility
next addressed in “Conclusions.”
The Conclusions chapter links methodology deployment results with the three
research questions of the Introduction, argues for methodology status of the research’s
risk- and fuzzy set-based approach to MUA design, and cites theoretical, methodological,
and practical contributions made by the research. It also serves a call for research
targeting further mitigation of ACTD and ACTD-like, assessment design problems.
This dissertation’s first nine appendices complement information resident in its
five chapters, but the tenth crystallizes the principal intent of all work portrayed in the
document. The “ACTD Assessment Guide for Practitioners” notes 25 steps that capture
for demonstration managers and analysts the essence of the MUA design methodology
proposed here. The Guide is not prescriptive, in keeping with the methodological level
claimed for this research’s assessment design approach; but it must be used smartly and
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rigorously. Though other research products may be rightfully evaluated as important, the
Guide is the only one that can genuinely, immediately, and significantly benefit U.S.
military service members.
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1

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Defense instituted its Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) program in 1994 to “help expedite the transition of maturing
technologies from... developers to... [military] users” (Department of Defense [DoD], no
date-a, Introduction to ACTDs: Introduction section, 1 3) challenged by rapidly changing
and significant threats (DoD, no date-b; Payton 2002). Conducted largely free of
longer-established but more prescriptive and time-consuming (U.S. General Accounting
Office [GAO], 2002), defense acquisition procedures, these demonstrations offer
opportunities to relatively quickly advance to military use critically needed (DoD, no
date-a), technological systems proposed but not necessarily developed for the military.
The ACTD program is noted to have met its intent in widely varying degrees (DoD,
1997, no date-a; “On the Fast Track,” 2005; Payton, 2002; South, 2003; U.S.
Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 1998; GAO, 1999,2002), with numerous
demonstrations criticized for frailties of methods used to assess the military utility of
proffered systems (GAO, 2002).
“The heart of an ACTD is the assessment of military utility by the warfighter”
(DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Formulation, Selection, and Initiation - Formulation
and Submission section, If 11), yet poorly designed or executed military utility
assessments (MUA) have plagued many (GAO, 2002) of the nearly 150 demonstrations
conducted 1995-2006 (DoD, 2006). Responsible DoD officials have conceded the need

This dissertation is formatted in the style of the Publication Manual o f the American
Psychological Association, 5th edition.
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for standards promoting thorough and consistent assessments (GAO, 2002), but none
have been formally promulgated by the department (A. G. Arnold, personal
communication, January 18, 2005; W. F. Smith, personal communication, January 18,
2005). This lack of MUA design standards invites a plethora of risks to acquisition
decisions (GAO, 2002) and the very military operations those decisions are intended to
support (DoD, no date-a; GAO, 2002). The standards deficiency constitutes a serious
problem that should be eliminated and, if smartly addressed, can be.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Military utility assessments are the most critical features of advanced concept
technology demonstrations, yet poorly designed or executed assessments have plagued
numerous demonstrations and represent significant risks to system acquisition decisions
and military operations the decisions are intended to support. The ACTD program
suffers from a lack of standards promoting consistently thorough assessment designs
tailored to individual demonstrations. Program officials concede the need for improved
designs but have provided no mechanism with which ACTD managers and their staffs
can rigorously identify the assessment criteria those designs should emplace.
THE ACTD PROGRAM
Findings and recommendations of the 1986 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission
on Defense Management, commonly called the Packard Commission, catalyzed the
ACTD program (South, 2003). Eight years later, the Commission’s call for a new,
defense acquisition management concept (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management, 1986) became what then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin
termed an ACTD program to “address operational utility and operational cost
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effectiveness with minimal technical risk” (Aspin, 1994, as cited in South, 2003, p. 14).
Those tenets of the program that spawned today’s ubiquitous, Predator and Global Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicle (GAO, 1999; “On the Fast Track,” 2005) operations, for
example, remain unchanged since 1994.
Advanced concept technology demonstrations are “extremely important
precursor[s] to...[what might be] formal acquisition processes” (Bachkosky, 1997, p. 54)
involving certain types of military systems. They offer military users “try-before-buy”
(Payton, 2006, p. 11) opportunities to operate prototype systems, explore prototype
capabilities derived from those systems, judge prototype system effectiveness and
suitability, and so influence related acquisition decisions that may follow. “Specifically,
ACTDs focus on the question, ‘Is there a near-term solution, based on mature technology,
that provides a useful and cost-effective response to ...[a particularly notable] military
need?’” (Perdue, 1997, p. 18). The ACTD process is not intended as “a substitute for the
formal acquisition system required to introduce.. .weapons systems such as ships, tanks,
.. .aircraft, ...or other[s]... [not involving].. .substantial modification of operational
concepts or procedures” (Perry, 1995, as cited in South, 2003, p. 16). It is, instead, a
mechanism for blending “technology, .. .advanced concepts, tactics, techniques, and
procedures” (Payton, 2002, p. 72) to satisfy “critical military needs” (DoD, no date-a,
Introduction to ACTDs: Focus of ACTDs - User needs section).
Demonstrations allow military operators to gain understanding of demonstration
prototype-derived capabilities postulated as significant. Users develop employment
concepts, or concepts of operations (CONOPS) (Ghambir, 2001; Koumbis, 2006), for
ACTD systems and, through trials of appropriate numbers, assess the military utility of
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capabilities those systems provide (DoD, no date-a, Introduction to ACTDs: Introduction
section, If 4) in concert with developed CONOPS. These processes lead to one of three
demonstration outcomes (DoD, no date-a, Introduction to ACTDs: Introduction section,

1 5 ):
(1) Demonstration systems and associated capabilities may be found militarily effective,
suitable, and required on a scale exceeding that of the demonstration. In such cases
demonstration officials will recommend that additional and possibly refined systems
be procured by formal acquisition means and that assessed prototypes remain in the
military’s possession to provide interim capabilities;
(2) Demonstration systems and associated capabilities may be found militarily effective
and suitable but required only to an extent already satisfied by residual prototypes.
Demonstration officials will recommend against additional acquisitions in those
cases; or
(3) Assessors may adjudge demonstration systems insufficiently useful and recommend
against acquisition or residual system pursuits.
Outcomes realized largely depend on military utility assessments peculiarly designed and
executed for every ACTD.
ACTD MILITARY UTILITY ASSESSMENTS
The “primary purpose of an ACTD is to allow the user to evaluate the military
utility of a [technology prototype-fostered] capability being considered in response to a
critical military need, and to do so prior to a decision by DoD to acquire that capability”
(DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Transition - Test and Evaluation - Assessment of
Military Utility section). Given that critical military needs may include counters to new
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5
threats, significant improvements in current mission performance, or wholly new
approaches to warfare (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans Objective section), military utility assessments aim to characterize demonstration systems
in terms of two questions:
(1)
(2)

What can it do? In other words, is it effective?

Can it be operated and maintained by the user? In other words, is it suitable?

(Perdue, 1997; DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Transition - Test and Evaluation Assessment of Military Utility section). These questions must be answered using
ACTDs’ three most essential, analytical components of critical operational issues,
measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance (DoD, no date-a, ACTD
Guidelines: Transition - Test and Evaluation - Assessment of Military Utility section):
(a) Critical operational issues (COI). Incontrovertible, user-identified requirements for
mission success or, equivalently, “show stoppers” (Sproles, 2002, p. 257) that “if
not.. .addressed... [to assessors’ satisfaction] will make... [ACTDs] unacceptable on
functional grounds” (Sproles, 2001, p. 147);
(b) Measures of effectiveness (MOE). “High level indicators of operational
effectiveness or suitability (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans Concept and Technical Approach - Measures of Effectiveness [MoE] and Measures
of Performance [MoP] section); “the engines of (test and evaluation)” (Sproles,
2002, p. 257); and standards directly derived by users from COIs, independent of
systems under evaluation and against which should be assessed the performance
(Sproles, 2000, 2001, 2002) of ACTD prototypes; and
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(c) Measures o f performance (MOP). “Technical characteristics that determine a
particular aspect of effectiveness or suitability (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines:
Management Plans - Concept and Technical Approach - Measures of Effectiveness
[MoE] and Measures of Performance [MoP] section), evaluations of “internal”
(Sproles, 2001, p. 146) functions, and the system performance values that are judged
against MOEs (Sproles, 2000, 2001,2002) in efforts to assess demonstration system
effectiveness and suitability.
With COI identification a strict charge of military operators and MOPs mere evaluations
of ACTD prototype attributes, it is left for utility assessments to apply MOEs providing
“the maximum opportunity to demonstrate... [any prototype] utility... [and operational]
synergy” (Arnold and Kujawa, 1999, p. 34) realized when employing demonstration
systems within settings replicating military operations (GAO, 2002). Effectiveness
measures normally represent formulations “heavily dependent on creative thought”
(Sproles, 2002, p. 257) of subject matter experts, but a MOE development process that
respects key features of complex military systems, or military systems of systems, might
more reliably channel expert creativity toward attributes of consistency, thoroughness,
and realism officially endorsed for utility assessments (GAO, 2002).
THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS METASYSTEM
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program guidelines cite three
classes of demonstrations. Class I ACTDs typically address information systems pursued
to meet very specific needs that can be met with system quantities roughly those used for
demonstrations. Class II ACTDs involve weapon or sensor systems, such as the Predator
and Global Hawk, similar to many procured through formal means (DoD, no date-a,
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ACTD Guidelines: Transition - Classes of ACTDs section) but novel in terms of
capabilities provided. Class III ACTDs are termed “systems of systems” (DoD, no
date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Transition - Classes of ACTDs section,

3) demonstrations

because they comprise combinations of: already-fielded, or legacy, systems; systems not
yet fielded but being acquired; and systems drawn from the technology base, such as
those that could be categorized as Class I or II if assessed alone. The system of systems
nature of Class III ACTDs effectively mandates that their assessments accommodate
system and process integration issues associated with the demonstrations’ own
components, but this concern can be generalized to endorse MUAs accommodating
integration issues attendant to all ACTDs as they are evaluated in settings replicating the
complex and hierarchically superior systems of systems, the metasystems (Keating et al.,
2003; Keating, Sousa-Poza, & Mun, 2004, Keating, Sousa-Poza, & Kovacic, 2005) of
joint, or multi-U.S. military service, operations (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines:
Formulation, Selection, and Initiation - Objective section, f 2) with which demonstration
prototypes or their derivatives can be ultimately incorporated (DoD, no date-a).
“There is no clear, common, definition of ‘systems of systems’” (DoD, 1999,
p. 44). “The term .. .means different things to different people” (DoD, 1999, p. 43), but
recent literature (Carlock & Fenton, 2001; Chen & Clothier, 2003; DoD, 1999; Eisner,
Marciniak, & McMillan, 1991; Keating et al., 2003; Keating et al., 2004; Luman, 1998;
Maier, 1999; Sage & Cuppan, 2001) evinces a confluence of complex system concepts
relevant to ACTD assessment design and described with this study’s most important
terms in Appendix A:
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■

Integrating complex systems - “many of which... [may not be] well integrated
themselves” (DoD, 1999, p. 43) - to effectively serve joint military operations is a
daunting task (Sage & Cuppan, 2001) of equally challenging implications for the
measurement of integration success;

■

Assessments of joint military operations metasystems must “accurately (reflect)
joint operations” (DoD, 1999, p. 44), including CONOPS (Carlock & Fenton, 2001);

■

Joint military operations are executed by what may be considered sociotechnical,
military metasystems of prominent social (such as individual and organizational
attitudes or relationships among distinct commands) and technical (such as
command structures, equipment, or knowledge required for military missions)
components. Advanced concept technology demonstrations mark attempts to
consequentially redesign military operations metasystems, with redesign the central
theme of a sociotechnical systems theory espousing balances of social and technical
components (Keating, Jacobs, Sousa-Poza, & Pyne, 2001);

■

Joint military operations metasystems are continuously evolving and heterogeneous
sets of legacy and new systems, with every system defined by its own operational,
economic, political, technical, or other attributes (Carlock & Fenton, 2001; Chen &
Clothier, 2003; Keating et al., 2003; Maier, 1999; Sage & Cuppan, 2001) and
interacting with others in complex and myriad ways (Keating et al., 2003);

■

Assessment designs must consider truly optimal, metasystem configurations as
fallacies precluded by metasystems’ ever-evolving nature and environmental factors
such as threat. Design processes should emphasize satisfactory configurations to be
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identified by assessed systems’ intended users (Keating et al., 2003; Kwok, Ma,
Vogel, & Zhou, no date);
■

Assessment designs must concede and accommodate high degrees of ambiguity and
uncertainty regarding metasystems addressed (Keating et al., 2003);

■

Assessment designs should pursue what Keating, Sousa-Poza, and Kovacic (2005)
have termed phased system changes that respect anticipated effects of ACTDs upon
the military operations metasystems with which they could be incorporated.
The foregoing list and earlier text illuminate two ACTD MUA design principles

that most motivated this research:
■

To design military utility assessments able to adequately measure effectiveness and
suitability of demonstration prototypes, the ACTD program tenet regarding minimal
technical risk must be expanded to one emphasizing “all types of risk” (Tchankova,
2002, p. 294) - such as organizational or operational as well as technical - possible
when incorporating prototypes with joint military operations metasystems; and

■

As with all ACTD assessment activities, MUA design processes should respect
end-user perspectives in identifying risks of incorporating ACTD prototypes with
joint military operations metasystems. Assessment design schemes should therefore
employ analytical methods suited to the ambiguities and other o f what have been
termed “fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338) manifestations of the cognition and language
(Btiyiikozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; Karwowski & Mital, 1986) with which end-users
would craft and express their perspectives.

These two principles prompted a research effort that merged methods of risk assessment
and fuzzy set theory to yield a fuzzy approach to risk assessment and a methodology for
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identifying the measures of effectiveness integral to advanced concept technology
demonstration military utility assessment design.
RESEARCH PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS
The purpose of this research was to develop and deploy a methodology for
identifying measures of effectiveness integral to advanced concept technology
demonstration military utility assessment design. The purpose implied two objectives:
developing a literature-based methodology with which can be identified measures of
effectiveness integral to ACTD MUA design; and deploying that methodology to gauge
its worth to ACTD MUA design. Those two objectives prompted three questions that
steered the research effort:
(1) How might joint military operations metasystem models guide the identification of
ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?
(2) How might be developed and employed joint military operations metasystem models
with which can be identified ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?
(3) How useful might ACTD managers and analysts find the MUA design methodology
developed and deployed with this research?
Once developed, the methodology was deployed to synthesize from joint military
operations literature and expert group perspectives a joint military operations metasystem
model suited to a simulated ACTD. Given that model and additional deliberations of the
operations expert group, the methodology next identified a group preference of
prioritized risks associated with fielding the simulated ACTD and from which could be
derived measures of effectiveness needed to assess the demonstration’s military utility.
The methodology and its deployment results were lastly reviewed by a distinct expert
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group of ACTD managers and analysts who evaluated the methodology’s potential
contribution to ACTD MUA design. Figure 1 represents the framework of inquiry that
guided this dissertation’s research.

Figure 1. Framework of Inquiry
Purpose o f the Research
Develop and deploy a methodology for identifying measures of
effectiveness integral to advanced concept technology
demonstration (ACTD) military utility assessment (MUA)
design.

Research Objectives
Develop a literature-based
methodology with which can be
identified measures o f effectiveness
integral to ACTD MUA design.

Deploy the methodology and gauge its
value for ACTD MUA design.

Research Questions

How might joint
military operations
metasystem models
guide the identification
o f ACTD MUA
measures o f
effectiveness?

How might be
developed and
employed joint military
operations metasystem
models with which can
be identified ACTD
MUA measures o f
effectiveness?

How useful might
ACTD managers and
analysts find the MUA
design methodology
developed and
deployed with this
research?

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This research contributed to the theory, methodology, and practice associated with
joint military operations metasystem transformations driven by new technology and
process insertion. In doing that, it also suggested a set of theoretical, methodological, and
practical considerations regarding assessments of similar transformations applied to other
types of metasystems.
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The study explored boundaries among theories regarding research in the fields of
complex systems, risk, and fuzzy sets. It revealed undeniable links among those domains
and forced consideration of synergies to be gained by exploiting them. It recognized the
utility of fuzzy set theory in describing epistemic risk so prominent in complex system
settings, and its emphasis upon risk, in particular, identified considerations pertinent to
the recognition of failure modes of complex systems.
The work demonstrated a valid, risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology for ACTD
military assessment design, and in doing so provided a flexible yet common scheme for
assessments quite unlike the ad hoc approaches previously used. The methodology itself
promoted a merger of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory that reflected theoretical
findings regarding the inextricability of fuzzy approaches to particular risk settings, and
the methodology’s deployment under an action research format endorsed the efficacy of
that qualitative scheme for assessment design efforts.
The research lastly and perhaps most significantly contributed to practice. The
MUA design methodology produced offers ACTD program executives, managers, and
analysts a standard they concede as lacking and necessary. A corollary product of the
research, a practitioner’s guide, can rigorously enable the identification and emplacement
of measures o f effectiveness fundamental to ACTD MUA designs or designs needed for
assessments of ACTD-like enterprises. Indeed, the methodology and its derivative
techniques suggest means with which complex system transformations of many kinds especially those planned by small numbers of subject matter experts constrained by
limited, evaluation resources - can be anticipated.
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LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The research described here was delimited in several ways and for several
reasons. Limitations of research processes and results were partly attributable to the
delimitations imposed.
Delimitations constrained the research scope and primarily comprised restrictions
upon methodology deployment. The methodology was applied to only a single,
simulated, joint operations ACTD derived from a single, actual, joint operations ACTD.
This restriction was emplaced because it honored the distinctiveness of individual
demonstrations while still satisfying research questions. The methodology was applied
by a small group of joint military operations experts of backgrounds less diverse than that
normally espoused in the literature, a conscious research concession to the homogeneity
of the U.S. military officer corps and the arguably often limited availability of more
heterogeneous groups to ACTD managers and analysts. Lastly, the operations expert
group pursued just one cycle of an action research process conventionally iterative but
restricted in this research to suitably exercise the proposed methodology without unduly
taxing valuable resources personified by volunteer members of the expert group.
Most research limitations of greatest significance directly reflected or derived
from delimitations established. The methodology’s single application to a single
(simulated) ACTD kept the research scope manageable but simultaneously opened to
challenge the generalization of research findings. So, too, could be criticized the study’s
use of a small and purposively selected group of military operations experts drawn,
however carefully, from an expert pool many times larger. The single iteration of an
action research-based MUA design scheme could prompt concerns regarding the
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completeness of the proposed methodology’s deployment results, though such concerns
might be blunted by arguments emphasizing the proof-of-concept nature of the
deployment over comprehensiveness of the results. Likewise, plausible criticisms of the
study’s use of purposively selected, joint operations ACTD managers and analysts would
have to overcome the reality that the expert sample used constituted a statistically
significant portion - perhaps as high as 50% - of a very small population of joint
operations ACTD experts largely known and available to the researcher.
A possible limitation independent of delimitations imposed could derive from
researcher assumptions regarding factors most consequential to MUA design. Should the
nine factors identified in the literature and employed for methodology development
constitute other than a necessary and sufficient set, the design methodology itself could
suffer challenge.
SUMMARY
The U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
program is intended to provide rapid and low-risk solutions to critical military operations
problems, yet it offers no rigorous methodology for designing military utility assessments
of demonstration systems. This research sought to correct that deficiency by developing
and deploying a joint military operations metasystem-oriented methodology to identify
measures of effectiveness required of ACTD MUA designs. The research was steered by
three questions:
(1) How might joint military operations metasystem models guide the identification of
ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?;
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(2) How might be developed and employed joint military operations metasystem models
with which can be identified ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?; and
(3) How useful might ACTD managers and analysts find the MUA design methodology
developed and deployed with this research?
Joint military operations metasystem characteristics pertinent to advanced concept
technology demonstrations were identified and in turn promoted the identification of two
principles of ACTD MUA design: that assessments address all types of risk - such as
organizational or operational as well as technical risk - possible when incorporating
demonstration prototypes with superior and complex, joint military operations systems;
and that MUA design processes employ analytical schemes suited to fuzzy manifestations
of human cognition and language that will be encountered during design phases. These
two principles and the three research questions drove a thorough literature review.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
This dissertation research rested on two premises: that ACTD military utility
assessments should account for principal risks associated with deploying demonstration
systems and associated CONOPS within standing, military operations metasystems of
relevance; and that the identification of principal risks to metasystem operations must
accommodate the ambiguities and other “fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338) characteristics of
human cognition and language (Buyukozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; Karwowski & Mital,
1986) inseparable from the subject matter expert (SME) judgments needed to identify and
evaluate metasystem risks. A literature review determined that these premises could
foster an original and significant contribution to the extant body of relevant research.
The literature is witness to an abundance of risk assessment study and practice. It
attests to an equal abundance of study and practice regarding fuzzy set theory. The rich
and ever-growing offerings of both fields of literature provided this study the thread to
stitch together a logical methodology for ACTD MUA design. A smaller but equally
instructive body of material addressing mergers of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory fuzzy approaches to risk assessment - further endorsed this work’s premises and served
as a first step in channeling the research toward literature deficiencies as evident as the
abundance of risk or fuzzy set treatments. Additional steps certified that this study would
remove some of those deficiencies.
The literature suffers from inattention to the utility of risk assessment and fuzzy
set theory, singly or together, within contexts true to joint military operations. Military
operations evaluations seem seldom to have been made using methods, techniques, or
tools of either field. Published literature regarding ACTD MUA design even more rarely
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addresses what this research presumed to be markedly supportive aspects of risk
assessment, fuzzy set theory, and complex system-based approaches to design. That
paucity of pertinent literature illuminated the need for a risk- and fuzzy set-based
methodology for advanced concept technology demonstration military utility assessment
design.
RELEVANCE OF RISK ASSESSMENT
“ACTDs are intended primarily to explore operational... [effectiveness and
suitability] issues of mature technologies; high technical risk is normally not acceptable”
(DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans - Concept and Technical
Approach - Technical Risk Assessment section). Demonstration planning must
nevertheless account for technical risks together with others such as the acceptability of
schemes - the CONOPS - envisioned for employment of demonstration prototypes. All
“risks must be identified and accepted by the primary stakeholders in the ACTD prior to
its initiation” (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Formulation, Selection and Initiation Formulation and Submission section, 1[ 10). This emphasis upon risk permeates the
ACTD program as it does all U.S. defense system acquisition processes (DoD, 2003a,
2003b, 2003c). It supports a notion that military utility assessment designs could or even
should be risk-based.
“Risk-based decisionmaking and risk-based approaches in decisionmaking are
terms frequently used to indicate that some systematic process that deals with
uncertainties is being used to formulate.. .options and assess their various impacts and
ramifications” (Haimes, 2004, p. 3). While often applied for purposes of policy
development, risk-based decision processes need not be so restricted. “Risk analysis is
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always part of a decision context” (Aven & Korte, 2002) and has been at least twice
applied to determine the scope of operational testing and evaluation (Thompson &
Montagne, 1998) required for military systems being procured with traditional
acquisition mechanisms. The efficacy of a risk-based approach to ACTD MUA design
becomes even more apparent with review of risk-related definitions and risk assessment
conventions.
FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk is perhaps most often defined as a function of likelihood and consequence
(Bedford & Cooke, 2001; DoD, 2003c; Haimes, 1998, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981;
Kaplan, Haimes, & Garrick, 2001; Kosmowski, 2000; Kujawski, 2002; Thompson &
Montagne, 1998). Within Department of Defense publications frequently used by ACTD
managers, risk is defined as “a measure of the potential inability to achieve overall
program objectives” (DoD, 2003c, p. 7), a definition those same managers could
plausibly be expected to interpret as a demonstration’s potential inability to perform well
against MUA measures of effectiveness. Two additional and important definitions
presented within the context of the ACTD program include:
■

Risk events are events that, should they occur, might limit capabilities otherwise
achievable with ACTD prototypes and which therefore warrant assessment in terms
of the two major risk components of likelihood and consequence (DoD, 2003c); and

■

Risk assessment is the process of first identifying risk events (Tchankova, 2002;
Williams, 1995) and then analyzing them for their criticality to military utility (DoD,
2003c). The process is intended to answer three questions: (a) What can go wrong?;
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(b) What is the likelihood that it will?; and (c) What would be the consequences if it
does? (Haimes, 1991, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981).
Like the development of a demonstration’s MOEs, the identification and analysis of risk
events is a process the DoD intends be accomplished in concert with experts in military
operations and related endeavors (DoD, 2003c).
RELEVANCE OF FUZZY SET THEORY
Zadeh’s (1965) seminal exposition has spawned more than four decades of
additional research regarding fuzzy set theory and derivative theories and applications
such as fuzzy numbers, linguistic variables, and evidence and possibility theory (Bae,
Grandhi, & Canfield, 2004; Bender and Simonovic, 2000; Dubois, Prade, & Smets, 2001;
Fedrizzi, 1987; Kangari & Riggs, 1989; Terano, Asai, & Sugeno, 1992; Zadeh, 1996).
Fuzzy set theory has been applied to fields as diverse as business project selection and
management, large-scale systems engineering and analysis, computer-aided design,
meteorology, medical diagnoses, decision-making for security trading and many other
purposes, human reliability, and robotic control of common systems as large as trains and
aircraft and as small as toaster ovens and video camcorders (Bender and Simonovic,
2000; Dutta, 1993; Karwowski & Mital, 1986; Klir & Folger, 1988; Kuchta, 2001;
Machacha & Bhattacharya, 2000; Mon, Cheng, & Lu, 1995; Perincherry, Kikuchi, &
Hamamatsu, 1994; Terano et al., 1992; Wang & Chang, 1980). Research closely
resembling that conducted with this effort has explored generalized risk engineering and
assessment (Cai, 1996; Kangari & Riggs, 1989; Karwowski & Mital, 1986), software
operational risk assessments (Xu, Khoshgoftaar, & Allen, 2003), and military exercise
reconstruction (Parsons, 1989). With its now widely-acknowledged utility for resolving
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ambiguities and imprecision in human thought and language (Gue, 2002; Kangari &
Riggs, 1989; Liao, Celmins, & Hammell, 2002; Lin & Chen, 2004), fuzzy set theory
bears significantly on processes central to ACTD military utility assessment design.
Zadeh (1965) and countless following practitioners have purported fuzzy set
theory’s usefulness in defining and manipulating typically human evaluations such as
“approximately 5 kg,” “short experience,” and “hot” weather (Parsons, 1989; Tah,
Thorpe, & McCaffer, 1993; Weiss, 2001), evaluations imprecise not for the aleatory
uncertainty precipitated by random variables of classic probability but for the epistemic
uncertainty (Bae et al., 2004; Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Quelch & Cameron, 1994;
Williams, 1995) derived from “the absence of sharply defined criteria of class
membership” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 339). A logical extension of these claims would have the
discipline support the understanding of “military utility” or other descriptors such as
“unacceptable” consequence, “frequent” likelihood, and “high risk” that could be
intuitively and easily used by experts (Huang, Chen, & Wang, 2001; Karwowski & Mital,
1986) assessing ACTD risks. Since MUA designers can be expected to construct
assessments that will draw upon deterministic (for example, certain prototype component
costs or threat system parameters) as well as probabilistic (such as historical weather data
pertinent to prototype missions) data, it is plausible to view fuzzy methods as necessary
to a suite of methods that assessment designs should offer assessors to evaluate the mixes
of deterministic, probabilistic, and fuzzy data (Cai, 1996; Zaras, 2003) those assessors
will routinely encounter. That such mixes will routinely comprise sizable proportions of
subject matter expertise and other fuzzy data (Quelch & Cameron, 1994) manifests in
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four traits of new commercial product development (Lin & Chen, 2004) readily
translatable to terms appropriate for ACTD military utility assessments:
(1) much of the information available to MUA designers is uncertain or incomplete;
(2) the prototype threat and operational environments are marked by uncertainty and
rapid changes in technologies and missions;
(3) criteria for military utility are not always quantifiable or comparable, and may
directly conflict or interact;
(4) multiple groups of interested parties, each with a different perspective, should be
accommodated in MUA design processes and therefore render them like so many of
the multicriteria and multi-attribute decision processes to which fuzzy set theory has
been applied for decades (Bender & Simonovic, 2000; Buyukozkan & Feyzioglu,
2003; Enea & Piazza, 2004; Ghyym, 1999; Ibrahim, 1991: Li & Yen, 1995; Lin &
Chen, 2004; Roubens & Vincke, 1987; Whalen, 1987; Zaras, 2003; Zimmerman,
1996).
A description of fuzzy set theory fundamentals further buttresses the theory’s place in
MUA design.
FUNDAMENTALS OF FUZZY SET THEORY
Traditional theory regarding what are termed “crisp” sets holds that members of
some universal set strictly are or are not wholly contained within any subset of the
universal set (Zimmerman, 1996). For example, each of the three elements of the crisp
set A of counting numbers, {1, 2, 3}, a subset of the universal set U of counting numbers,
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...}, are wholly contained within set A; the universal set’s remaining
counting numbers of 4, 5, 6, ... are not elements of set A. Such a thoroughly
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unambiguous approach using distinct set boundaries cannot support mathematics
appropriate for analyzing fuzzy concepts so prevalent in human cognition and language;
but fuzzy set theory does seem able to do so (Li & Yen, 1995).
Fuzzy set theory allows set elements partial - and hence, fuzzy - membership in a
set. Formally,
DEFINITION 1. A fuzzy setzi of elements, x, on a given universe U is a
set of ordered pairs such that
A = { (x, tw(x)) | x e U }, where
(44 (x)

6 [0, 1]

is the membership function of x or grade of membership of x in the fuzzy
set, A.
For example, a fuzzy set defining old-aged persons in discrete terms of decades of life
between 10 and 80 could be represented as (Klir & Folger, 1988)
old = { (10, 0.0), (20, 0.1), (30, 0.3), (40, 0.4), (50, 0.6), (60, 0.7), (70, 0.8), (80, 1)},
while a similar but continuous set might be expressed as (Biiyukbzkan & Feyzioglu,
2003)
0,
old

x -1 0
70
1,

x<10
10 < x < 80
x> 8 0 .

Note that unlike the somewhat analogous, density functions of classic probability, the
membership values of elements of fuzzy sets need not sum to unity, and this total
relaxation of a tenet of probability theory promotes fuzzy set theory as the better vehicle
for mathematically representing the vagaries of risk assessments in situations devoid of
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data sufficient for application of the former (Quelch & Cameron, 1994). Note, too,
however, that identification of membership functions has been long held as problematic.
“The issue of membership function generation is vital to ... [every] fuzzy set
theory.. .application [that] depends on the membership function used” (Liao et al., 2002,
p. 242). Such functions can be estimated from data when it is available, but must often
be assumed a priori by theorists and practitioners (Medaglia, Fang, Nuttle, & Wilson,
2002). There is neither universal agreement on characteristics required of membership
functions (Medaglia et al., 2002) nor even uniformity in interpreting the meaning of
membership grades (Dubois & Prade, 1997). Much research has been and continues to
be dedicated to resolving the membership function dilemma, but the dilemma apparently
remains (Ayyub, 2001; Comelissen, van den Berg, Koops, & Kaymak, 2002; Liao et al.,
2002; McCauley-Bell & Badiru, 1996a; Mendoza & Prabhu, 2003; Norwich & Turksen,
1984; Turksen, 1991).
Equally integral to fuzzy set theory but far less problematic than membership
functions are the corollary concepts of a-cuts and cut-sets, A a, “especially useful
for. ..arithmetic operations on fuzzy numbers” (Btiyukozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003, p. 43).
The cut-set, A a, of a fuzzy set, A , may be formally expressed as (Biiyukdzkan &
Feyzioglu, 2003)
DEFINITION 2.

A a = { x e U \ ^l a (x ) > a }
for a e [0, 1] and pi(jc) e [0, 1],

with an a-cut simply the minimum membership value on the interval [0, 1] that every
member of the cut-set, A a, o f A must hold.
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Definitions 1 and 2 are as fundamental to the MUA design principles of this
research as they are to fuzzy set theory, itself. They make apparent a link between fuzzy
operations and epistemic risk that in turn promotes fuzzy approaches to risk assessment.
FUZZY APPROACHES TO RISK ASSESSMENT
The literature abounds with treatments of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory. A
body of material far smaller than that dedicated to either field concerns mergers of the
two: fuzzy approaches to risk assessment. Such approaches served both to presage and
refine the scope of this work.
Carroll (1983) may have been among the first to endorse the use of fuzzy methods
expressly for risk analyses, particularly for the analyses of complex problems strongly
characterized by uncertainty. Karwowski and Mital (1986) shortly afterward echoed the
aspect of uncertainty by noting “risk (as) a fuzzy concept in that there does not exist a
unique risk that a hazardous event will occur in a given period of time” (p. 106). Others
have also endorsed the suitability of fuzzy methods for many risk assessment constructs
traditionally employed only with probability techniques the fuzzy set theorists considered
insidiously too exact (Quelch & Cameron, 1994; de Ru & Eloff, 1996; Tah et al. 1993;
Yager, 2002; Zimmerman, 1983).
Fuzzy approaches to classic risk assessment-related methods and techniques such
as: critical path method (Kaufmann & Gupta, 1988); program evaluation and review
(Mon et al., 1995); fault tree analysis (Terano et al., 1992); event tree analysis (Cho,
Choi, & Kim, 2002; Huang et al., 2001); failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis
(Bowles & Pelaez, 1995); and quantitative risk analysis (Quelch & Cameron, 1994) have
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been explored during the past two decades. Fuzzy risk assessment methods have also
been deployed that share no links with probabilistic convention.
Fuzzy set theory has been suggested as a means to address some of this nation’s
most public topics related to risk. Five years after Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island
incident, Yeh (1984) proposed that fuzzy set theory - precisely, fuzzy ranking schemes be used to assess nuclear power plant fire risks. Cornelissen et al. (2002) demonstrated a
fuzzy approach to assessing risks inherent in agricultural production systems upon which
the United States so greatly depends. Karwowski and Mital (1986) identified numerous
industrial safety engineering applications of fuzzy concepts, McCauley-Bell and Badiru
(1996a, 1996b) applied the same to the slightly more refined topic of occupational
injuries in workplaces, and Merilan (1996) portrayed fuzzy set theory as a potent, risk
assessment tool for epidemiologists. Demonstrated, too, have been business applications
of importance to the nation’s economic health.
Serguieva and Hunter (2004) suggested fuzzy set theory as a means to appraise
business investment risks. That proposal complemented and was in large part made
plausible by preceding research regarding the multi-industry applicability of fuzzy
methods to countless problems rooted in epistemic uncertainties of information or
information flow (Kaufmann & Gupta, 1988; Klir & Folger, 1988; Zimmerman, 1996),
conceptual design evaluation (Smith & Verma, 2004; Verma, Smith, & Fabrycky, 1999),
major system design firm performance prediction (Sun, 2000), major system design
performance prediction (Buyukozkan and Feyzioglu, 2003; Chen, 2001; Ibrahim, 1991),
project selection (Enea & Piazza, 2004), major system operations risks (Xu et al., 2003),
supplier evaluations (Tsai, 1999), the risks of selling certain consumer goods (Lin &
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Chen, 2004; Liu, 1996), and general project risks of many sorts (Grabot, Blanc, & Binda,
1996; Gue, 2002; Jones, 2001; Kangari & Riggs, 1989; Kuchta, 2001; Liberatore, 2002;
Machacha & Bhattacharya, 2000; Tamimi, 1989; Wells, 1997; Zaras, 2003).
These cited and other mergers of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory channeled
this research effort, with other elements of the literature providing further refinement.
The balance of relevant literature addressed ACTD MUA design methodologies,
approaches to complex system analysis and transformation, risk-based and fuzzy
approaches to military operations assessments, small expert group and group decision
characteristics, and fuzzy risk prioritization schemes.
ADDITIONAL RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature displays a paucity of research and convention directly applicable to
development of an ACTD MUA design methodology. To construct a methodology of
value, therefore, fundamentally-pertinent topics of risk assessment, fuzzy set theory, and
fuzzy approaches to risk assessment must be largely supplemented by literature related
only indirectly to critical aspects of ACTD assessment: literature, for example, that
illuminates complex system analysis and transformation attributes bearing on assessment
design; literature respecting military operations; and literature addressing key elements of
small group decision processes integral to MUA design, such as group composition,
group size, proclivity for agreement among group members, and means by which
decisions of any level of accord may be rendered in the face of ambiguity or uncertainty
typically associated with decision criteria.
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ACTD MUA Design Methodologies
Little official, government literature directly addresses the question of how to
design an advanced concept technology demonstration military utility assessment, and
directives that do exist focus on assessment conduct rather than design. Unofficial
proposals for MUA design compensate somewhat for the paucity of Defense Department
guidelines, but these unofficial suggestions collectively provide more for concept- than
for methodology-level needs.
The Department of Defense unequivocally mandates that typically limited, ACTD
resources be directed toward determining “how effectively (a) capability under evaluation
performs (an) intended mission and how suitable [that capability] is.. .for use in military
operations” (DoD, no date-a, ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans - Concept and
Technical Approach - Measures of Effectiveness [MoE] and Measures of Performance
[MoP] section). Department guidance additionally stipulates those determinations to be
made with respect to measures of effectiveness identified during demonstration planning
stages by intended users assisted by military utility assessment agents (DoD, no date-a,
ACTD Guidelines: Management Plans - Concept and Technical Approach - Measures of
Effectiveness [MoE] and Measures of Performance [MoP] section). These few official
dictates are complemented by military- and nonmilitary-related literature sourced beyond
the confines of the Department of Defense.
Arnold and Kujawa (1999) emphasize systems of systems aspects of ACTD MUA
design in offering a methodology for identifying effectiveness measures derived by
military users and assessment analysts from the highest-level definitions of success in
missions that individual ACTDs aim to support. Arnold (no date) and others refine that
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approach by suggesting that joint ACTD MOEs be directly derived with subject matter
expertise from critical operational issues (Arnold, 1998; Elliott, Madden, & Dean, 1997;
Luman, 1998; Luman & Scotti, 1996; Singleton, Luman, & Rapport, 1998; Sproles 2000,
2001, 2002; The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory [JHU/APL],
2000; JHU/APL, 2004; U.S. Atlantic Command [USACOM], 1998) in turn drawn from
the Universal Joint Task List (DoD, 2002) of mission tasks assigned U.S. joint military
forces (Arnold, no date; Singleton et al., 1998). Additional military and nonmilitary
works (Arnold, 1998; Bahill & Briggs, 2001; Carlock & Fenton, 2001; Enea & Piazza,
2004; Ghyym, 1999; Haimes, 2004; JHU/APL, 2000, 2004; Lin & Chen, 2004; Longstaff
& Haimes, 2002; Luman, 1998; Sproles, 2001; USACOM, 1998; Verma, Smith, &
Fabrycky, 1999) indirectly reinforce the importance to MOE identification of CONOPS
and system of system perspectives, particularly when attempts to upgrade complex
sociotechnical metasystems entail the use and related risks of what are termed
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies (Bahill & Briggs, 2001; Chung & Cooper,
2003; Luman, 1998; JHU/APL, 2000) so prominent in the ACTD program. Significantly,
none of these offerings specify or even imply other than Sproles’ (2002) earlier-cited,
“creative thought” (p. 257) method for identifying effectiveness measures; but Thompson
and Montagne (1998) do provide the specificity upon which this research quite strongly
depends.
Thompson and Montagne (1998) perhaps alone have challenged a serious
literature deficiency by illustrating a “risk assessment process.. .(to) plan operational
tests” (p. 42) in accordance with DoD (2000) prescriptions for formalized, operational
testing. Those authors’ method for designing operational tests and evaluations of military
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command and control systems might serve as an example for designing deliberately less
formal (GAO, 2002), ACTD assessments. Their employment of user-developed, risk
assessments as first steps toward MOE identification might be repeated by ACTD MUA
managers and designers. Just as important to repeat might be three more aspects of the
Thompson and Montagne formula:
(1) a “user community... intimately familiar with... [demonstration] system requirements
and.. .therefore the best group to assess the mission impact of a failure to meet each
requirement” (p. 44);
(2) a “level of (assessment).. .sufficient to provide high confidence among the entire
(user) community that...(assessment) results properly (reflect).. .operational
effectiveness and suitability” (p. 46) of the assessed capability, without wasting
resources that might be otherwise wasted with differently-designed assessment
plans; and
(3) a level of user involvement strongly supporting the identification of risks across all
domains relevant to military operations metasystems of interest.
This third aspect also figures prominently in complex system analyses and transformation
approaches quite pertinent to the development of a methodology for ACTD MUA design.
Approaches to Complex System Analysis and Transformation
The literature supports a presumption that joint military operations should be
analyzed and transformed as complex metasystems with all metasystem characteristics
typically attendant. While only a tiny fraction of relevant literature (Arnold and Kujawa,
1999; Luman, 1998; Luman & Scotti, 1996) directly supports that notion’s application to
ACTDs, a larger body of military- and nonmilitary-related work does indirectly secure
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the validity of holistic, complex system-based approaches to analysis and transformation
that ACTDs can impose on sociotechnical, joint operations systems of systems.
Holistic, complex system analyses depend on holistic, complex system modeling
that places a primacy on characteristics distinguishing complex systems from simple
ones. These characteristics include sociotechnical constructs postulated by numerous
researchers (Clegg, 2000; Einarsson & Rausand, 1998; Elzen, Enserink, & Smit, 1996;
Gregoriades, Sutcliffe, & Shin, 2003; Haimes, 2004; Keating et al., 2001; Keating et al.,
2005; Kosmowski, 2000; Kosmowski & Kwiesielewicz, 2002; Longstaff & Haimes,
2002; Sage & Cuppan, 2001; Williams, 1999), a principle holding that different
perspectives will generally foster different models of any complex system (Enea &
Piazza, 2004; Haimes, 2004; Keating et al., 2003; Newbem & Nolte, 1999; Pennock &
Haimes, 2002), and what many (Beckerman, 2000; Calvano & John, 2003; Chen and
Clothier, 2003; Keating et al., 2004; Williams, 1999) have described as dynamic behavior
and “system properties that ‘emerge’ from the synthesis of interactions between
components, at each level of interconnection within” (Beckerman, 2000, p. 98) any
complex system. The importance of such characteristics influences the transformation as
well as the analysis of complex systems.
Complex system transformation - an activity that perfectly describes the intent of
any ACTD - most often occurs in environments of attributes familiar to ACTD MUA
managers and designers:
■

Multiple stakeholders related to all component systems.. .with varying interests;

■

High levels of technical complexity;

■

Large scale, broad scope and long term activity;
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■

Change and evolution management (required for many) activities;

■

Various constituent systems featuring independent lifecycles and lines of
responsibility;

■

(Complex system assembly) often (made) at short notice to meet unprecedented
operational needs; [and]

■

The requirement for (complex system) adaptability... [and] flexibility. (Chen &
Clothier, 2003, pp. 173-174)

These environmental factors “both constrain and enable” (Keating et al., 2004, p. 4) the
transformation of complex systems, so complex system transformation efforts should
account for them (Beckerman, 2000; Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005) together
with the closely-related characteristics of complex systems (Clegg, 2000; Elzen et al.,
1996; Gregoriades et al., 2003; Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005; Rouse, 2005).
Plausible accounting tools seem to be risk-based and fuzzy approaches to military
operations and relevant aspects of the environments in which those operations occur.
Risk-based and Fuzzy Approaches to Military Operations Assessments
The literature makes evident no risk assessment or fuzzy set theory-based MUA
design schemes per se, although the operational test and evaluation design proposal of
Thompson and Montagne (1998) quite nearly does offer the former. Military operations
and operations support processes other than those of ACTDs have more often been the
objects of risk-based approaches to assessment.
Risk-based approaches to military operations assessments have perhaps been most
visibly pursued by Haimes (2004) and others (Haimes, Kaplan, & Lambert, 2002;
Lambert, Haimes, Li, Schoof, & Tulsiani, 2001; Lamm & Haimes, 2002; Leung,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
Lambert, & Mosenthal, 2004; Longstaff & Haimes, 2002; Riese, 2001; Riese, Brown, &
Haimes, 2006) who have advanced the concept of a hierarchical, holographic model, or
HHM, aligned with holistic approaches to complex system analysis because of its holistic
(Haimes, 1989,1991) representations of those same systems and associated risks. “The
term, hierarchical refers to the desire to understand what can go wrong at many different
levels of... [a] system hierarchy” (Haimes, 2004, p. 90), with that emphasis on hierarchy
seemingly quite appropriate for addressing strongly hierarchical, military operations
metasystems. The term, holographic “is suggested by holography... .The difference
between holography and conventional photography, which captures only
two-dimensional planar representations of scenes, is analogous to the
differences.. .between conventional mathematical modeling techniques.. .and the HHM
schema” (p. 89) that affords multiple views of a hierarchical system’s multiple
components. The HHM methodology has been frequently applied to military operations
and operations support systems in efforts to determine and assess associated risks.
Haimes (2004) has applied hierarchical holographic modeling to military
operations like those for which ACTDs can be appropriately staged, with applications
ranging from operations support processes such as military system procurement, through
what are termed military operations other than war (MOOTW), to homeland defense
operations. Lambert et al. (2001) have used HHM to model and assess risks associated
with additional, military procurement systems; Haimes, Kaplan, and Lambert (2002)
have used the methodology to model and assess risks of additional MOOTW; and Ozinci,
Singleton, Stobbart, and Zulick (2002) and Leung, Lambert, and Mosenthal (2004) have
applied it to yet more homeland defense issues for which each group determined a set of
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defense priorities for critical highway infrastructure nodes thought vulnerable to terrorist
attacks. Lamm and Haimes (2002) and Longstaff and Haimes (2002) have also applied
HHM to risk-related pursuits regarding the need for military information assurance so
critical to contemporary, joint operations.
The literature reveals a number of fuzzy set theory-based approaches to military
operations assessments far smaller than that evident for risk-based methods. Parsons’
(1989) suggestion of theory utility for military exercise reconstruction and analysis may
be the best example and few, if any, others might be so directly linked.
Zimmerman (1983) was among the first to extol the virtues of fuzzy set theory
vis-a-vis operations research and in so doing can be argued to have first promoted its
applicability to the assessment of military operations. In recognizing the importance of
multi-attribute system concept designs - with their routinely imprecise requirements and
priorities - inextricably linked to the holistic system modeling already described, the
work of Verma, Smith, and Fabrycky (1999) represents a large body of research
(Bellman & Zadeh, 1970; Bollujo, 1996; Buyiikozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; Enea &
Piazza, 2004; Fedrizzi, 1990; Gaines, 1987; Lin & Chen, 2004; Liu, 1996; Machacha &
Bhattacharya, 2000; Perrincherry, Kikuchi, & Hamamatsu, 1994; Smith & Verma, 2004;
Terano, 1992; Whalen, 1987; Zahariev, 1990) that indirectly supports fuzzy set theory’s
place in military operations assessments.
Sm all Expert Group and Group Decision Characteristics
The literature is replete with treatments of large and small expert group decision
functions, especially risk assessment (Aven & Korte, 2002; Ayyub, 2001; Blin, 1974;
Blin 8c Whinston, 1973; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Comelissen et al., 2002; Ghyym,
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1999; Haimes, 2004; Kunreuther & Slovic, 1996; Lin & Chen, 2004; Saaty, 1980, 1987;
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Wang, Sii, Yang, Pillay, Yu, Liu, et al.,
2004; Weiss, 2001). Given “the limited resources available” (DoD, no date-a, ACTD
Guidelines: Management Plans - Concept and Technical Approach - Measures of
Effectiveness [MoE] and Measures of Performance [MoP] section) to ACTD managers,
one can argue the importance of small group risk assessments to ACTD MUA design as
well as the literature-acknowledged pertinence to such assessments of group composition,
group size, and degree of participant agreement regarding decisions often made under the
very uncertainty driving the need for expert perspectives.
Ayyub (2001) advocates expert panels that possess “a balance and broad spectrum
of viewpoints, expertise, technical points of view, and organizational representation”
(p. 242). Clemen and Winkler (1999), too, endorse “heterogeneity among experts (as)
highly desirable” (p. 199), as do Comelissen et al. (2002), though the latter do not wholly
dismiss a place for expert group homogeneity. Other researchers (Bezdek, Spillman, &
Spillman, 1978; Enea & Piazza; Ghymm, 1999; Spillman, Bezdek, & Spillman, 1979)
implicitly emphasize heterogeneity of expert groups with their explicit emphasis upon the
multi-attribute or multicriteria decision processes of groups of experts characterized by
differing viewpoints, expertise, organizational allegiances, and the like.
The proper size for particular, small expert groups assigned particular - perhaps
risk assessment - functions “should be determined on a case-by-case basis....(but also)
be large enough to achieve a needed diversity of opinion, credibility, and result
reliability” (Ayyub, 2001, p. 241). The sizing might also be bounded by parameters
found in the literature.
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Chen’s (2001) approach to evaluating the rate of aggregative risk in software
development employed two experts. Ghyym (1999) employed a three-expert risk
assessment panel, while Chytka (2003) followed by citing an admonition “that combining
the assessments of three experts yields the most advantage to (certain types of group
decision processes).. .(with).. .little to no empirical evidence that adding additional
experts improves...effectiveness” (p. 17). Clemen and Winkler (1999) exceeded the
number three slightly by noting analyses suggesting “three to five experts” (p. 199) to be
optimal in many cases. Small group risk expert assessment panels of sizes 4 (Lin &
Chen, 2004; Wang et al., 2004), 10 (Weiss, 2001), and 7 through 20 (Haimes, 2004) have
also been demonstrated.
Past and current research emphasizes the need for means to measure the level of
agreement among members of small groups of experts attempting to render consolidated,
group decisions of all sorts, including decisions regarding risk. Many authors (Bezdek et
al., 1978; Blin, 1974; Blin & Whinston, 1973; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Fedrizzi, 1990;
Saaty, 1980, 1987; Spillman, Spillman, & Bezdek, 1980; Weiss, 2001; Xu, 2004) indicate
the desirability of measures of small group accord, particularly when group decisions are
subject to ambiguity, uncertainty, or even ignorance of information. Means posited and
practiced to measure degrees of agreement behind small group judgments rendered under
uncertainty have proved valuable accompaniments to proposed or practiced means for
first achieving the small group risk prioritizations such measures of accord might
describe.
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Fuzzy Risk Prioritization Methods
Small group risk assessments demand prioritization schemes by which “individual
preferences on a given set [can be reduced] to a single collective preference” (Fernandez
6 Olmedo, 2004, p. 430), and “the combining process (as part of the overall expert
judgment process) should depend on the details of each individual situation” (Clemen &
Winkler, 1999, p. 199). While many may rarely if ever have been applied to military
operations or similar assessments, the literature does evince group prioritization schemes
aligned with this study’s motivating precept that ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness
be derived from holistic risk assessments accommodating “fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338)
manifestations of assessors’ cognition and language (Buyukozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003;
Karwowski & Mital, 1986). Most demonstrate characteristics that can be used to classify
them as either ordinal scale-type, comparative techniques or cardinal scale-type, direct
ranking techniques, and many of both classifications can be difficult to employ and
produce inconsistent results (Kim & Park, 1990). Cardinal scale-based comparisons, in
particular, are vulnerable to claims that they can force expert evaluators to exceed the
7 ± 2 absolute, unidimensional judgments long considered by many as a limit of human
capacity (Ghyym, 1999: Karwowski & Mital, 1986; Miller, 1956; Mustafa & Al-Bahar,
1991; Saaty, 1980; Wang et al., 2004).
“Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) first considered the possibility of
using fuzzy sets to model the process of group decision making. They constructed a
fuzzy [binary preference] relation over the set of alternatives under consideration by a
group” (Spillman et al., 1980, p. 292) that drew from Zadeh’s (1965, 1971) definition of
such relations as fuzzy collections of ordered pairs associated by membership functions
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describing group confidence in collective, pairwise rankings. Fuzzy, pairwise ranking
has since been often and favorably applied (Basile, 1987; Bezdek et al., 1978;
Buyukozkan and Feyzioglu, 2003; Chen & Klein, 1997; Fernandez & Olmedo, 2004;
Roubens & Vincke, 1987; Spillman et al., 1979; Xu & Da, 2003) within decision contexts
demanding comparisons of moderately large numbers of alternatives or when decision
criteria are imprecisely determined (Graham & Rhomberg, 1996; Zahariev, 1990). The
worth of so “natural” (Harker, 1987b, p. 837) a comparison method and its parent class of
ordinal scale-based techniques has been acknowledged by the U.S. Department of
Defense (2003c) and additionally promoted with fuzzy treatments (Enea & Piazza, 2004;
Fedrizzi, 1990; Lee & Ahn, 1991; McCauley-Bell & Badiru, 1996a, 1996b; Mustafa &
Al-Bahar, 1991; Wang, Wang, & Hu, 2005) of Saaty’s (1980) widely-used, pairwise
comparison-based analytic hierarchy process, or AHP, itself expressly endorsed (DoD,
2003c) for use in military risk assessments.
Cardinal scale-type, direct fuzzy ranking methods - including those utilized for
risk assessments - are commonly found in literature offering resolutions of expert group
preferences “when the number of alternatives to be compared is relatively small and the
criteria are well determined” (Zahariev, 1990, p. 186). Smith and Verma (2004), for
example, use a fuzzy, “weighted wedge” (p. 342) approach to individually grade the
compliance with rigorously-specified requirements of small numbers of competing,
system engineering project conceptual designs. Bowles & Pelaez (1995) demonstrate
fuzzy set theory’s utility for determining risk priority numbers used with the automotive
industry’s risk assessment conventions that emphasize limited numbers of risk categories
and well-defined criteria. Bender and Simonovic (2000) exercise what they term a fuzzy
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compromise approach that uses “the concept of the displaced ideal.... to determine a
direct ranking (strong ordering) of [small numbers of] alternatives” (p. 36) with respect to
limited sets of criteria characterized as objectively as possible. A sizeable portion of
cardinal scale-based, fuzzy multcriteria and multi-attribute approaches to risk assessment
exhibits pairings of small numbers of decision alternatives with well determined, decision
criteria (Ghyym, 1999; Ibrahim, 1991; Karwowski & Mital, 1986; Lin & Chen, 2004;
Machacha & Bhattacharya, 2000).
SUMMARY
This dissertation effort rested on two premises: that ACTD military utility
assessments should account for principal risks associated with deploying demonstration
systems and associated operations concepts within joint military operations metasystems
of which they could become a permanent part; and that the identification of those risks
should accommodate ambiguities of cognition and language used by the experts assessing
demonstrations’ military utility within relevant metasystems. A literature review that
emphasized nine topics determined those premises to point toward an original and
significant contribution to the extant body of related research:
■ Risk assessment
■ Fuzzy set theory
■ Fuzzy approaches to risk assessment
■ ACTD MUA design methodologies
■ Approaches to complexsystem analysis
and transformation

■ Risk-based approaches to military
operations assessment
■ Fuzzy approaches to military operations
assessments
■ Small expert group and group decision
characteristics
■ Fuzzy risk prioritization methods
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Ample risk assessment- and fuzzy set theory-related literature made evident those
topics’ relevance to ACTD MUA design methodology development. A smaller but still
instructive body of work regarding fuzzy approaches to risk assessment demonstrated the
value to be gained from an MUA design methodology that merged key elements of the
fields of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory. Complementary components of the
literature identified a niche into which a risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology for
ACTD MUA design could fit.
The literature review confirmed the legitimacy of this dissertation’s problem
statement. Few offerings directly address the question of how to design advanced concept
technology demonstration military utility assessments and, therefore, any proposal for a
design methodology must largely depend on a synthesis of study and practice bearing on
the problem only indirectly. Holistic approaches to complex system analysis and
transformation were viewed as indispensable elements of that synthesis, as were more
particular pursuits that applied either risk- or fuzzy set theory-based approaches to
military operations assessments. Equally pertinent and even more particular were
concerns for expert group decision processes required of ACTD MUA planning. By
noting reasonably direct correspondence between representative research efforts and the
literature review’s nine topics of emphasis, Table 1 portrays the review’s findings of
literature supporting this study’s two premises as well as deficiencies in research and
practice the study is intended remove.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The literature review confirmed the theoretical, methodological, and practical
contributions to be made with an ACTD MUA design methodology respecting risks
associated with demonstration deployments and ambiguities of cognition and language
associated with expert perspectives of those risks. The development and deployment of
such a design methodology would itself be subject to methodological strictures emplaced
to buttress arguments for its worth. Its status as a legitimate methodology would also
have to be argued.
A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING-BASED METHODOLOGY
Keating et al. (2003) endorse Checkland’s (1999, as cited, p. 41) suggestion “that
methodology is a guide more specific than philosophy (theory), but more general than a
tool, method, or technique.” Keating et al. (2004) continue that “a systems-based
methodology must provide a framework that can be elaborated to effectively guide
action” (p. 5), and they identify nine attributes of a system of systems-based methodology
suited to the engineering that occurs when ACTDs test transformations of joint military
operations metasystems. Table 2 lists the nine attributes, all of which this dissertation’s
proposed methodology can be seen to hold.
This study’s ACTD MUA design methodology was developed to serve
theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations regarding assessments of joint
military operations metasystem transformations. It was also intended to be transportable
to other types of assessments pursued within contexts set by similar metasystems - like
assessments now also required for ACTD-derivative, joint capability technology
demonstrations (JCTD) - or even distinct ones, provided that any assessment designs
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guided by the methodology are dependent on the judgments of subject matter expert
groups of purpose and composition like those defining this dissertation’s application.
Small expert group characteristics of purpose and composition are particularly significant
requirements that link the methodology’s practical artifacts to its driving principles
grounded in theory regarding risk assessment, fuzzy sets, and complex systems.

Table 2. Attributes of a System of Systems-based Methodology
Attribute

Attribute Description

T ra n s p o rta b ility

C a p a b le o f a p p lic a tio n a c ro s s a s p e c tru m o f c o m p le x s y s te m s e n g in e e rin g
p r o b le m s a n d c o n te x ts .

T h e o re tic a l a n d P h ilo s o p h ic a l
G ro u n d in g

L in k a g e o f th e m e th o d o lo g y to a th e o re tic a l b o d y o f k n o w le d g e a s w e ll a s
p h ilo s o p h ic a l u n d e rp in n in g s th a t fo rm th e b a s is o f th e m e th o d o lo g y a n d
its a p p lic a tio n .

G u id e to A c tio n

T h e m e th o d o lo g y m u s t p r o v id e s u ffic ie n t d e ta il to fra m e a p p ro p ria te
a c tio n s a n d g u id e d ir e c tio n o f e ffo rts to im p le m e n t th e m e th o d o lo g y .

S ig n ific a n c e

T h e m e th o d o lo g y m u s t e x h ib it th e “ h o lis tic ” c a p a c ity to a d d re s s m u ltip le
p r o b le m s y s te m d o m a in s , m in im a lly in c lu d in g c o n te x tu a l, h u m a n ,
o rg a n iz a tio n a l, m a n a g e ria l, p o lic y , te c h n ic a l, a n d p o litic a l a s p e c ts o f a
s y s te m o f s y s te m s p ro b le m .

C o n s is te n c y

C a p a b le o f p ro v id in g r e p lic a b ility o f a p p ro a c h a n d re s u lts in te rp re ta tio n
b a s e d o n d e p lo y m e n t o f th e m e th o d o lo g y in s im ila r c o n te x ts .

A d a p ta b ility

C a p a b le o f fle x in g a n d m o d ify in g th e a p p ro a c h c o n fig u ra tio n , e x e c u tio n ,
o r e x p e c ta tio n s b a s e d o n c h a n g in g c o n d itio n s o r c irc u m s ta n c e s r e m a in in g w ith in th e f ra m e w o r k o f th e g u id a n c e p r o v id e d b y th e
m e th o d o lo g y , b u t a d a p tin g a s r e q u ir e d to f a c ilita te s y s te m ic in q u iry .

N e u tra lity

T h e m e th o d o lo g y a tte m p ts to m in im iz e a n d a c c o u n t fo r e x te rn a l
in f lu e n c e s in a p p lic a tio n a n d in te rp re ta tio n . P r o v id e s s u f fic ie n t
tr a n s p a r e n c y in a p p ro a c h , in te rp re ta tio n , a n d e x e c u tio n s u c h th a t b ia s e s ,
a s s u m p tio n s , a n d lim ita tio n s (m a y b e ) m a d e e x p lic it a n d c h a lle n g e d
w ith in th e m e th o d o lo g y a p p lic a tio n .

M u ltip le U tility

S u p p o rts a v a rie ty o f a p p lic a tio n s w ith r e s p e c t to c o m p le x s y s te m s o f
s y s te m s , in c lu d in g n e w s y s te m d e s ig n , e x is tin g s y s te m tra n s fo rm a tio n ,
a n d a s s e s s m e n t o f e x is tin g c o m p le x s y s te m o f s y s te m s in itia tiv e s .

R ig o r

C a p a b le o f w ith s ta n d in g s c ru tin y w ith r e s p e c t to : ( 1 ) id e n tif ie d lin k a g e
... (to ) a b o d y o f th e o ry a n d k n o w le d g e ; (2 ) s u ffic ie n t d e p th to
d e m o n s tra te s u ffic ie n t g ro u n d in g w ith in th e s y s te m s e n g in e e rin g
d is c ip lin e ; a n d (3 ) c a p a b le o f p r o v id in g tr a n s p a r e n t re s u lts th a t a re
r e p lic a b le w ith r e s p e c t to r e s u lts a c h ie v e d .

(Keating et al., 2004, p. 6 )
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The significance of holism that Keating et al. (2004) assign to system of
systems-based methodologies was a key determinant of the methodology developed for
this dissertation, and that holism markedly supported development of a process providing
the guide to action, consistency, adaptability, neutrality, and multiple utility described in
Table 2. Those five attributes, together with the methodology’s final attribute of rigor,
will be evinced with coming, more detailed descriptions of this study’s approach to
ACTD MUA design.
PROBLEM SELECTION CRITERIA
Fernandez and Olmedo (2004) echo Zadeh (1971), Blin and Whinston (1973),
Blin (1974), and others in acknowledging the importance of agents with which can be
determined group, or social, decisions. They also recognize the difficulty of group
decision agent design and endorse the use of fuzzy set theory in the design of decision
agents to be applied to problem settings of the following characteristics:
(1) Each (group member) considers the same set of alternatives or potential actions;
(2) The preference of each group member can accurately be represented by a ranking
(with ties) of all alternatives from best to worst;
(3) All group members have the same importance for deriving final agreement; and
(4) The group members accept a final ranking derived from an aggregation of their
opinions with fairness and equity. (Fernandez & Olmedo, 2004, p. 430)
These characteristics perfectly describe key elements of the ACTD MUA design
methodology this research tested against a simulated, Class III demonstration derived
from an actual case of ACTD program history. They are also perfectly aligned with
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Department of Defense intent that identification and analysis of risk events bearing on
military system acquisitions be accomplished in concert with military operations experts
and those of other pertinent fields (DoD, 2003c). The Department’s acquisition-related
intent bears on its ACTD program and can met by that program with methods drawn
from the fields of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory.
A RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD SUITED TO THE PROBLEM
“The key to successful risk analysis is the development of a model that clearly
illustrates risk factors and their relationships without getting into unnecessary detail”
(Ashley & Avots, 1984, p. 56). “The ‘right’ model seems to capture the essentials of the
system. Too much detail obscures the essentials; too little misses them” (Anderson et al.,
1999, p. 59). Risk analyses should ideally avoid vulnerabilities such as: (a) dependence
on models based on overly-simplistic assumptions, like those that assign independence or
Normal variation to model entities or processes for which those characteristics cannot be
verified (Beckerman, 2000; Tamimi, 1989); (b) analytical treatments conveying a sense
of surety not justified by available data, as can occur when probabilistic methods are used
to describe processes about which too little is known (Bier, Haimes, Lambert, Matalas, &
Zimmerman, 1999); or (c) a level of reductionism greatly favoring identification of
model components at the expense of studying interactions among them (Beckerman,
2000). One aspect of user-intensive, risk analysis that should always be prominent is the
use of models understandable to participating users (Gue, 2002) but not so simple that
they surrender utility (Tamimi, 1989). Risk assessments promoting MUA design should
avoid unnecessary vulnerabilities and depend on justifiable and holistic, operations
metasystem models elicited from and validated by military literature and experts;
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assessment-peculiar elements of Haimes’ (2004) well-practiced, Risk Filtering, Ranking,
and Management (RFRM) method meet both criteria.
The RFRM comprises eight phases of risk-related review, the first three of which
were important to the research of this dissertation. Phase I activities can identify military
operations metasystem risk scenarios associated with ACTD prototypes by using a
hierarchical holographic model (HHM) “developed to describe...[the metasystem’s] ‘as
planned’ or ‘success’ scenario[s]” (Haimes, 2004, p. 280). The filtering process of
Phase II can reduce the number of Phase I-identified risks by emphasizing particular
aspects of envisioned, ACTD prototype employment. Finally, the DoD-conventional
(DoD, 2003c; Haimes, 2004), risk likelihood- and consequence-based filtering
mechanism of Phase III can decrease what might be hundreds of Phase I-derived, ACTD
risks (Haimes, 2004; Haimes et al., 2002) to a number of perhaps no more than 20
(Lamm & Haimes, 2002) practically required for the individual risk prioritization scheme
this research pursued as a pivotal step in ACTD MUA design.
“The basic building block of the RFRM is the HHM” (Leung, Lambert, &
Mosenthal, 2004). A HHM is able to demonstrate relationships among what could be
termed an ACTD’s overlapping functional, temporal, organizational, geographical, and
like perspectives (or head topics) and subordinate domains (or subtopics) (Haimes, 1998,
2004; Haimes et al., 2002). Figure 2 offers an illustrative version of a HHM suited to
designing ACTD assessments, with major, joint military operations metasystem
components - Haimes’ perspectives - of commands, critical operational issues, major
missions, users, system functions, and threat decomposed into varying numbers of
interdependent domains each simultaneously representing the success and, when normal
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operations are disrupted, the risk scenarios associated with ACTDs (Haimes, 2004;
Kaplan et al., 2001). In practice, domains can be further subdivided into whatever
number of subdomains needed to portray total risk to joint operations utility; the assumed
interdependence of all domains and subdomains most enables identification of individual
risks.

Figure 2. Representative HHM for ACTD Military Utility Assessments
Joint Operations
Utility

Commands

Critical
Operational
Issues

Major
Missions

Users

System
Functions

Threat

Higher

COI1

Mission 1

User 1

Function 1

Threat 1

Adjacent

C O I2

Mission 2

User 2

Function 2

Threat 2

Subordinate

COI3

Mission 3

User 3

Function 3

Threat 3

Function 4

Threat 4

Function 5

Threat 5

Mission 4

Function 6

Figure 3 portrays the manner in which submodels of the Figure 2 example HHM
afford identification of “an inclusive set of answers to ‘what can go wrong?” (Haimes et
al., 2002, p. 386). It shows that, from the perspective of any of the four major missions
the illustrated ACTD prototype might be expected to perform, there might be as many as
five threats against which it could be employed or which could otherwise jeopardize its
employment. Analysts, military operators, and other subject matter experts can use such
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relationships to prompt consideration regarding “what can go wrong?” Many risks will
be identified in this way, though numerous other associations will merely illuminate
highly unlikely or even infeasible scenarios. The qualitative elimination of unlikely or
infeasible scenarios defines Phase II of the RFRM. The method’s Phase III can further
refine the set of consequential risks to joint operations utility with its use of another
qualitative procedure well known to ACTD managers.

Figure 3 ACTD Major Mission Submodel
Risk to
Joint Operations Utility
Major Missions

Mission 1

Mission 3

Mission 2

Mission 4

Threats

Threat 1

Threat 2

Threat 3

Threat 4

Threat 5

Phase III of the RFRM features a matrix of independent dimensions of likelihood
and consequence, graduated in accordance with long-standing, DoD evaluation measures
generically depicted with Figure 4 (DoD, 2003c; Haimes, 2004; Jones, Lyford, Qazi,
Solan, & Haimes, 2003). Should the balance of the number of risks identified through
RFRM Phase II activities remain large, the matrix can be employed to determine whether
those remaining risks should be classified as high, moderate, or low. These Phase III
classifications allow experts to focus on lesser numbers of risks (perhaps only those
classified as high) than will be identified through Phase II, numbers possibly more
conducive to ensuing prioritizations with which can be developed ACTD MUA measures
of effectiveness. With risk “a fuzzy concept... .(of) quantities.. .inherently imprecise”
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(Karwowski & Mital, 1986, p. 106), such risk prioritizations can employ a particular
method of fuzzy set theory that respects the normal, experiential judgment processes
(Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004) used by subject matter experts rather than
forcing those experts - as is the case with many risk prioritization methods - to render
judgments in starkly analytical terms neither necessarily applicable nor with which the
experts may be facile or unbiased (Karwowski & Mital, 1986).

Figure 4. DoD-Conventional Matrix of Risk Likelihood and Consequence
LIKELIHOOD
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Remote

Unlikely

Likely

Highly
Likely

Frequent

Unacceptable

M o d e ra te

H ig h

H ig h

H ig h

H ig h

Minimally Acceptable

L ow

M o d e ra te

M o d e ra te

H ig h

H ig h

Acceptable with
Significant Utility Loss

L ow

L ow

M o d e ra te

M o d e ra te

H ig h

Acceptable with Slight
Utility Loss

L ow

L ow

L ow

M o d e ra te

M o d e ra te

Little or None

L ow

L ow

L ow

L ow

M o d e ra te

A FUZZY SET THEORY METHOD SUITED TO THE PROBLEM
The several risk filtering and ranking phases of Haimes’ (2004) RFRM not
already addressed in this chapter depend on often-challenged (and challenging) Bayesian
techniques of evaluation (Aven & Kvaloy, 2002; Bier et al., 1999; Clemen & Winkler,
1999) as well as problematic weighting schemes (Bender & Simonovic, 2000;
Btiyiikozkan & Feyzioglu, 2003; Chen, 2001; Forman, 1987; Lee and Ahn, 1991; Xu,
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2004) that can force subject matter experts to render judgments in starkly analytical terms
neither necessarily applicable nor with which they may be facile or unbiased (Karwowski
& Mital, 1986). Risk-related weighting schemes and resultant cardinal rankings
additionally conflict with a strong DoD inclination toward ordinal evaluations of risk
(DoD, 2003c), an organizational preference that must surely affect ACTD managers
despite the availability of RFRM and many more risk ranking methods featuring
criteria-weights, cardinal scales, distance and area metrics, or other arguably
overly-analytical schemes, some even infused with fuzzy concepts (Bender & Simonovic,
2000; Bortolan & Degani, 1985; Chen & Klein, 1997; Lee & Ahn, 1991; Tseng & Klein,
1989). One sometimes weight-based scheme known to ACTD managers (DoD, 2003c)
and often extended with fuzzy concepts is Saaty’s (1980) AHP, notable not for its use of
absolute measures or fuzzy extensions but for its dependence upon simple, pairwise
comparisons minimally stressing (Harker, 1987b; Lee & Ahn, 1991; Mustafa &
Al-Bahar, 1991; Vachnadze & Markozashvili, 1987) the number of 7 ± 2 absolute,
unidimensional judgments popularly assigned as a limit of human capacity (Ghyym,
1999: Karwowski & Mital, 1986; Miller, 1956; Mustafa & Al-Bahar, 1991; Saaty, 1980;
Wang et al., 2004). That these “pairwise comparisons are fundamental...[to] the AHP”
(Saaty, 1987, p. 163) and that the AHP has found so many applications over the last
quarter century (Harker, 1987a, 1987b; Lee & Ahn, 1991; Mustafa & Al-Bahar, 1991;
Vachnadze & Markozashvili, 1987) is strong endorsement of the utility of a fuzzy
set-based ranking method to which pairwise comparisons are equally central.
Less than a decade after Zadeh (1965) set forth his theory o f fuzzy sets, Blin and
Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) proposed the notion of a fuzzy preference, a
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straightforward and fuzzy set-based method for relating small group preferences, and one
that circumvents most problems of criteria weights, cardinal scales, membership
functions, and like complications that could trouble ACTD managers or military
operators. The essence o f Blin and Whinston’s approach has been revisited (Klir and
Folger, 1988), expanded (Spillman, Bezdek, & Spillman, 1979; Spillman, Spillman, &
Bezdek, 1980), and otherwise modified (Basile, 1990; Chen and Klein, 1997), but its
original form and purpose of easily identifying and characterizing in terms of agreement
level the preferences of small groups seems well-suited to a MUA design process
typically involving small groups of experts who could develop MOEs based on their
independent and relative assessments of demonstration system risks.
Individual choices may be categorized as binary, {Yes, No}, or (0, 1} in type, but
“a cursory examination of the history of decisions should suffice to convince us of the
fuzziness of group preferences” (Blin, 1974, p. 28). Group preferences may be modeled
as fuzzy binary relations (Blin, 1974), or sets, in accordance with Zadeh’s (1965, 1968,
1971) theories of fuzzy sets and relations (Blin and Whinston, 1973). Blin and
Whinston’s method for determining social, or group preferences, allows groups’
“individual (members) to possess different aims and values while still assuming that the
overall [group] purpose is to reach a common, acceptable decision” (Klir & Folger, 1988,
p. 258), a presumption that can be plausibly made for military settings of many kinds,
including ACTD MUA design. Multiplicity of opinion can be accommodated by
defining a group, or social, preference, S, as a fuzzy binary relation of membership
function
(x„ Xj): U x U e [0, 1]
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indicating the degree to which the group believes risk x, exceeds risk xy. Such an
expression of group preference may be defined in many ways, with one of the most direct
possibly free of significant, membership function-related controversy and thus appealing
to ACTD participants:
DEFINITION 3.

(*„ xj) =

N (x x 1
P J ,
n

the simple fraction of the number, N(xh Xj), of «-total experts considering x, riskier than xy.
With such a membership function in place, final and nonfuzzy, group prioritizations of
any number of risks may be determined by recognizing S as the union of crisp relations
of its own cut-sets, S a, with a-cut values essentially representing strengths of group
agreements on particular prioritizations, or orderings.
The sequential procedure for identifying final, collective, group preferences and
associated values of agreement level involves:
■

identifying elements of the set, O, of all possible, crisp preference orderings;

■

selecting from all possible orderings, the subsets, Oa, of elements compatible with
the paired elements of the cut-set of highest-valued a-cut; and

■

continuing the process through cut-sets of increasingly smaller a-cut values until
only a single, crisp preference ordering remains (Klir & Folger, 1988).

An example drawn from Klir and Folger (1988) illustrates how Blin and Whinston’s
(1973) method could be used to determine the most acceptable, overall group rankings of
ACTD prototype risks requiring the greatest, MUA design emphasis:
Suppose that n = 8 military experts, E„ /' = 1,2,

. . . 8,

have together

applied Phases I-III of the RFRM to identify an ACTD’s four most critical
risks, a, b, c, and d. Suppose still that this group hopes to prioritize - with
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some reasonable degree of agreement - those four most critical risks in an
effort to follow with a MUA construct of accordingly tailored MOEs.
Now assume that the eight experts have independently ranked the four
risks, in order from most to least risky, as:
Ei = (a, b, c, d)
E 2 = E 5 = (d, c, b, a)
E 3 = E 7 = (b, a, c, d)
E 4 = Eg = (a, d, b, c)
E 6 = {d, a, b, c).
Applying Definition 3 to the individual rankings of Ei through Eg yields
what is termed a reciprocal (Spillman et al., 1979; Spillman et al, 1980),
fuzzy, group preference relation, S, that may be expressed in matrix form
as

a
b
c
d

a

b

c

d

0
0 .5
0 .2 5

0 .5
0
0 .2 5

0 .7 5
0 .7 5
0

0 .6 2 5
0 .3 7 5
0 .3 7 5

0 .3 7 5

0 .6 2 5

0 .6 2 5

0

The significant cut-sets of this fuzzy relation are those associated with
a-cuts that match matrix values. Thus
S1

= 0

S°-?s

= { (a, c), (b, c ) }

S 0-625

= { (a, c), (b, c), (a, d), (d, b), (d, c) }

S 0-5

= { (a, c), (b, c), (a, d), (d, b), (d, c), (b, a), (a, b) }

S 0375

= { (a, c), (b, c), (a, d), (d, b), (d, c), (b, a), (a, b), (d, a),
...( b ,d ) ,( c ,d ) }
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S 0J5

= { (a, c), (b, c), (a, d), (d, b), (d, c), (b, a), (a, b), (d, a),
...(b, d), (c, d), (c, a), (c, b) }.

To determine the unique, crisp ordering that will constitute the group
choice, the set of all (in this example, 4! = 24) possible risk orderings can
be reviewed in descending, a-cut value sequence to identify those
compatible with the pairings of corresponding cut-sets:
O1

0 ° '7S

= Trivial solution (all 24 possible orderings are compatible with
S 2= 0)

= { (d, a, b, c), (a, b, c, d), (a, d, b, c), (a, b, d,

c), (d, b, a, c),

...(b, a, c, d), (b, d, a, c), (b, a, d, c) }
O0-625

= { (a, d, b, c) }

The ultimately determined, group-preferred ordering is { (a, d, b, c) },
which carries with it an agreement value of 0.625 and only coincidentally
matches the individual preferences of experts E 4 and Eg.
This example not only demonstrates the Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin
(1974) method mechanics but also the method’s characteristics that would most
prominently affect its use in ACTD military utility assessment design. These are:
(1) Simplicity. Military operators would understand the method’s foundational
mechanics and so be likely to accept them.
(2) Promotion of risk orderings independently identified by every evaluator.
Though DoD-endorsed (DoD, 2003c) and long-popular decision making methods
like the AHP and RAND Corporation’s Delphi (Ayyub, 2001) method allow groups’
levels of agreement to be visible to group members, and even though enhancements
of Blin and Whinston’s own method (Spillman et al, 1979; Spillman et al, 1980)
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promote open consensus building, there may be little reason to believe that open
approaches to small group decisions can produce sets of paired risk comparisons
more valid (Bone, Hey, and Suckling, 1999) than can the Blin and Whinston
approach. Moreover, the shared sense of mission that can be plausibly ascribed to
military operators, here evaluators, might alone preclude any need to debate the
relative strengths of collaborative and independent processes.
(3) De facto need to keep small the number of risks to be ranked. The number of
pairwise comparisons required for a collection of n risks is (Vi)(n)(n - 1). For
example, the 2 0 risks previously described as a hoped-for upper limit of the number
identified through a RFRM Phase III process would incur 190 pairwise comparisons,
a total possibly taxing to even the most dutiful of military evaluators. Incomplete or
inconsistent pairings could also occur with so large a number of comparisons, and
methods like those of Harker (1987a, 1987b) or Saaty (1980, 1987) might have to be
invoked in response. While at least one algorithm has been demonstrated to require
only n comparisons of n risks (Chen & Klein, 1997), its otherwise quite complex
features might prove intolerable to military users.
Additionally, the number of possible preference orderings for n risks is n\, a
dauntingly large number for even small values of n. Though computer-based sorting
should render this factor of little computational concern, such large numbers of
permutations might nevertheless concern MUA designers.
The Blin and Whinston method can serve as a straightforward, risk prioritization tool
complementing the equally straightforward, risk identification capability afforded by
RFRM Phases I-III. The collective expert ranking offered by the application of both

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
methods may promote the development of measures of effectiveness and derivative
assessment designs de facto already validated by the military user community that would
employ them. As a whole, then, this risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology developed
for ACTD MUA design merited the tests of application and review.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The research of this dissertation relied upon a simulated, Class III, system of
systems ACTD of technology, organization, and military operations function components
like those that MUAs are prescribed to address. The simulation was derived from an
actual Class III demonstration in order to enhance research validity. A five-phase
deployment scheme of key attributes depicted by Figure 5 afforded thorough exercise and
review of the ACTD MUA design methodology developed for this research:
Phase 1. Joint warfare operations expert and researcher-assisted
development of a military operations metasystem model suited to a
joint service ACTD. This first phase of research involved the researcher
as study leader and three joint warfare operations specialists purposively
selected for their familiarity with organizations and operational functions
relevant to the simulated ACTD; the group size of three and purposive
selection for membership reflected findings of the literature review as well
as ACTD norms. Participants over time collectively reviewed, refined,
and confirmed the appropriateness of a joint military operations
metasystem HHM initially prototyped by the researcher using sources like
the Universal Joint Task List (DoD, 2002) used to identify critical
operational issues for actual ACTDs (Singleton et al., 1998). The HHM
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development observed practice long employed and endorsed by numerous
researchers (Florentine et al., 2003; Haimes, 2004; Haimes et al., 2002;
Horowitz & Haimes, 2003; Jones et al., 2003; Lambert et al., 2001; Lamm
& Haimes, 2002; Leung et al., 2004; Pennock & Haimes, 2002).

Figure 5. Research Design
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Phase 2. Collective, military operations expert assessment of risks
identified with the ACTD-relevant, military operations metasystem
model. The same group of experts used to develop the simulated,
ACTD-relevant HHM next collectively identified and analyzed the most
significant risks represented by the model. This assessment utilized
procedures conventional for the RFRM Phases II-III (Haimes, 2004;
Haimes et al., 2002; Haimes et al., 2004; Horowitz & Haimes, 2003; Jones
et al., 2003; Lambert et al., 2001; Leung et al., 2004; Pennock & Haimes,
2002)

augmented by elements of expert perspective elicitation procedures

proposed by Brandon (1998) and others.
Phase 3. Individual expert prioritizations of the group-identified risks
of greatest significance. This process of independent rankings required
final contributions from all joint military operations expert group members
except the researcher, who supported individual ranking processes in
face-to-face fashion for acceptable completeness and consistency.
Phase 4. Researcher aggregation of individual, risk rankings. The
researcher exclusively executed this wholly mechanical process.
Phase 5. Individual expert reviews of methodology utility. This final
phase of research synthesized judgments of a group of 2 0 purposively
selected individuals collectively expert in ACTD management and MUA
design. It employed a lone, single-stage, cross-sectional, primarily Likert
scale-type survey instrument generally reflecting those demonstrated by
Monroe (1997), Yeh (1998), Morgan (1999), and Chytka (2003) and
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topically related to survey structures used for related research in: (a)
decision making (Yeh, 1998), (b) design performance evaluation (Sun,
2000); (c) risk and uncertainty assessment, including risk ranking (Chytka,
2003; Hampton, 2001; Monroe, 1997; Morgan, 1999; Wells, 1997); (d)
technology adoption impact (Conway, 2003); and (e) evaluation of
commercial product customer preferences (Liu, 1996).
Table 3 associates with these five phases this dissertation’s three research questions and
data collection and analysis processes pursued under the study’s “dominant-less
dominant” (Creswell, 1994, p. 177), research design.

Table 3. Data Collection and Analysis
Research Phase 1
Research Question:

Collection Method
■ Written document
review
■ One-on-one interviews
■ Group interviews

H o w m ig h t jo in t m ilita ry o p e ra tio n s m e ta s y s te m m o d e ls g u id e th e id e n tific a tio n
o f A C T D M U A m e a s u re s o f e ffe c tiv e n e s s ?

Reference
• Brandon (1998)
■ Brannen (2004)
■ Creswell (1994)
■ Denzin & Lincoln
(2005)
■ Haimes (2004)
■ Leedy & Ormrod
(2001)

Analysis Method
■ Triangulation
■ Tabulation

Reference
■ Creswell (1994)
■ Haimes (2004)
■ Leedy & Ormrod
(2001)

Expected Products
■ A military operations
metasystem model
pertinent to the
simulated ACTD.
■ A military operations
metasystem model
implying ACTD risks.

Research Phases 2-4
Research Question:

H o w m ig h t b e d e v e lo p e d a n d e m p lo y e d jo in t m ilita ry o p e ra tio n s m e ta s y s te m
m o d e ls w ith w h ic h c a n b e id e n tifie d A C T D M U A m e a s u re s o f e ffe c tiv e n e s s ?

Collection Method

Reference

• One-on-one interviews
■ Group interviews
■ Cross-sectional,
individual surveys

■ Blin (1974)
■ Blin & Whinston
(1973)
■ Brandon (1998)
■ Creswell (1994)
• Haimes (2004)
■ Leedy & Ormrod
(2001)

Analysis Method
■ Triangulation
■ Tabulation
■ Fuzzy preference
relations

Reference
• Blin (1974)
■ Blin & Whinston
(1973)
■ Creswell (1994)
■ Haimes (2004)
■ Leedy & Ormrod
(2001)

Expected Products
■ Prioritized listing o f
greatest risks to
ACTD.
■ Degree o f operations
expert group
agreement regarding
prioritization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

Table 3. Continued
Research Phase 5
Research Question:

Collection M ethod
■ Cross-sectional,
individual surveys

H o w u s e fu l m ig h t A C T D m a n a g e rs a n d a n a ly s ts fin d th e A C T D d e s ig n
m e th o d o lo g y d e v e lo p e d a n d d e p lo y e d w ith th is re s e a rc h ?

Reference
■ Ayyub (2001)
* Creswell (1994)
■ Leedy & Ormrod
(2001)

Analysis Method
■ Descriptive statistics
• Inferential statistics

Reference

Expected Products

■ Creswell (1994)
■ Leedy & Ormrod
(2001)

■ Measure o f ACTD
expert-perceived utility
of methodology.

RESEARCH METHOD
Creswell (1994) identifies a combined, quantitative- and qualitative-research
design that captures methodological aspects significant to this research effort:
In (the dominant-less dominant) design the researcher presents the study
within a single, dominant paradigm with one small component o f the
overall study drawn from the alternative paradigm. A classic example o f
this approach is a quantitative study based on testing a theory in an
experiment with a small qualitative interview component in the data
collection phase. Alternately one might engage in qualitative observations
with a limited number o f informants, followed by a quantitative survey o f a
sample from a population. The advantage o f this approach is that it
presents a consistent paradigm picture in the study and still gathers
limited information to probe in detail one aspect o f the study (p. 177).
This dissertation’s research Phases 1 and 2 comprised primarily less-dominant,
qualitative pursuits supporting the dominant and distinctly quantitative Phases 3-5. Only
this sort of combined design could have adequately addressed the problem and answered
the questions that drove the research.
The Practical Impetus fo r Combined Designs
Though much popular literature portrays research as divided into two mutually
exclusive camps of quantitative paradigm-adherent positivists and qualitative
paradigm-adherent constructivists, that distinction has been often challenged by
practitioners of both paradigms (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2001; Brandon, 1998;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62
Brannen, 2004; Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005; Ladkin, 2004; Patten, 2004; Seale, Gobo,
Gubrium, & Silverman, 2004). “Instead of forcibly applying abstract methodological
rules (regarding the use of quantitative or qualitative paradigms),” suggest Seale et al.
(2004, p. 7), researchers might instead fix their “research situation.. .in a place of
dialogue with methodological rules.” If in particular, as others have posited, “the notion
of different paradigms defies the way research is carried out in practice” (Brannen, 2004,
p. 312), then researchers need not necessarily heed common exhortations (Creswell,
1994) to avoid combinations of quantitative and qualitative approaches to research. They
should instead remain open to research opportunities to which both paradigms would
bring value, and they should do so without fear of linkages that do not truly exist between
research methodologies and the ontological and epistemological assumptions of
research’s two traditional paradigms (Brannen, 2004).
The nature of the research reality and the relationships between researchers and
the researched may be considered relevant to the selection of research methods, but strict
adherence to positivist or constructivist stances can blind researchers to the answers they
seek (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005). Quantitative and qualitative data should be viewed
as compatible and so should be together collected and analyzed if such collection and
analysis serves research needs (Brannen, 2004; Zaras, 2003). Researchers should not feel
constrained by either of the quantitative or qualitative paradigms and associated
underpinnings of ontology and epistemology (Blaxter et al., 2001; Patten, 2004). Applied
researchers, in particular, must view paradigmatic constraints as largely relaxed (if not
altogether artificial or imagined) as they attend to practical aspects of problems of
interest.
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Applied researchers normally do emphasize problems over paradigms in acting as
translators between theoretic disciplines and the world of action (Miller & Salkind,
2002). Those wishing to apply research findings directly to practical programs or
processes are commonly said to pursue evaluation research (Kelly, 2004; Patten, 2004),
of which the 40 years of public program evaluations prompted by and since President
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society initiatives may be the examples (Orcher, 2005; Rossi &
Wright, 2002) best known in this country. Evaluation research routinely melds
quantitative and qualitative methods (Blaxter et al., 2001) and has been plainly described
in the following fashion (Patton, 1990, p. 11, as cited in Kelly, 2004, p. 523):
The term evaluation may be used quite broadly to include any effort to
increase human effectiveness through systematic data-based inquiry.
Human beings are engaged in all kinds o f efforts to make the world a
better place. These efforts include assessing needs, formulating policies,
passing laws, delivering programs, managing people and resources,
providing therapy, developing communities, changing organizational
culture, educating students, intervening in conflicts, and solving problems.
In these and other efforts to make the world a better place, the question o f
whether the people involved are accomplishing what they want to
accomplish arises. When one examines and judges accomplishments and
effectiveness, one is engaged in evaluation. When this examination o f
effectiveness is conducted systematically and empirically through careful
data collection and thoughtful analysis, one is engaged in evaluation
research.
The discipline of evaluation research also serves as an umbrella for more refined
categories such as action research (Kelly, 2004).
Characterizing Action Research
Since the approach’s beginnings credited to social psychologist, Kurt Lewin and
the United Kingdom’s Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (Argyris, Putnam, &
Smith, 1985; Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005), “the term ‘action research’ (has been)
increasingly used to describe a [Figure 6 ] cycle of events that is intended to help the
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practitioner evaluate and modify practice. There are several models of action
research.. .but, in essence, .. .the.. .process is problem-driven, in that a practice-based
problem is identified... [and] the
practitioner and researcher design

Figure 6. The Action Research Spiral

a research programme to
investigate i t , ...develop a
package of change based on the
[research] results, and then
evaluate the impact of the change
package” (Hicks, 2004, p. 8 ).
The defined cooperation between
practitioner and researcher serves
to “empower practitioners and to
integrate research with practice,

(Atweh et al., 1998, p. 22, as cited in
Blaxter et al., 2001, p. 70. Reprinted
with permission.)

thereby overcoming the
well-known (practice-research) divide” (p. 8 ).
Greenwood and Levin (1998, p. 21, as cited in Blaxter et al., 2001, p. 67)
elaborate upon Hicks’s description with:
(Action research) is a complex, dynamic activity involving the best efforts
o f both members o f communities or organizations and professional
researchers. It simultaneously involves co-generation o f new information
and analysis together with actions aimed at transforming the situation in
democratic ways. (Action research) is holistic and also context bound,
producing practical solutions and new knowledge as part o f an integrated
set o f activities... (it) is a way ofproducing tangible and desired results for
the people involved, and it is a knowledge-generation process that
produces insights both fo r researchers and the participants. It is a
complex action-knowledge generation process... the immense importance
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o f insider knowledge and initiatives is evident, marking a clear distinction
from orthodox research that systematically distrusts insider knowledge as
co-opted.
These latter authors’ references repeat emphases applied earlier in this document to
notions of holism, context, and complexity, all integral to a system of systems philosophy
with which this dissertation’s research corresponds.
Utilizing Action Research
“The purpose of action research is, always and explicitly, to improve practice”
(Griffiths, 1998, p. 21, as cited in Blaxter et al., 2001, p. 67). It has therefore become
increasingly popular with small-scale researchers working in professional areas (Blaxter
et al.,

2 0 0 1 ).

“(Action research) is well suited to the needs of people conducting research in
their workplaces, and who have a focus on improving aspects of their own and their
colleagues’ practices. For example, the teacher who is concerned to improve
performance in the classroom may find action research useful because it offers a
systematic approach to the definition, solution, and evaluation of problems and concerns”
(Blaxter et al., 2001, p. 67). Variations of action research have even been demonstrated
with attempts to correct deficiencies in large-scale systems, notably health care and
higher education delivery systems (Clarke, 1998; Greenwood & Levin, 2005; Linden &
Wen, 1998; Meltzoff, 1998). That action researchers can realize process improvements
by working together with those whose processes they seek to improve is reflected in
seven characteristics that Hart and Bond (1995, p. 37-38, as cited in Blaxter et al., 2001)
maintain distinguish it from alternate research methods:
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Action research:
( 1) is educative;
(2 ) deals with individuals as members of social groups;
(3) is problem-focused, context-specific, and future-oriented;
(4) involves a change intervention;
(5) aims at improvement and involvement;
(6 ) involves a cyclic process in which research, action and evaluation are
interlinked;
(7) is founded on a research relationship in which those involved are
participants in the change process, (p. 69)
Hart’s and Bond’s characterization promotes action research as an appropriate vehicle for
deploying and testing the ACTD military utility assessment design methodology
proposed with this research.
STUDY LEADER SELECTION CRITERIA
As a combined effort of researcher and selected experts, the deployment of this
study’s ACTD MUA design methodology greatly depended on a study leader of
“managerial and technical responsibility for executing the (study), overseeing all
participants, and intellectually owning the results” (Ayyub, 2001, p. 235). The study
leader would perform the roles of technical integrator and facilitator described in
Appendix A; the leader would also possess characteristics aligned with general criteria
drawn from Ayyub (2001):
(1) Competence based on academic training and relevant experience;
(2) Strong communication skills, interpersonal skills, flexibility, impartiality, and ability
to generalize and simplify;
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(3) A large contact base of (ACTD program) leaders, researchers.. .and decision makers;
and
(4) Leadership qualities and the ability to build consensus, (p. 240)
Needed interactions with the operations expert group also required the study leader to
meet the specific criteria prescribed in Appendix B for operations group participants.
This dissertation’s author met general and specific requirements for service as study
leader and so performed that role.
EXPERT SELECTION CRITERIA
This study also greatly depended on characteristics of members selected for each
of the required, joint military operations and ACTD expert groups. Though numerous
studies point to difficulties associated with “expert” identification (Hutton & Klein, 1999;
Shanteau, Weiss, Thomas, & Pounds, 2002; Vick, 2002), the following five general rules
drove the participant selection criteria of both groups:
(1) Participants must be or represent ACTD program stakeholders (Brandon, 1998),
with stakeholders defined as groups or individuals who can affect or be affected by
some system of interest (Comelissen et al., 2002; Turnley, 2002) and “have
demonstrated their need and willingness to be involved in seeking a solution”
(Sproles, 2000, p. 53) to whatever problem the system is intended to address.
(2) Participants must possess strong relevant expertise in the study’s area of focus,
gained through professional accomplishment and experience as well as academic
training (Ayyub, 2001; Brandon, 1998);
(3) Participants must be willing to act as impartial evaluators (Ayyub, 2001);
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(4) Participants must be available and willing to commit the time and effort required by
the study (Ayyub, 2001); and
(5) Participants must possess the same degree of communication and interpersonal
skills, flexibility, impartiality, and abilities to generalize and simplify as that
required of the study leader (Ayyub, 2001).
Appendices B and C respectively identify these and more precise criteria applied for the
selection of individuals to populate the operations and ACTD expert groups. All general
and specific, individual expert selection criteria were complemented by other
requirements desired for the compositions of both groups ultimately determined to
promote the study.
Operations Expert Group Characteristics
The joint military operations expert group employed for this research comprised
three joint warfare operations specialists purposively selected in accordance with
Appendix B. Group sizing reflected a preponderance of literature relevant to the
research, and the purposive selection process could be plausibly argued as that which
would normally be available to ACTD managers pursuing development of their
demonstrations’ military utility assessments. The operations expert group displayed a
degree of heterogeneity expected with military stakeholder experience, but - as with the
purposive selection process - this degree of homogeneity was accepted by the researcher
as closely aligned with realities of ACTD staffing.
ACTD Management and MUA Design Expert Group Characteristics
The expert group of ACTD managers and MUA designers employed for this
research comprised 2 0 purposively selected individuals meeting the selection criteria
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specified in Appendix C. This second group’s purpose of methodology review differed
markedly from that of the operations group’s methodology deployment charge, and its
characteristics reflected that distinction.
The group’s sizing represented a large portion of all individuals who have been or
are involved with joint ACTD management or military utility assessment design. Its
purposive origin, then, did not challenge routinely-voiced and accepted calls for random
selection processes nearly as strongly as did the purposive origin of the operations expert
group. The ACTD review group’s heterogeneity could also be shown to have been more
prominent than that of the operations-oriented group.
METASYSTEM MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Brandon (1998) identifies three broad procedural rules for guiding interactions
among study leaders and study experts, rules that transcend mere procedure by also
contributing to study validity. The first of these three rules requires the “participation of
stakeholder groups with the appropriate (study) expertise” (p. 328), and this research
observed that first rule with the criteria established for participation in its operations and
ACTD expert groups. The second rule stipulates “that stakeholders’ (study-related)
expertise should be fully tapped by applying carefully developed, thorough methods for
stakeholder participation” (p. 330), while the third holds that “the equitable participation
of stakeholders.. .should be ensured” (p. 332). The second and third rules have been
expanded by other researchers equally concerned with validity-related issues, and both
were observed with processes executed during this dissertation’s research Phase 1 of
metasystem model development.
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Ayyub (2001), Chicken and Hayns (1989), Comelissen et al. (2002), and Pennock
and Haimes (2002) suggest complementary criteria also applied during this research to
prepare for and execute the Phase 1 development of a joint military operations
metasystem HHM. Those complementary criteria included:
■

Providing expert group members with statements of study objectives before the
expert groups commenced their respective tasks;

■

Providing expert group members with explanations of appropriate, study-significant
terms and processes prior to commencement of each group’s respective tasks;

■

Providing expert group members with clear and concise explanations of their
respective tasks;

■

Providing expert group members with equitable, participation opportunities; and

■

Comprehensive documentation of each group’s proceedings in order to support
acceptance of the results.

The operations expert group used supplied, preparatory information and brainstorming
endorsed by Haimes (2004), Pennock and Haimes (2002), and others to develop the
simulated ACTD-relevant, joint military operations metasystem HHM with which it was
charged, a HHM o f detail sufficient to capture substantive risks (Haimes, 2004; Saaty,
1987) but not so complex as to threaten the availability of expert time or commitment
(Haimes, 2004). Phase 1 proceedings may be considered to have been semi-structured,
group interviews orchestrated and recorded by the researcher as study lead.
METASYSTEM MODEL RISK ASSESSMENT AND PRIORITIZATION
Research Phases 2 and 3 each exhibited all appropriate, preparatory and execution
process criteria observed during Phase 1. The second phase of research demonstrated a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71
collaborative identification of risks made evident to the operations expert group by the
joint operations metasystem model - the HHM - that the group developed during
research Phase 1. A singular focus upon the independent, pairwise comparisons required
by the Blin and Whinston (1973) method determined risk prioritizations of individual
experts and marked Phase 3 as the operations expert group’s lone departure from
collaboration. The Phase 4, study leader aggregation of Phase 3 prioritizations drew
further upon the Blin and Whinston work by defining a single, operations expert group
preference regarding prioritization of risks thought most significant. All Phase 1 through
4 processes were next reviewed in Phase 5 by a group of experts distinct from the
operations group and collectively versed in ACTD management and MUA design.
ASSESSMENT OF METHODOLOGY UTILITY
A group of 20 individuals expert in either ACTD management, MUA design, or
both, reviewed during research Phase 5 the ACTD MUA design methodology developed
and deployed by the study leader and joint military operations expert group in preceding
phases. Once accorded the same preparatory and procedural treatments provided the
operations expert group, each ACTD or MUA design expert independently reviewed the
methodology’s development, processes, and products with the aid of a lone, single-stage,
cross-sectional survey instrument structurally like those of Monroe (1997), Yeh (1998),
Morgan (1999), and Chytka (2003) and topically related to surveys used for related
research in: (a) decision making (Yeh, 1998), (b) design performance evaluation (Sun,
2000); (c) risk and uncertainty assessment, including risk ranking (Chytka, 2003;
Hampton, 2001; Monroe, 1997; Morgan, 1999; Wells, 1997); (d) technology adoption
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impact (Conway, 2003); and (e) evaluation of commercial product customer preferences
(Liu, 1996).
APPROACH TO RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
This study pursued a dominant-less dominant (Creswell, 1994), combined design
approach to reliability and validity. Research and instrument reliability and validity
issues were of particular concern during the less-dominant, action research-dependent
Phases 1 and 2 of military metasystem model development and risk identification.
Concerns reflected epistemological issues that Styhre et al. (2002, p. 98, as cited in
Ladkin, 2004, p. 539) reveal to have engendered criticism for “action researchers.. .not
taking a detached position vis-a-vis the research objects but rather actively becoming
involved” in ways possibly consequential to research findings.
The effort’s first two study phases pursued validity and reliability using an
epistemological tack respecting the Argyris et al. (1985) definition of action contexts of
high complexity wherein “unilateral control of variables is neither possible nor desirable”
(p. 239). To meet the phases’ contextual challenge, the research employed observations,
interviews, and recordings (Argyris et al., 1985; Gorman & Clayton, 2005) typical of
qualitative research together with a heavy emphasis on face, content, and construct
validity deemed appropriate for an HHM and as defined by Bernard (2002), Gliner and
Morgan (2000), and Orcher (2005) in Appendix A. Research Phases 1 and 2 also
observed the very clear counsel of Greenwood and Levin (2005, p. 54) regarding the
establishment of validity and reliability in action research studies:
Validity ...and reliability in action research are measured by the
willingness o f ...stakeholders to act on the results o f the action research,
thereby risking their welfare on the “validity ” o f their ideas and the
degree to which the outcomes meet their expectations. Thus, cogenerated
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contextual knowledge is deemed valid i f it generates warrants fo r action.
The core validity claim centers on the workability o f the actual ...change
engaged in, and the test is whether or not the actual solution to a problem
arrived at solves the problem.
The dominant, third through fifth research phases of risk prioritization, risk
aggregation, and methodology review employed non-experimental but still thoroughly
quantitative analysis and survey methods. These phases observed measures of reliability
and validity commonly associated with quantitative tests and survey instruments.
The combined design acknowledged plainly visible and necessary, qualitative and
quantitative aspects of the MUA design process. It, too, was necessary and so necessarily
judged in accordance with qualitative and quantitative norms of reliability and validity.
SUMMARY
The ACTD MUA methodology developed for this dissertation was characterized
as one displaying the attributes that some researchers have posited for system of systems
engineering-based methodologies. That characterization supported researcher claims of
an assessment design product applicable to numerous, complex systems other than the
one simulated for this research.
The complex system simulated for this research was developed in accordance
with criteria derived from the realities of the ACTD program, realities that include a
prominent need for risk-based, expert judgments rendered either independently or
collectively as group, or social, preferences. Elements of Haimes’ (2004) risk filtering,
ranking, and management method and Blin and Whinston’s (1973) method for resolving
small group preferences were identified as a pairing possibly able to address MUA design
realities in a manner acceptable to program stakeholders. A five-phase research effort
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was planned to test the utility of a risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology for ACTD
MUA design.
A mixed-method, action research plan was emplaced to govern less-dominant,
qualitative proceedings of research Phases 1 and 2 as well as dominant, quantitative
proceedings executed during Phases 3 through 5. The need for qualitative proceedings
naturally derived from the expert perspective-based HHM development and risk
identification that would occur during the first two research phases, while the need for
quantitative measures derived equally naturally from the risk prioritizations and
judgments regarding proposed methodology utility to define Phases 3 through 5. The
research plan additionally incorporated distinct, selection criteria for the study lead and
each of two expert groups respectively employed for the HHM development and risk
prioritizations of research Phases 1 through 3 and the methodology utility assessment of
research Phase 5. These selection criteria would buttress research validity and so
complement other efforts regarding validity and reliability applied to qualitative and
quantitative elements of the research.
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RESULTS
This research addressed its purpose, its objectives, and its three foundational
questions within a single cycle of the Figure 6 action research spiral. Once developed,
the risk- and fuzzy set-based MUA design methodology was deployed within the context
of a simulated ACTD of technologies, organizations, processes, and other components of
joint military operations metasystems that utility assessments should accommodate. The
joint operations expert group executed its deployment charge by first identifying a model
its members believed to portray the most relevant aspects of a joint military operations
metasystem incorporated with the simulated demonstration. That same group then used
the model to identify and classify in terms of high, moderate, and low the risks associated
with adoption of the simulated ACTD within the superior metasystem. The classification
was next refined with individual member prioritizations of those risks that the entire
group had assessed as most serious. In a role of study leader granted under the action
research format that governed the conduct of methodology deployment, the researcher
concluded the exercise by determining a single, operations expert group prioritization of
selected risk criticality, a prioritization the methodology holds to enable identification of
measures of effectiveness fundamental to ACTD MUA design. All of these research
processes were lastly reviewed by a distinct and consequentially-sized group of
individuals prominent in the management or assessment of actual, joint operations
demonstrations.
SIMULATED ACTD
The ACTD simulated for this research, the Operational Mine Detection ACTD,
strongly reflected for validity purposes certain elements of an actual demonstration, the
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Class III, Joint Countermine (JCM) ACTD conducted 1994-2000 (Blumenthal, no date;
Elliott, Madden, & Dean, 1996; Schaffer, Arnold, Smith, & Jackson, 1997; Schnoor, no
date; U.S. Atlantic Command [USACOM], 1998). Aspects of the simulated, joint,
amphibious, forcible entry operations-related, OMD ACTD included programmatic,
technical, and operational traits that would be typically known to staffs early in a
demonstration’s life cycle, when MUA design begins. Operations expert group
members were given a statement of critical military need, a statement of OMD ACTD
purpose, critical operational issues, and key technical and operational characteristics
associated with the OMD system’s two principal and complementary components: the
covert, national-level, Remote Littoral Sensing System (RLSS); and the Proximate
Littoral Sensing System (PLSS) organic to the joint forces it would serve for joint,
amphibious, forcible entry operations planning. The RLSS was characterized as using
novel computational techniques to exploit capabilities of existing national-level
reconnaissance assets and provide joint forces with cuing information required of the
PLSS, an unmanned aerial vehicle, surveillance platform. Appendix D detail the OMD
ACTD prototype and all other information provided the operations group in anticipation
of research Phase 1.
METASYSTEM MODEL
Research Phase 1 saw the joint warfare operations expert group development of a
joint military operations metasystem model suited to the OMD ACTD. That model was
the fundamental element produced during the MUA design methodology deployment,
and it was identified in accordance with Haimes’ (1998, 2004) notions of a HHM. The
operations expert group crafted and achieved consensus on the HHM using a seed model
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provided by the study lead and that the balance of the group modified through 10 hours of
deliberations over five meeting sessions. The final HHM comprised 13 perspectives the principal, military operations metasystem components or, equivalently, those
highest-level systems constituting the military operations metasystem with which the
OMD ACTD was to be incorporated - derived from a seed model total of 7. The 13
perspectives together encompassed 93 domains and 95 subdomains, and they were
derived through major, model configurations that included the seed’s 7 perspectives and
an intermediate model’s 11. Table 4 describes the final HHM perspective evolution and
Appendix E identifies the entire final model of perspectives, domains, and subdomains.

Table 4. OMD ACTD HHM Perspective Development
Seed M odel Configuration
• Friendly Military and
" OMD System Users
Non-Military
■ OMD System
Organizations
Functions
■ OMD ACTD Critical
■ OMD System
Operational Issues
Operations
■ OMD System Missions

■ Adversary Threats to
OMD Operations

Intermediate M odel Configuration
■ Classes of Threat
Mines
■ Potential Global Areas
o f Interest
■ OMD ACTD Critical
Operational Issues

■ OMD System Missions ■ Neutral Military and
■ Friendly Military and
Non-Military
Non-Military
Organizations
Organizations
■ RLSS Functions,
■ Adversary Military and
Command and Control,
Non-Military
Users, and Operations
Organizations
■ PLSS Functions,
Command and Control,
Users, and Operations

■ Adversary Threats to
OMD Operations

Final M odel Configuration
■ Engineering Aspects o f * OMD System Missions ■ Neutral Forces and
Threat Mine
■ Friendly Forces and
Other Support
Employment
Other Support
Capabilities
■ Environmental Aspects
Capabilities
■ RLSS Technical
o f OMD Operating
■ Adversary Forces and
Attributes
■ RLSS Operational
Areas
Other Support
■ OMD ACTD Critical
Capabilities
Attributes
Operational Issues

■ PLSS Technical
Attributes
■ PLSS Operational
Attributes
■ Adversary Threats to
OMD Operations

■ Temporal Aspects of
OMD ACTD.
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METASYSTEM MODEL RISK ASSESSMENT
Research Phase 2 constituted an operations expert group assessment of risks
represented to it by the HHM. Supported by the researcher as a study leader otherwise
extracted from the assessment process, and mindful of Slovic et al. (2004) admonitions to
regard “risk as feelings....[together with] risk as analysis” (p. 311), the three operations
experts initially identified a collection of 104 risks they perceived associated with the
adoption of the OMD ACTD by a superior, joint military operations metasystem. That
number was refined through 25 hours of deliberation to the 86 identified in Appendix F,
and the experts used an enhanced version of the RFRM Phase III and DoD-conventional
risk matrix to classify each element of the resolved set as high, moderate, or low. This
classification was achieved by associating with each risk one of the ordered pairs of
consequence and likelihood, (consequence, likelihood), depicted in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Enhanced RFRM Phase III and DoD-Conventional Risk Matrix
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE
Unacceptable

Minimally Acceptable

Remote

Unlikely

Likely

M o d e ra te

H ig h
( 5 ,2 )

(5 , 3 )

(5 , 1)
L ow
(4 , 1)

Acceptable with
Significant Utility Loss

(3 , 1)

Acceptable with Slight
Utility Loss

( 2 ,1 )

Little or None

L ow

L ow

L ow
0 ,1 )

H ig h

Highly
Likely

Frequent

H ig h
( 5 ,4 )

(5 , 5 )

H ig h

H ig h

M o d e ra te
( 4 ,2 )

M o d e ra te
(4 , 3 )

H ig h
( 4 ,4 )

(4 , 5 )

L ow
( 3 ,2 )

M o d e ra te
( 3 ,3 )

M o d e ra te
( 3 ,4 )

H ig h
( 3 ,5 )

L ow
( 2 ,2 )

L ow
( 2 ,3 )

M o d e ra te
( 2 ,4 )

M o d e ra te

L ow
( 1 ,2 )

L ow
( 1 ,3 )

L ow
( 1 ,4 )

M o d e ra te
0 ,5 )
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Operations expert group members initially assigned (consequence, likelihood)
pairings to risks on an independent basis. Once each of the three experts had completed
their individual assessments, those risks that had been identified as high by any expert
were again evaluated by the entire group, with the aim to resolve high risks to precise,
(consequence, likelihood) assessments. This precise resolution facilitated two purposes.
First, it offered opportunities to settle upon or at least understand group members’
possibly distinct definitions of “acceptable with significant utility loss,” “unacceptable,”
“highly likely,” and other risk matrix terms; common understandings so achieved
accommodated fuzzy terminology and issues beyond the scope of the research. Second,
precise (consequence, likelihood) evaluations of risks considered to be high promoted the
prioritization mechanics pursued in research Phases 3 and 4. Only high risks were
resolved to consensus because: to identically resolve moderate or low risks would have
added nothing to the deployment demonstration of the MUA design methodology; and
because constraints of resources of other factors might force actual ACTD managers and
analysts to design utility assessments based on effectiveness measures derived only from
the most serious of methodology-identified risks.
Group consensus held eight risks as high once each had been associated with a
particular ordered pair of (consequence, likelihood). Those eight high risks and their
ordered pair assignments were:
■

(5, 3). OMD system yields false positive indications of mines or minefields.

■

(5, 3). OMD system yields false negative indications of mines or minefields.

■

(5, 3). Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects
expected to be seen within surf and beach zones.
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■

(5, 4). Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection
capabilities.

■

(4, 4). RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information
regarding areas of operational interest.

■

(4, 4). PLSS UAV airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and
tactics, including small arms fire.

■

(5, 4). PLSS deployment concept of one system per host vessel insufficiently
supports operational needs.

■

(5, 3). Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance
functions.

Figure 8 is a pictorial representation of the distribution of high risks that operations
experts unanimously perceived linked to the OMD ACTD and its relevant metasystem.

Figure 8. High Risk Distribution Derived from the OMD ACTD HHM
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE
Unacceptable

M inimally Acceptable

Remote

Unlikely

Likely
4 H ig h R is k s
( 5 ,3 )

Highly
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( 4 ,4 )

Acceptable with
Significant Utility Loss
Acceptable with Slight
Utility Loss
Little or None
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METASYSTEM MODEL RISK PRIORITIZATION
Research Phase 3 directed individual expert prioritizations of the eight high risks
determined in Phase 2, and those prioritizations might have been executed in two primary
ways. The experts might have ignored their earlier (consequence, likelihood) evaluations
and treated the eight risks as elements of a single set to be ranked first through eighth in
terms of seriousness. Alternately, they might have first prioritized in terms of seriousness
the (consequence, likelihood) pairings assigned each of the high risks and then prioritized
the risks assigned identical pairings. With neither suggestions from the study leader nor
external guidance available to them from risk literature sources like Haimes (2004), the
remaining three operations expert group members unanimously endorsed the alternative
scheme of prioritization.
The operations expert group felt quite strongly that the two risks assigned a (5, 4)
(consequence, likelihood) pairing should be, in some order, the most and second-most
serious risks of the eight high risks identified. They felt equally strongly that risks
categorized as (5, 3) should constitute those third- through sixth-most serious of the eight
and that the (4, 4)-assigned risks should be considered seventh- and eighth-most serious.
The group’s intent dictated the format of the individual, pairwise comparisons that would
immediately follow.
The three operations expert group members participating in research Phase 3 were
asked to use pairwise comparisons to prioritize elements of three risk sets, or categories.
Those three categories comprised the two risks assigned (5, 4) pairings of consequence
and likelihood:
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(A) PLSS deployment concept of one system per host vessel insufficiently supports
operational needs and
(B) Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities;
the four risks of
(C) Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions,
(D) OMD system yields false negative indications of mines or minefields,
(E) Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to be
seen within surf and beach zones, and
(F) OMD system yields false positive indications of mines or minefields,
that were assigned (5, 3) pairings; and the two risks of
(G) RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information regarding
areas of operational interest.
(H) PLSS UAV airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and tactics,
including small arms fire,
both assigned the pairings of (4, 4). Given these three categories of seriousness and the
(V2 ){n)(n -1 ) number of pairwise comparisons needed to prioritize all elements of each of
the two-, four-, and two-risk element sets respectively representing those categories, the
researcher as study leader constructed a questionnaire of
1 + 6 + 1=8

pairwise comparisons randomly ordered in a fashion unlike any to which the operations
expert group had been previously exposed. The members then independently used the
questionnaire, presented in Appendix G, to identify three distinct prioritizations that can
be portrayed using the preceding, (A) - (H) lettering scheme:
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Operations Expert Group Participant A: (B ,A , D, F, E, C, H, G)
Operations Expert Group Participant B: (A ,B ,D , F, E, C, G, H)
Operations Expert Group Participant C: (A, B, D, E, F, C, G, H)
These disparate prioritizations concluded research Phase 3. They also provided
all the elements necessary for the researcher, as study leader, to execute research Phase 4
in accordance with the Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) method for identifying
a group preference regarding, in this case, the most serious risks to the joint military
operations metasystem with which the OMD ACTD system might be incorporated. In
fact, the operations expert group’s use of three seriousness categories drove three distinct
applications of the fuzzy group preference approach executed during Phase 4.
A first application of the fuzzy group preference method to (5, 4)-assessed risks A
and B determined a fuzzy, group preference relation, .Si, described by the reciprocal
matrix
A

B

The cut-sets of this fuzzy relation that correspond with its matrix values are, almost
trivially,
•Si1 = 0

.Si* = { (A, B) }
S t* = { ( A , B ) , ( B , A ) } .
The only possible crisp orderings of risks A and B are the 2! = 2 pairs (A, B) and (B , A),
where
Oi = Trivial solution (both orderings are compatible with .S / = 0 ) and
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O ,* = { (A, B) }
identified the (A, B) ordering as the one preferred by the operations expert group at an
agreement level of %.
A second application of the fuzzy group preference method to (5, 3)-assessed
risks C through F yielded a fuzzy, group preference relation, S 2 of
C

D

E

F

c
D

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

E
F

1

0

0

lA

1

0

%

0

This fuzzy relation matrix determines cut-sets of
S 2 1 = {(Df Q , ( D , E ) , ( D , F ) , ( E , C ) , ( F , C ) }
S/

3

= { (D, C), (D, E), (D, F), (E, C), (.F, C), (F, E) }

S2'A = { (A Q , (A E), (D, F), (E, Q , (E, C), (F, E), (E, F) }.
Table 5 portrays the set of 4! = 24 possible crisp orderings with which S 2 cut-sets were
compared to determine the one that constituted the group prioritization of risks C-F.

Table5. Crisp Orderings of Risks C-F

(C, D, E, F)
(C, D, F, E)
(C, E, D, F)
(C, F, O, E)

0c, E, F, D)

(C, F, E, D)
(D, c, E, F)
(D, c, F, E)

c, D, F)
(F, c, D ,E )
(E, C, F ,D )
(E,

(F, C, E ,D )

(A E, c, F)
(A F, c, E)

c, F)
(F, D, c, E)
(E, D,

F, c, D)
(F, E, c, D)
(A E, F, Q
(A F, E, Q
(E,

(E, A F,
(F,

O
A E, Q

(E, F,D ,
(F, E ,D ,

A review of these possible orderings in the descending, a-cut value sequence of
O2 1 = { ( D , E , F , Q , ( D , F , E , Q }
0 / = { (D, F , E , Q }
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identified the ordering (D, F, E, C) as that preferred by the operations expert group at an
agreement level of % identical to that achieved for the (A, B ) ordering of the two most
serious risks.
A third and final application of the Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974)
method to (4, 4)-assessed risks G and H determined a fuzzy, group preference relation,
S 3 , described by the reciprocal matrix
G

S3

n
g

Ir~ 0

H

%

I

Hl_ 1/3 0 _T

The cut-sets of this fuzzy relation that correspond with its matrix values are

S31 = 0
SiA = { (G , H ) }
S 3 A = { (G,H), (H, G) }.
Similar to the case of the two most serious risks, A and B, the only possible crisp
orderings of the least serious of operations expert group-identified, high risks are (G, H)
and (G, H), where
O3 1 = Trivial solution and
0 /

=

{(G ,H )}

identified the (G, H) pair to represent the operations expert group prioritization at an
agreement level of %. Merging these (4 4)-risk category results with those of the (5,4)and (5, 3)-assessed categories - all three attained with agreement levels of 2/3 - yielded a
comprehensive prioritization of
(A, B , D , F , E, C, G, H)
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carrying a comprehensive agreement level of % and that only coincidentally matched the
individual prioritization of expert group Participant B.
All operations expert group participants expressed satisfaction with this final
accord elaborated with Table 6. They also believed their prioritization would facilitate

Table 6. Final Operations Expert Group Ranking of OMD ACTD High Risks
(1 ) PLSS deployment concept o f one system p e r host vessel insufficiently supports operational needs.
(2 ) Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities.
(3 ) OMD system yields false negative indications o f mines or minefields.
(4 ) OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.
(5 ) Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to be seen within su rf and

beach zones.
(6 ) Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.
(7 ) RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information regarding areas o f operations

interest.
(8 ) PLSS UA V airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and tactics, including small arms

fire.

the identification of measures of effectiveness - such as those inviting counts of
operational deficiencies imposed by a PLSS deployment concept of one surveillance
vehicle per host vessel - by affording the pertinence, completeness, and accuracy
required of a MUA design process.
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
The satisfaction that operations expert group members expressed regarding their
efforts and results hints at reliability- and validity-related aspects of research Phases 1
through 4. A more complete review of reliability and validity associated with this study
can be generated.
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The first two phases o f this research observed identical, qualitative approaches to
reliability and validity. Reliability - or an equivalent term of dependability preferred by
some adherents of the qualitative paradigm of research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005) - can
be argued to have been introduced primarily with the operations expert selection criteria
promoted by numerous sources (Ayyub, 2001; Brandon, 1998; Comelissen et al., 2002;
Tumley, 2002; Sproles, 2000), together with the holistic perspective integral to Haimes’
(2004) RFRM and with which this study’s operations experts, given their selection, can
be said to have been facile. Arguments addressing research Phases 1-2 validity rest
primarily upon action research tenets as well as the same expert selection criteria and
Haimes’ holism that supported reliability.
The instrumental case study-like (Stake, 2005) effort of research Phases 1-2
depended for its reliability upon a qualitative scheme by Gorman and Clayton (2005)
supposing persistent recording as “perhaps the main key to reliability” (p. 56); such
recording was a hallmark of researcher activity during Phases 1-2 development of the
OMD ACTD HHM and following identification of associated risks. The action research
formula that placed the researcher as the operations expert group leader represented a
second reliability technique endorsed by Gorman and Clayton, that of researcher
immersion in the problem context; this circumstance was reinforced by the participation
criteria established prior to methodology deployment for the study leader and all
members of the operations expert group. Expert selection criteria demanding a high
degree o f pertinent operations and operational testing experience also represented a third
Gorman and Clayton technique of drawing upon “other research...for assistance” (p. 57).
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This third technique was itself buttressed by a prominent history of RFRM applications
available to the operations group through the literature.
The measurement validity of this work’s Phase 1-2 effort should also be gauged
from the perspective of qualitative or, more precisely, action research. That may be done
using five criteria suggested by Reason and Bradbury (2001, p. 5, as cited in Ladkin,
2004):
■

The extent to which the research demonstrates emergence and enduring
consequences;

■

The extent to which the research deals with pragmatic issues of practice and
practising;

■

The extent to which the inquiry demonstrates good qualities of relational practice,
such as democracy and collaboration;

■

The extent to which the research deals with questions of significance; and

■

The extent to which the research takes into account a number of different ways of
knowing, (p. 539)

These criteria can be shown to encompass measurement validation concepts more
traditionally termed (Gliner & Morgan, 2000; Gorman & Clayton, 2005; Leedy &
Ormrod, 2001) face, content, and construct validity. Satisfying the criteria represented
the culmination of efforts to establish the face, content, and construct validity of the
operations expert group-derived HHM and set of 86 risks.
The Phase 1 development of the OMD ACTD HHM and the Phase 2
identification of 104 model-derived risks later resolved to 86 each plainly evinced an
emergence of expert understanding and concerns stimulated by the collaborative
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environment emplaced for those two research phases. The very nature of the complex,
joint military operations metasystem to be modeled drove “a number of different ways of
knowing” (p. 539) that were manifested in the use of Haimes’ (1998, 2004) RFRM and,
particularly, HHM development processes. The significance of the pragmatic issue
simulated - OMD ACTD MUA design - provided the impetus for all research and
supported a supposition of “enduring consequence” plausible for one last and notable
characteristic of action research: that the validity of such research is “measured by the
willingness of.. .stakeholders to act on the results of (their work), thereby risking their
welfare on the ‘validity’ of their idea and the degree to which the outcomes meet their
expectations” (Greenwood & Levin, 2005, p. 54). Given that operations expert group
selection criteria stipulated members to be either stakeholders or representatives of
stakeholders, and given that each of those members expressed comfort with the final
HHM and associated set of risks, the “enduring consequence” criterion may be portrayed
as satisfied.
Research Phase 3-4 reliability and measurement validity concerns reflected
attributes of quantitative research practice. Phase 3 reliability concerns rested strictly
with the instrument reliability of an eight-question survey that invited only pairwise
comparisons of risks earlier collectively identified and defined by the operations expert
group, and it is easy to argue that multiple applications of the instrument would have
yielded precisely the same number of identical results. The practically deterministic, Blin
and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) fuzzy group preference method applied in research
Phase 4 to Phase 3 results effectively dismisses concerns regarding Phase 4 reliability.
The issue of Phase 3 measurement validity may be characterized as trivial in that a survey
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eliciting only eight pairwise comparisons must surely have accurately indicated the
individual preferences of operations expert group members. The measurement validity of
research Phase 4 seems only slightly more difficult to judge with its exceedingly
straightforward derivation of a group prioritization of risks and its identification of a level
of group agreement invoking an arithmetic mean easily accepted as accurate.
The measures of internal and external validity - respectively, the evaluation of
extraneous variable control and generalizability - that may be assigned this research
proved high, largely for a design that accommodated the Argyris et al. (1984) definition
of action research problem contexts as highly complex and wherein “unilateral control of
variables is neither possible nor desirable” (p. 239). The RFRM and fuzzy group
preference methods of this research were employed precisely for their suitability to
processes demanding holistic perspectives and the necessarily dense array of variables
associated with those perspectives. It was the collective reasoning process utilized by the
operations expert group during research Phases 1-2 that established order over numerous
and legitimate, group concerns and that therefore afforded the variable control expected
for internal validity.
The study’s external validity, or “the extent to which its results [could] apply to
situations beyond the study itself’ (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001, p. 105), was likewise
promoted by the research design. The OMD ACTD simulation did, indeed, simulate
essential elements of problem contexts evident with actual demonstrations like that from
which it was derived. The operations expert selection criteria established for the
deployment stage of this research ensured that individuals chosen to execute the
research-proposed, MUA design methodology truly represented those available to and
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desired by assessment designers and managers preparing to conduct actual
demonstrations. These research design factors reflected strategies commonly pursued to
“enhance the external validity o f research” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001) projects. They also
promoted an assertion that the study’s methodology could be applied to: all ACTDs; to
ACTD program-derivative, joint capability technology demonstrations; and quite
possibly to assessment settings beyond those two programs and that equally depend on
the holistic perspectives of small groups of experts upon which this study so greatly
depended.
ASSESSMENT OF METHODOLOGY UTILITY
The methodological and practical aspects of a research effort emphasizing joint
service ACTD assessment designs prompted review by: persons who have managed the
joint service-oriented ACTD programs of major organizations; persons who have served
individual demonstrations as the operational managers and deputy managers most
responsible for the implementation and conduct of joint service-oriented ACTD MUA;
and persons who have designed and conducted military utility assessments of joint
service-oriented ACTDs for those demonstrations’ operational managers. While not
required for research validation purposes, the researcher adjudged the solicitation of these
persons’ perspectives as an indispensable appendage of the methodology development
and its deployment executed during research Phases 1 through 4. Research Phase 5
therefore pursued ACTD expert opinion regarding the MUA design methodology, its
derivation, and its testing.
In Phase 5 a group of 20 ACTD experts reviewed the methodology and research
Phases 1-4 application by the operations expert group, with no members of the ACTD
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expert group having served as a member of the latter body. The ACTD experts included:
four individuals primarily experienced in large-organization management of joint service
ACTDs; eight individuals primarily experienced as operational or deputy operational
managers of one or more, joint service demonstrations, with operational management
arguably the most central of all, ACTD managerial tasks and operational managers those
persons most responsible for military utility assessments; and eight individuals primarily
experienced in the design and conduct of military utility assessments applied to the joint
service demonstrations guided by operational managers. The group represented a large
portion of individuals known by the researcher to have participated in demonstrations
emphasizing joint service needs that the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM),
perhaps most among major U.S. military commands and organizations, is directed to
support (USJFCOM, no date). The command has served a major sponsorship role for 33
(G. A. Koumbis, personal communication, January 9, 2007) of nearly 150 demonstrations
executed since ACTD program initiation (DoD, 2006), and it was sponsoring 12 of the 74
demonstrations active at the time of this research (G. A. Koumbis, personal
communication, January 9, 2007). Three of the four ACTD program managers served the
USJFCOM, all of the operational managers and deputy operational managers had pursued
their positions in the service of USJFCOM ACTD efforts, and all individuals of MUA
design and conduct experience had gained their experience by supporting
USJFCOM-sponsored demonstrations. Length of ACTD expert group participant
experience varied from between one and two years to periods of continuing involvement
that began with ACTD program inception in 1994.
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Over a series of seven lecture sessions directed toward mixed groups of between
one and five ACTD program managers, operational or deputy operational managers, or
MUA designers, the researcher reviewed the risk- and fuzzy set-based, MUA design
methodology development and deployment, including the final application results
achieved during research Phase 4. Following their respective sessions, the ACTD experts
were asked to complete a 49-question survey that offered each participant an opportunity
for 47 Likert scale- and 2 free form-type responses. Nineteen ACTD experts responded
to the researcher’s request to complete the questionnaire of Appendix H, three of the four
ACTD program managers and all remaining of the group of 20. Responses identified in
Appendix I proved instructive:
■

Sixteen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that user assessments of military
utility constituted the most important aspect of ACTDs;

■

All respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that ACTD program intent established
military utility assessments as the chief mechanism by which should be gauged
ACTDs’ potential value to military users;

■

Seventeen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that ACTD program intent
assigned MOEs to be the chief mechanism for determining if prototype system
demonstrations address critical operational issues identified by potential, system
users. All 19 agreed or “strongly” agreed that MOEs are indispensable to MUA
design;

■

Fifteen ACTD experts agreed that the Department of Defense (DoD) has suggested
no rigorous methodology for MUA design, two claimed they did “not know,” and
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two considered local processes to represent DoD-level suggestions they otherwise
conceded had not been promulgated;
■

Eighteen of the 19 respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed upon a need for more
rigor in ACTD MUA design. One “strongly” disagreed;

■

Seventeen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that the design methodology
proposed with this research promoted a degree of MUA rigor appropriate for
ACTDs;

■

Eighteen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that the design methodology
proposed with this research represented a treatment of joint military operations
metasystems appropriate for ACTDs. Eighteen also rendered an identical judgment
regarding the methodology’s treatment of risk, with 16 likewise endorsing the
methodology’s treatment of the ambiguities of human judgment. The balance of
respondents in each of these three cases considered themselves unable to render the
requested judgments;

■

Questionnaire responses and complementary inquiries of the researcher
demonstrated that none of the 19ACTD experts had been previously exposed to a
MUA design methodology comprising the treatments of complex systems, risk, and
fuzzy set theory essential to the methodology proposed with this research. In
particular, no respondents had before been exposed to a methodology based on the
work of Haimes (1998, 2004), Blin and Whinston (1973), and Blin (1974).

■

Fourteen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that the methodology proposed
with this research “(filled) a gap in the ACTD MUA design process,” and 15
believed that the methodology would promote the identification of MOE needed of
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assessment design processes. The balance of respondents conceded they did “not
know” and so could render no judgments regarding those elements of the survey;
and, lastly,
■

Seventeen respondents agreed or “strongly” agreed that the MUA design
methodology proposed with this research could be applied by analysts immediately
assigned MUA design tasks as well as managed by demonstrations’ operational
managers ultimately responsible for assessment design and execution.

SUMMARY
The deployment stage of this study was executed using a demonstrably reliable
and valid, action research process the researcher considered most appropriate for the
research context and aims. A group of three volunteers expert in joint, amphibious
forcible entry operations coupled foundational information supplied by the researcher
with elements of Haimes’ (1998, 2004) Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management
method to develop a hierarchical holographic model they believed represented the
simulated, Operational Mine Detection ACTD incorporated with what would be its
superior, joint military operations metasystem. That same group of three next drew from
the HHM the most serious risks posed by the ACTD and its metasystem to joint military
utility. The three group members then individually prioritized eight risks that the group
had categorized as high, and the researcher followed with an application of the Blin and
Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) fuzzy method for resolving preferences of small groups
and identifying associated levels of agreement. All results as well as the rationale and
processes leading to those results were finally reviewed by a total of 20 ACTD
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management and MUA experts, 19 of whom used the information to judge the worth to
practice of the MUA design methodology proposed with the study.
The OMD ACTD metasystem model developed by the operations expert group
required approximately 10 hours of collaborative work and comprised 13 perspectives, 93
perspective-subordinate domains, and 95 subdomains identified in accordance with
Haimes’ (1998, 2004) notions of an HHM. From that HHM the operations experts drew
a total of 104 risks to joint operations utility that the model represented to them, over
time refining the 104 to a number of 86. Of the 86 risks, the operations group noted 8 to
be distinctly more serious than the others and classified them as high risks.
The three operations expert group members then departed from their previously
strictly collective processes to individually prioritize the group-identified high risks using
a survey that offered a series of pairwise comparisons in accordance with the fuzzy group
preference method of Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974). The researcher, too,
employed the fuzzy preference method to transform the three individual prioritizations
into a single, group-preferred prioritization from which could be derived measures of
effectiveness required for an OMD ACTD MUA. The researcher additionally used the
fuzzy preference method to assess and associate with the group preference a % level of
agreement useful to any following process of MOE development.
Prominent methodological and practical aspects of the MUA design methodology
development and deployment prompted a corollary review of its worth to practice by 20
volunteers expert in the management, design, and conduct of ACTD military utility
assessments. The review indicated a potential user community that recognized the value
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of a MUA design standard not presently available and which the proposed methodology
would provide with a complement of attributes the ACTD experts considered necessary.
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CONCLUSIONS
This research pursued the development and deployment of a risk- and fuzzy
set-based methodology for advanced concept technology demonstration military utility
assessment design. The research was prompted by the lack of a standard for rigorously
identifying the assessment criteria that individual demonstration MUA designs should
emplace. It was guided by two principal propositions that MUA design standards should:
■

holistically account for risks precipitated when ACTD systems and processes are
considered for incorporation within the complex metasystems of joint military
operations; and

■

respect ACTD end-user perspectives necessary for MUA designs by employing
analytical schemes suited to the ambiguities and other of what have been termed
“fuzzy” (Zadeh, 1965, p. 338) manifestations of human cognition and language.

It was also guided by a set of three research questions.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A purpose to develop and deploy an ACTD MUA design methodology prompted
three research questions:
(1) How might joint military operations metasystem models guide the identification of
ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?
(2) How might be developed and employed joint military operations metasystem models
with which can be identified ACTD MUA measures of effectiveness?
(3) How useful might ACTD managers and analysts find the MUA design methodology
developed and deployed with this research?
Each of these was answered during the course of the study.
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The research demonstrated that an ACTD-tailored, joint military operations
metasystem model developed by appropriate experts could promote the identification of
risks evident in the model and that those risks could, in turn, promote the identification of
effectiveness measures by which ACTD utility could be gauged. Table 8 confirms this
assertion with samples of MOEs derivable from the Table 7 risks identified during this
research.
The research also demonstrated how an ACTD-tailored, joint military operations
metasystem model could be developed and employed for the purpose of MUA MOE
identification, and it did so by observing its own risk- and fuzzy set-related propositions
regarding MUA design standards. A holistic approach afforded model developers a
construct able to promote the identification of an equally holistic set of risks from which
could be derived needed effectiveness measures. Certain risk filtering elements of
Haimes’ (1998, 2004) eight-phase, Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management method
were first used to develop a hierarchical holographic model of a joint military operations
metasystem appropriate for a simulated ACTD. Other filtering elements were next
employed to determine and categorize as high, moderate, or low a set of risks that the
model represented to its developers. A fuzzy group preference method of Blin and
Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) was then used to transform independently-formulated
prioritizations of identified high risks into a single, group preference with associated
agreement level and from which could be derived MOEs like those displayed in Table 7.
As a guide to ACTD practitioners, Appendix J provides a review of proceedings that met
expected reliability and validity criteria while satisfying the second of the three research
questions.
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Table 7. HHM-Identified Risks and Sample Derivative Measures of Effectiveness
HHM-Identified Risks
P L S S d e p lo y m e n t c o n c e p t o f o n e s y s te m p e r h o s t
v e s s e l in s u f f ic ie n tly s u p p o r ts o p e ra tio n a l n e e d s .

Sample Derivative MOE
■ P e rc e n ta g e o f o p e ra tio n s im p e d e d b y P L S S
d e p lo y m e n t c o n c e p t o f o n e s u rv e illa n c e v e h ic le p e r
h o s t v e s s e l.
■ T y p e s o f o p e ra tio n s im p e d e d b y P L S S d e p lo y m e n t
c o n c e p t o f o n e s u rv e illa n c e v e h ic le p e r h o s t v e s s e l.

A d v e rs a rie s u s e v a rio u s m e a n s to c o u n te r O M D
s y s te m d e te c tio n c a p a b ilitie s .

■ F a ls e n e g a tiv e ra te o f s u rv e illa n c e d e te rm in e d b y
a d v e rs a ry c o u n te rm e a s u re s .
■ F a ls e p o s itiv e ra te o f s u rv e illa n c e d e te r m in e d b y
a d v e rs a ry c o u n te rm e a s u re s .

O M D s y s te m y ie ld s fa ls e n e g a tiv e in d ic a tio n s o f
m in e s o r m in e fie ld s .

■ F a ls e n e g a tiv e ra te o f s u rv e illa n c e .

O M D s y s te m y ie ld s fa ls e p o s itiv e in d ic a tio n s o f
m in e s o r m in e fie ld s .

■ F a ls e p o s itiv e r a te o f s u rv e illa n c e .

M in e s a re c o n c e a le d o r c a m o u f la g e d b y n a tu ra l o r
m a n m a d e o b je c ts e x p e c te d to b e s e e n w ith in s u r f
an d b each zones.

■ F a ls e n e g a tiv e ra te o f s u rv e illa n c e d e te rm in e d b y
n a tu ra l o b je c ts , in c lu d in g th o s e p o s itio n e d a s
a d v e rs a ry c o u n te rm e a s u re s .
■ F a ls e n e g a tiv e r a te o f s u rv e illa n c e d e te r m in e d b y
m a n m a d e o b je c ts , in c lu d in g th o s e p o s itio n e d a s
a d v e rs a ry c o u n te rm e a s u re s .

A d v e rs a ry e le c tro n ic a tta c k s im p a ir P L S S
n a v ig a tio n o r s u rv e illa n c e fu n c tio n s .

■ P e rc e n ta g e o f m is s io n s im p a ir e d d u e to a d v e rs a ry
e le c tro n ic a tta c k s u p o n P L S S n a v ig a tio n s y s te m .
■ P e rc e n ta g e o f m is s io n s im p a ir e d d u e to a d v e rs a ry
e le c tro n ic a tta c k s u p o n P L S S s u rv e illa n c e s y s te m .

R L S S a lg o rith m s a re n o t s u ffic ie n tly r o b u s t to
p ro v id e u s e fu l in fo rm a tio n re g a rd in g a re a s o f
o p e ra tio n s in te re s t.

■ P e rc e n ta g e o f g e o g ra p h ic a lly a n d o p e ra tio n a lly
re p re s e n ta tiv e m is s io n s fo r w h ic h R L S S fa ile d to
p r o v id e a d e q u a te , P L S S c u in g .

P L S S U A V a irfra m e is v u ln e ra b le to a d v e rs a ry
a n ti-a irc ra ft w e a p o n s a n d ta c tic s , in c lu d in g s m a ll
a rm s fire .

■ E s tim a te d p e rc e n ta g e o f m is s io n s in w h ic h th e
P L S S p la tfo rm p r o v e d v u ln e ra b le to a d v e rs a ry
a n ti-a irc ra ft w e a p o n s a n d ta c tic s .
■ E s tim a te d p e rc e n ta g e o f in d iv id u a l flig h t p ro file s
fo r w h ic h th e P L S S p la tf o rm p r o v e d v u ln e ra b le to
a d v e r s a r y a n ti- a ir c r a f t w e a p o n s a n d ta c tic s ..
■ T y p e s o f flig h t p ro file s fo r w h ic h th e P L S S
p la tfo rm d is p la y e d v u ln e ra b ility to a d v e rs a ry
a n ti- a ir c r a ft w e a p o n s a n d ta c tic s .
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The third of three research questions addressed the utility that might be assigned
by expert, ACTD managers and analysts to the MUA design methodology proposed with
this research. A survey of 20 such experts indicated an almost complete endorsement of
the methodology and its value to practice.
SUITABILITY AS A METHODOLOGY
The risk- and fuzzy set-based approach to ACTD MUA design taken with this
research proved to be, as originally claimed by the researcher, one properly characterized
as a methodological level of study applicable to complex systems. Accordingly, it
displayed all nine attributes that Keating et al. (2004) assign to system of systems-, or
complex system-oriented methodologies: the emphasis upon assessment design rather
than conduct, in particular, gave the approach a transportability feature suiting it to
application to ACTDs, to demonstrations of the joint capability technology demonstration
program recently initiated by the Department of Defense, to rapid acquisition test and
evaluation design, to operational tests like those developed for DoD acquisition
programs, and to similar assessment design needs that could or even must be met using
the perspectives of small groups of appropriate experts; key artifacts of the Haimes
(1998, 2004), Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) methods pointed directly to the
approach’s grounding in theory and philosophy associated with risk assessment, fuzzy
sets, and complex systems; the holistic perspective required by complex systems theory
and afforded by Haimes’ RFRM and Blin and Whinston’s method for resolving group
preferences marks the approach as a “guide to action... [of] significance, consistency,
adaptability, neutrality, and multiple utility” (Keating et al., 2004, p. 6 ); and numerous
aspects of the Haimes and Blin and Whinston methods provide the approach a degree of
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“rigor” (p. 6) needed for justifiable employment and that does not exist among ad hoc
MUA design schemes presently used. The Appendix J practitioner’s guide embodies and
directly or indirectly requires the observance of each of these attributes.
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
This research contributed to the theory, methodology, and practice associated with
joint military operations metasystem transformations driven by new technology and
process insertion. It did that by suggesting theoretical, methodological, and practical
considerations applicable to similar transformations of other types of metasystems.
The study revealed undeniable and significant links among domains of risk, fuzzy
set theory, and complex systems theory; and it forced consideration of synergies to be
gained by exploiting those links. It recognized the advantage of using fuzzy set theory to
accommodate the epistemic uncertainties and describe the associated risks so prominent
in complex system settings, with that emphasis upon risk, in particular, prompting
additional considerations regarding analyses of complex system failure modes.
The work demonstrated a valid, risk- and fuzzy set-based methodology for ACTD
military assessment design, and in doing so provided a flexible yet common scheme for
assessments quite unlike the ad hoc approaches previously used. The methodology itself
promoted a merger of risk assessment and fuzzy set theory that reflected theoretical
findings regarding the inextricability of fuzzy approaches to particular risk settings, and
the methodology’s deployment under an action research format endorsed the efficacy of
that qualitative scheme for assessment design efforts.
The research lastly and perhaps most significantly contributed to practice. The
MUA design methodology produced offers ACTD program executives, managers, and
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analysts a standard they concede as lacking and necessary. A practitioner’s guide also
produced can rigorously enable the identification and emplacement of measures of
effectiveness fundamental to ACTD MUA designs or designs needed for assessments of
ACTD-like enterprises. Indeed, the methodology and its derivative techniques suggest
means with which complex system transformations of many kinds can be anticipated,
whether those transformations will be evaluated using the relatively informal assessment
formats of ACTDs, the more particular evaluation designs typically associated with
formalized operational testing, or other assessment conventions.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Future research could explore and possibly advance several of this study’s
assumptions and findings. That research would address methodology elements such as
model development, expert identification, the significance of fuzzy set theory and
derivative applications, and methodology application.
The identification of HHM perspectives appeals for possible enhancement. In this
and apparently other research, the highest-level HHM components were derived from the
collective and holistic wisdom of a group of experts, with that derivation a process as
much art as science. A more rigorous, if not more complete or accurate, approach might
apply grounded theory to the effort of identifying the most prominent parts of a complex
system characterized in terms of system context. Crownover’s (2005) recent proposals
regarding construction of complex system contextual frameworks could provide one path
toward more rigorously defined, HHM constructs.
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Additional research might also enhance this study’s expert identification methods.
Much work has been done and continues to be done in the field of expert identification,
and reason points toward some merger of that work with the work of this study.
This research demonstrated the pertinence of fuzzy set theory to assessment
design through the need to resolve independent, expert prioritizations to a single, group
prioritization preferred by all group members. That demonstration ignored other aspects
of the chosen problem that equally called for applications of fuzzy mathematics, such as
the definition of risk assessment-related and patently fuzzy descriptors like “military
utility,” “unacceptable” consequence, “frequent” likelihood, and “high risk.” A more
encompassing application of fuzzy set theory to risk-based assessment design seems in
order.
A final suggestion for future research must address the breadth of problems to
which this study’s methodology should be applied. A superficial case can and has been
made for the methodology’s applicability to ACTD assessment design, JCTD assessment
design, rapid acquisition test and evaluation, operational test planning, and other
semiformal or formal assessment design needs. However, the methodology was tested
upon only a simulated ACTD and only within a single cycle of the action research spiral
(Figure 6); although it does seem to exhibit tenets prescribed for transportability and
other methodological attributes, the true bounds of its applicability remain undetermined.
SUMMARY
This research pursued the development and deployment of a risk- and fuzzy
set-based methodology for advanced concept technology demonstration military utility
assessment design. It was prompted by the lack of a standard for rigorously identifying
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the assessment criteria that individual demonstration MUA designs should emplace, and
it was guided by propositions regarding the pertinence of holistic risk assessments and
fuzzy set theory. The research pursued and answered three questions in demonstrating a
rigorous approach - well received by potential users - to determining measures of
effectiveness by which ACTD military utility must be gauged. It also showed a
methodology observant of standards established for research and measurement reliability
and validity, with study limitations and delimitations addressed by calls for future
research.
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Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the
mission (DoD, 2005).
Complex System. A bounded set of richly interrelated elements of collective structural
and behavioral patterns together producing a system performance that emerges over time
through interactions among system elements and elements of the environment in which
the complex system operates (Keating et al., 2004).
Complex System Context. The set of factors that influence a complex system or
metasystem (Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005).
Construct Validity. A characteristic of measurement instruments like surveys or
structured interviews that can be judged by researchers or stakeholder participants as
producing measurements and even supporting predictions regarding complex traits of the
objects of measurement, such as risks associated with ACTDs (Bernard, 2002; Gliner &
Morgan, 2000; Orcher, 2005).
Content Validity. A characteristic of measurement instruments like surveys or
structured interviews that can be judged by researchers or stakeholder participants to
possess contents representative of the concepts, such as risk, instruments are intended to
measure (Bernard, 2002; Gliner & Morgan, 2000; Orcher, 2005).
Critical Operational Issues. In terms of ACTDs, incontrovertible, military operator
identified requirements for mission success; essentials of capability without which an
ACTD would be adjudged unacceptable on functional grounds (DoD, no date-a; Sproles
2001, 2002).
Face Validity. A characteristic of measurement instruments like surveys or structured
interviews that can be judged by, or appear to, researchers or stakeholder participants as
appropriate for the instruments’ purposes (Bernard, 2002; Gliner & Morgan, 2000;
Orcher, 2005).
Joint, Amphibious, Forcible Entry Operations. The use of a joint military force and
ship-to-shore maneuver to seize and hold a shore-area, military lodgment in the face of
armed opposition (DoD, 2005).
Joint Military Operations. Single-command operations of forces composed of
significant elements assigned from two or more of the United States Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard (DoD, 2001, 2005).
Measures of Effectiveness. In terms of ACTDs, high-level indicators of military
effectiveness and suitability; standards directly derived by military operators from critical
operational issues, independent of particular demonstrations or demonstrations’
performance, and against which should be assessed the performance of ACTDs (DoD, no
date-a; Sproles, 2000, 2001, 2002).
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Measures of Performance. In terms of ACTDs, technical characteristics that determine
a particular aspect of a system’s effectiveness or suitability, evaluations of
system-internal functions, and the system performance values that can be judged against
MOEs to assess demonstration effectiveness and suitability (DoD, no date-a; Sproles,
2000, 2001, 2002).
Metasystem. Synonymous with the term, system o f systems, a system of functionally
integrated and complex subsystems necessarily complex in its own right (Keating et al.,
2003; Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005).
Military Effectiveness. In terms of ACTDs, the ability of a demonstration system to
provide its postulated capabilities within a military environment (DoD, no date-a).
Military Suitability. In terms of ACTDs, a function of the operational facility,
sustainability, reliability, and like characteristics associated with a demonstrated system’s
use in a military environment (DoD, no date-a).
Military Utility. In terms of ACTDs, a function o f a demonstration system’s military
effectiveness, military suitability, and contribution to military operations (DoD, no
date-a).
Risk. A function of some risk event’s likelihood and consequence (Bedford & Cooke,
2001; DoD, 2003c; Haimes, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Kaplan et al., 2001;
Kosmowski, 2000; Kujawski, 2002; Thompson & Montagne, 1998), characterized by one
or both of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty (Bae et al., 2004; Bedford & Cooke, 2001;
Quelch & Cameron, 1994; Williams, 1995). In terms of ACTDs, a demonstration’s
potential inability to perform well against military utility assessment measures of
effectiveness (DoD, 2003c).
Risk Assessment. In terms of ACTDs, the process of identifying events (Tchankova,
2002) possibly limiting demonstrations’ ability to enhance the utility of joint military
operations metasystems with which the demonstrations could be incorporated (DoD,
2003c). The process is intended to answer the three questions of: (1) What can go
wrong?; (2) What is the likelihood that it will?; and (3) What would be the consequences
if it does? (Haimes, 1991, 2004; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981).
Risk Event. In terms of ACTDs, an event or circumstance potentially constraining a
demonstration’s effectiveness and which therefore merits assessment in terms of
likelihood and consequence (DoD, 2003c).
Stakeholder. An individual or group of individuals who can affect or be affected by
some system of interest and has demonstrated a desire and need to engage in that
system’s development or analysis (Comelissen, 2002; Sproles 2000; Tumley, 2002).
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System of Systems. Synonymous with the term, metasystem, a complex system of
functionally integrated, complex subsystems that can be diverse in technology, context,
operation, geography, and conceptual perspectives of persons associated with the system
of systems or its components (Keating et al., 2004; Keating et al., 2005).
Technical Facilitator. An individual responsible for structuring and facilitating the
interactions of experts employed for expert-elicitation processes (Ayyub, 2001).
Technical Integrator. An individual responsible for developing the composite
representation of expert judgments (Ayyub, 2001).
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This research imposed general and specific requirements for the selection of
operations expert group participants. General requirements were that:
(1) Participants be or represent ACTD program stakeholders (Brandon, 1998), with
stakeholders defined as in Appendix A.
(2) Participants possess expertise strongly relevant to the simulated ACTD of the study
and gained through professional accomplishment, experience, and academic training
(Ayyub, 2001; Brandon, 1998);
(3) Participants be willing to act as impartial evaluators (Ayyub, 2001);
(4) Participants be available and willing to commit the time and effort required by the
study (Ayyub, 2001); and that
(5) Participants possess strong communication and interpersonal skills, flexibility,
impartiality, and an ability to appropriately generalize and simplify (Ayyub, 2001).
Specific requirements were that:
(6) Participants had attained an active duty rank of: major in the U.S. Army, Air Force,
or Marine Corps; or lieutenant commander in the U.S Navy; and
(7) Participants could demonstrate experience with or formal training in joint operations
of attributes similar to those of the ACTD simulated for this research; and
(8) Participants could demonstrate experience with or formal training in the operational
test and evaluation of military systems or prototypes; and that
(9) Participants had been awarded graduate degrees in a physical science, mathematical
sciences, or a field of engineering.
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This research imposed general and specific requirements for the selection of
ACTD management- and MUA design-experienced participants, collectively termed the
ACTD expert group. General requirements were that:
(1) Participants be ACTD program stakeholders (Brandon, 1998), with stakeholders
defined as in Appendix A.
(2) Participants possess expertise strongly relevant to ACTD management, MUA
design, or both, and gained through professional accomplishment, experience, and
academic training (Ayyub, 2001; Brandon, 1998);
(3) Participants be willing to act as impartial evaluators (Ayyub, 2001);
(4) Participants be available and willing to commit the time and effort required by the
study (Ayyub, 2001); and that
(5) Participants possess strong communication and interpersonal skills, flexibility,
impartiality, and abilities to generalize and simplify (Ayyub, 2001).
Specific requirements were that:
(6) Participants had been assigned as ACTD operational managers or deputy operational
managers for periods of at least one year; or
(7) Participants had been assigned ACTD military utility assessment or supporting
analysis tasks for periods of at least one year; or
(8) Participants had been assigned general or specific, ACTD program management or
training responsibilities at U.S. Department of Defense or major military command
levels for periods of at least one year; and that
(9) Participants had been awarded baccalaureate degrees.
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The ACTD simulated for this research, the Operational Mine Detection ACTD,
strongly reflected for validity purposes certain elements of an actual demonstration, the
Joint Countermine (JCM) ACTD conducted 1994-2000 (Blumenthal, no date; Elliott et
al., 1996; Schaffer et al., 1997; Schnoor, no date; USACOM, 1998). Aspects of the
simulated, joint forcible entry operations planning-related ACTD generated for this
research included technological and operational traits typical of those available to ACTD
staffs early in a demonstration’s life cycle, when MUA design begins. These and other
appropriate planning details were provided to the joint military operations expert group
under the following format:

The Operational Mine Detection (OMD) ACTD has been selected for an
immediate start. Key demonstration initiatives, issues, and attributes include:
Statement of Critical Military Need. Near- and on-shore mining by threat forces can
impede or deny amphibious forcible entry operations. With no significant improvements
having been made to amphibious forcible entry operations capabilities since the 1991
Operation Desert Storm, U.S. joint military forces now face a critical deficiency in a key
mission area.
Statement of ACTD Purpose. The OMD ACTD is intended to offer a near- and
on-shore mine surveillance capability suited to present-day, U.S. joint, amphibious
forcible entry operations needs.
Critical Operational Issues (COI) and Component Issues. Military sponsors of the
OMD ACTD have stipulated three top-level, critical operational issues, or questions, they
wish the demonstration to address. Sponsors have additionally identified limited sets of
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components associated with each top-level COI, and they reserve the right to alter those
sets during the course of the demonstration’s MUA. Current issues and component issues
are:
Critical Operational Issue 1. Functionality. Do OMD systems and processes
represent a credible, near- and on-shore mine detection capability suited to present-day,
joint amphibious forcible entry operations?
Component Issue l.a. Are OMD capabilities equally available under all
(nonthreat-induced) operational conditions typically encountered by joint, amphibious
forces?
Component Issue l.b. Can OMD capabilities be routinely realized given
their dependence upon systems and processes controlled by other than the joint forces
seeking to employ those capabilities?
Critical Operational Issue 2. Impact. Given that desired, OMD functionality is
observed, does it significantly enhance the totality o f operations that might be executed
by U.S. joint military forces?
Component Issue 2.a. Are OMD capabilities equally available under all
threat-induced operational conditions expected to be encountered by joint, amphibious
forces?
Component Issue 2.b. Do systems or processes providing the OMD
capability in any way degrade or interfere with other joint force capabilities?
Critical Operational Issue 3. Suitability. Can OMD capabilities be integrated
with current systems and processes without undue logistical burdens?
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Component Issue 3.a. Would the integration o f OMD capabilities with
extant systems and processes adversely affect personnel staffing or training processes?
Component Issue 3.b. Would adoption o f OMD capabilities pose
untenable problems regarding system-level integration?
ACTD Technical and Operational Characteristics. The Operational Mine Detection
ACTD comprises covert and overt elements. Those complementary elements are
intended to yield a prototype, amphibious forcible entry capability significantly better
than any presently available and suited to today’s threats.
One of the OMD prototype’s two principal components is the covert, Remote
Littoral Sensing System, or RLSS, that uses novel computational techniques to exploit
capabilities of existing national-level reconnaissance assets and provide joint forces with
cuing information required of the OMD prototype’s second major element, the
Proximate Littoral Sensing System, or PLSS. The PLSS is an operational-level, overt
asset organic to the joint forces it serves.
The RLSS may be characterized by its unique set of technical and operational
attributes. Most significant of the technical attributes are:
■ An infrared and visible spectrum imaging capability;
■ A capability to detect the presence of minefields in surf zones and very shallow
water, as well as on beaches;
■ A capability to provide atmospheric and bathymetric data in the vicinity of beaches
of interest;
■ A very limited capability to detect individual mines or to determine geospatial
parameters of minefields;
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■ A capability to detect mine laying activities; and
■ No practical capability to detect the presence of mines in land or ocean settings
unlike those already described. The system is optimized for clear-day, very-near
shore environments.
Most significant of RLSS operational attributes are:
■ Strategic national-level control of those reconnaissance assets from which the RLSS
draws its data;
■ Strategic theater-level (typically a joint force higher headquarters) control of RLSS
data requests, processing, and dissemination;
■ Data collection, processing, and dissemination times markedly dependent on factors
such as atmospheric and oceanographic conditions in the vicinity of beaches of
interest, availability o f transmission media for processed information, and competing
demands for the use of national-level reconnaissance systems.
The PLSS may be characterized by its own unique set of attributes. Most
significant of its technical attributes are:
■ A medium-sized, single propeller-driven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platform
hosting an infrared sensor dedicated to preprogrammed, self-navigation and two
multi-spectral optical sensors constituting the system’s primary, surveillance
elements;
■ A UAV platform designed to be catapult-launched from and net-recovered to U.S.
Navy amphibious class, aviation and aviation-capable ships. Such ships normally
carry a single, PLSS system;
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A UAV platform possessing a programmable, self-navigation capability. Once
launched by a catapult, the UAV executes a mission program and returns to its
launching platform in accordance with that program. The system can remain
airborne for up to four hours but possesses no in-flight, reprogramming capability.
The system can only be net-recovered;
A UAV platform of 60 knots maximum airspeed and 20 knot stall speed;
Tandem-mounted and gimballed, infrared- and visible spectrum-sensitive sensors
operating redundantly for sensor data fusion purposes. Independent operations are
not possible, though single-imager operations remain available when an imager’s
optical system fails but the tandem gimballing mechanism does not;
Algorithms within the PLSS onboard, intelligent target recognition (ITR) software
package manipulate sensor data to determine whether the presence of individual
mines represents the presence of whole minefields. One of three determinations is
possible: minefields are present; minefields are not present; or no determination.
The ITR processing outcomes are transmitted to launch vessels via encrypted, radio
frequency communications;
The equivalent of two hours of digitized optical data can be retained onboard the
UAV and retrieved with recovered vehicles for post-mission processing. Optical
data cannot be transmitted from the PLSS UAV to launching vessels;
Launching vessels house personnel and facilities able to independently analyze data
employed during missions by the ITR system and recovered with the PLSS UAV;
A capability to detect individual mines or obstacles presenting to PLSS sensors
cross-sectional areas no less than the equivalent of 12 inch diameter, circular mines;
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■ A capability to detect individual mines or obstacles positioned on or very near the
surface of dry beach areas as well as beach areas washed by breaking waves;
■ A capability to detect individual, submerged mines or obstacles positioned on or
very near the sea floor surface to depths of 10 feet;
■ Given ideal atmospheric and oceanographic conditions, a capability to detect
individual mines or obstacles from altitudes as high as 1000 feet above beach areas.
And
■ A limited capability, constrained by sensor and algorithmic limitations, to
distinguish between mines and natural or man-made obstacles.
The most significant of PLSS operational attributes are:
■ Surveillance and related parameters optimized for RLSS cuing. System operations
independent of RLSS cuing are generally difficult and time-consuming;
■ With RLSS cuing and ideal atmospheric and oceanographic conditions, PLSS
systems may survey beach areas of up to 10,000 square meters within three hours.
Identically-sized submerged areas may be surveyed within six hours. Survey times
are highly dependent upon constraints built into the ITR system with intelligent
software agents;
■ Semi-autonomous operations of the UAV platform may only be interrupted by PLSS
personnel positioned aboard launching vessels. These personnel may terminate
PLSS missions and direct platforms to return to their launch sites but cannot
reprogram UAV flight profiles or control surveillance sensor fields of view during
vehicle operations;
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■ The specially trained, PLSS personnel stationed aboard system launch vessels
execute a primary role of post-mission analysis. These same personnel also execute
a very limited, flight operations and data transmission monitoring function;
■ Launch vessel personnel are able to destroy PLSS UAV platforms in flight;
■ System personnel positioned aboard PLSS UAV launch vessels may monitor
real-time transmissions of ITR products.
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The following Operational Mine Detection Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration hierarchical holographic - ACTD metasystem - model (HHM) was the
fundamental element of the deployment phase of research regarding a risk- and fuzzy
set-based methodology for ACTD MUA design. The model was developed in
accordance with the general work of Haimes (1998, 2004) and was the particular result of
a simulated, action research process pursued by the researcher as study lead and three
volunteer participants expert in what the U.S. Department of Defense terms amphibious,
joint forcible entry operations (DoD, 2002,2005). The operations expert group crafted
and achieved consensus on this HHM using a seed model provided by the study lead that
the balance of the group modified through a total of 10 hours of deliberations over five
meeting sessions:

Perspective 1. Science and Engineering Aspects of Threat Mines and Employment
Domain l.A. Mine Physical Characteristics
Subdomain l.A.a. Distinctiveness
Subdomain l.A.b. Size
Subdomain l.A.c. Shape
Subdomain l.A.d. Visible and Infrared Spectral Reflectivity
Domain l.B. Mine Emplacement
Subdomain l.B.a. Presented Area
Subdomain l.B.b. Visible and Infrared Spectral Contrasts with
Surroundings
Subdomain l.B.c. Concealment
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Subdomain l.B.d. Camouflage
Subdomain l.B.e. Emplacement Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Domain l.C. Recognizable Features of Mine Type
Perspective 2. Environmental Aspects of OMD System Operating Areas
Domain 2.A. Seasonal Factors
Domain 2.B. Atmospheric Factors
Subdomain 2.B.a. Temperature and Humidity
Subdomain 2.B.C. Cloudiness and Other Spectral Attenuation
Subdomain 2.B.C. Wind and Turbulence
Subdomain 2.B.d. Ambient Light
Domain 2.C. Oceanographic Factors
Subdomain 2.C.a. Clarity
Subdomain 2.C.b. Salinity
Subdomain 2.C.c. Turbidity
Subdomain 2.C.d. Temperature
Perspective 3. OMD ACTD Critical Operational Issues
Domain 3.A. Functionality. Do OMD systems and processes represent a
credible, near- and on-shore mine detection capability suited to present-day, joint
amphibious forcible entry operations?
Subdomain 3.A.a. Are OMD capabilities equally available under all
(nonthreat-induced) operational conditions typically encountered by joint,
amphibious forces?
Subdomain 3.A.b. Can OMD capabilities be routinely realized given
their dependence upon systems and processes controlled by other than the
joint forces seeking to employ those capabilities?
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Domain 3.B. Impact. Given that desired, OMD functionality is observed, does it
significantly enhance the totality of operations that might be executed by U.S.
joint military forces?
Subdomain 3.B.a. Are OMD capabilities equally available under all
threat-induced operational conditions expected to be encountered by joint,
amphibious forces?
Subdomain 3.B.b. Do systems or processes providing the OMD
capability in any way degrade or interfere with other joint force
capabilities?
Domain 3.C. Suitability. Can OMD capabilities be integrated with current
systems and processes without undue logistical burdens?
Subdomain 3.C.a. Would the integration of OMD capabilities with
extant systems and processes adversely affect personnel staffing or
training processes?
Subdomain 3.C.b. Would adoption of OMD capabilities pose untenable
problems regarding system-level integration?
Perspective 4. OMD System Missions
Domain 4.A. Near-shore Mine Surveillance
Subdomain 4.A.a. Forcible Entry Operations Near-Shore Route Planning
Subdomain 4.A.b. Special Operations Near-Shore Route Planning
Domain 4.B. On-Shore Mine Surveillance
Subdomain 4.B.a. Forcible Entry Operations On-Shore Route Planning
Subdomain 4.B.b. Special Operations On-Shore Route Planning
Perspective 5. Friendly Forces and Other Support Capabilities
Domain 5.A. Senior Military Forces
Subdomain 5. A. a. Allied Forces
Subdomain 5.A.b. U.S. Regional Combatant Commands
Subdomain 5.A.C. U.S. Joint Task Forces
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Subdomain 5.A.d. U.S. Joint Component Commands
Subdomain 5.A.e. U.S. Amphibious Forces
Domain 5.B. Subordinate Military Forces
Subdomain 5.B.a. Allied Forces
Subdomain 5.B.b. U.S. Amphibious Forces
Domain 5.C. Coordinating U.S. Military Forces and Defense Organizations
Subdomain 5.C.a. U.S. Strategic Command
Subdomain 5.C.b. U.S. Special Operations Command
Subdomain 5.C.C. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
Subdomain 5.C.d. U.S. National Reconnaissance Office
Subdomain 5.C.e. U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Subdomain 5.C.f. U.S. Military Service Intelligence Organizations
Subdomain 5.C.g. U.S. Air Force Space Command
Subdomain 5.C.h. U.S. Naval Network Warfare Command
Subdomain 5.C.i. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Subdomain 5.C.j. U.S. Military Service Systems Commands
Domain 5.D. Coordinating Allied Military Forces and Defense Organizations
Domain 5.E. Other Support Capabilities
Subdomain 5.E.a. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Subdomain 5.E.b. U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
Subdomain 5.E.C. Governmental Space Agencies
Subdomain 5.E.d. Commercial Space-Bome Imagery Organizations
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Perspective 6. Adversary Forces and Other Support Capabilities
Domain 6.A. Military Forces
Subdomain 6.A.a. Defensive (Geographic) Area
Subdomain 6.A.b. Defensive Forces
Subdomain 6.A.C. Mining Forces
Domain 6.B. Defense Organizations
Domain 6.C. Adversary-Allied Military Forces and Defense Organizations
Domain 6.D. Other Support Capabilities
Subdomain 6.D.a. Governmental Space Agencies
Subdomain 6.D.b. Commercial Space-Bome Imagery Organizations
Subdomain 6.D.C. Non-Military Population
Perspective 7. Neutral Forces and Other Support Capabilities
Domain 7. A. Military Forces
Domain 7.B. Defense Organizations
Domain 7.C. Other Support Capabilities
Subdomain 7.C.a. Governmental Space Agencies
Subdomain 7.C.b. Commercial Space-Bome Imagery Organizations
Perspective 8. RLSS Technical Attributes
Domain 8.A. Ground-Based Computational Venues
Domain 8.B. Raw Data Receipt
Domain 8.C. Novel Computational Techniques
Domain 8.D. Optimized for Clear-Day, Near-Shore Environmental Data
Domain 8.E. Visible Spectrum Image Processing
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Domain 8.F. Infrared Spectrum Image Processing
Domain 8.G. Surf and Beach Zone Minefield Detection Capability
Domain 8.H. Limited Minefield Parameter Detection Capability
Domain 8.1. Limited Individual Mine Detection Capability
Domain 8. J. Beach and Surf Zone Area Atmospheric Data Processing Capability
Domain 8.K. Beach and Surf Zone Area Bathymetric Data Processing Capability
Domain 8.L. Capability to Detect Mine Laying Activities in Surf and Beach
Zone Areas of Interest
Domain 8.M. No Practical Capability to Process Other Than Beach and Surf
Zone Surveillance Data
Domain 8.N. Processed Data Dissemination
Perspective 9. RLSS Operational Attributes
Domain 9.A. Data Collection Greatly Dependent On Atmospheric and
Oceanographic Conditions in Areas of Interest
Domain 9.B. Operators
Subdomain 9.B.a. Requesting Joint Task Forces
Subdomain 9.B.b. Requesting Joint Task Force Theater-Level
Headquarters
Subdomain 9.B.C. National Reconnaissance Asset Control Authorities
Domain 9.C. Concept of Operations
Subdomain 9.C.a. Completeness
Subdomain 9.C.b. Doctrinal, Organizational, Training, Material,
Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications
Subdomain 9.C.c. Operator Employment
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Domain 9.D. Command and Control
Subdomain 9.D.a. Joint Forces Issue Requests for RLSS Data to
Theater-Level Headquarters
Subdomain 9.D.b. Theater-Level Control of RLSS Data Requests, Data
Processing, and Processed Data Dissemination
Subdomain 9.D.C. National-Level Control of Reconnaissance Assets
Subdomain 9.D.d. Data Collection Greatly Dependent On Competing
Demands for National-Level Reconnaissance Systems
Subdomain 9.D.e. Processed Data Dissemination Greatly Dependent On
Availability of Transmission Media
Domain 9.E. System Usability
Domain 9.F. Operator Staffing and Proficiency
Domain 9.G. System Availability, Reliability, and Maintainability
Domain 9.H. Maintenance Personnel Staffing and Proficiency
Perspective 10. PLSS Technical Attributes
Domain 10.A. Medium-Sized, Single Propeller-Driven Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) Platform
Domain 10.B. U.S. Navy Aviation or Aviation-Capable Amphibious Ship-Based
Domain 10.C. Semi-Autonomous Flight Operations Using Programmable
Navigation Augmented by Onboard, Infrared Navigation Sensor
Domain 10.D. No Inflight Navigation Programming Capability
Domain 10.E. Catapult-Launched
Domain 10.F. Net-Recovered
Domain 10.G. Maximum Flight Endurance of Four Hours
Domain 10.H. Maximum Airspeed of 60 Knots and Stall Speed of 20 Knots
Domain 10.1. UAV Platform Equipped with Two Multi-Spectral Optical
Surveillance Sensors
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Domain 10.J. One Visible-Spectrum and One Infrared-Spectrum Surveillance
Sensor Tandem-Mounted and Gimballed for Redundant Surveillance
Domain 10.K. No Capability for Independent Operations of Visible-Spectrum
and Infrared-Spectrum Sensors
Domain 10.L. Onboard Intelligent Target Recognition (ITR) System Processes
Sensor Data for Outcome of Minefields Present, Minefields Not Present, or No
Determination
Domain 10.M. ITR Processing Outcomes Transmitted to the PLSS Host via
Encrypted Radio Frequency (RF) Transmissions
Domain 10.N. ITR System Can Store and Process Up to Two Hours of Optical
Data
Domain 10.0. ITR-Stored Optical data Cannot be Transmitted to the PLS Host
Domain 10.P. ITR-Stored Data May be Recovered with the PLSS UAV for
Analysis by PLSS Support Personnel Aboard the Host Vessel
Domain 10.Q. Capability to Detect Individual Mines Presenting to Sensors
Equivalent of 12-Inch Diameter, Circular Mines
Domain 10.R. Capability to Detect Individual Mines On or Very Near Surface of
Dry or Wave-Washed Beach Areas
Domain 10.S. Capability to Detect Individual Submerged Mines On or Very
Near the Surf Zone Surface to Depths of 10 Feet
Domain 10.T. Under Ideal Atmospheric and Oceanographic Conditions, a
Capability to Detect Individual Mines from Altitudes As High As 1000 Feet
Above Beach Zones
Domain 10.U. Onboard PLSS Sensor Characteristics and Processing Algorithms
Limit ITR System Capability to Distinguish Between Mines and Natural or
Manmade Obstacles
Perspective 11. PLSS Operational Attributes
Domain 11. A. Normal Deployment Complement of One System Per Host Vessel
Domain ll.B . Surveillance Capability Strongly Dependent On RLSS Cuing,
with Non-Cued Operations Very Difficult and Time-Consuming
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Domain ll.C . With RLSS Cuing and Ideal Atmospheric and Oceanographic
Conditions, PLSS Systems Require Three Hours to Survey 10,000 Square Meters
of Dry or Wave-Swept Beach Areas
Domain ll.D . With RLSS Cuing and Ideal Atmospheric and Oceanographic
Conditions, PLSS Systems Require Six Hours to Survey 10,000 Square Meters of
Submerged Surf Zone Areas
Domain ll.E . PLSS Personnel Aboard Host Execute Primary Role of
Post-Mission Analysis
Domain ll.F . PLSS Personnel Aboard Host Vessel Execute Secondary Role of
Real-Time Flight Operations and ITR-Processed Data Transmission Monitoring
Domain 11.G. Semi-Autonomous Flight Operations May Be Terminated by
Retum-to-Vessel (RF) Signal from Host Vessel
Domain ll.H . Semi-Autonomous Flight Operations May Be Terminated by
Destruct (RF) Signal from Host Vessel
Domain 11.1. Operators
Subdomain 11.La. PLSS Support Personnel
Subdomain 11.1.b. Host Vessels
Subdomain 11.I.e. Joint Task Forces
Subdomain ll.I.d . Joint Task Force Theater-Level Headquarters
Domain 11.J. Concept of Operations
Subdomain ll.J.a. Completeness with Integration of Host Vessel and
Other Operator Processes
Subdomain ll.J.b . Implications for Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
Subdomain ll.J .c. Operator Employment
Domain U.K . Command and Control
Subdomain ll.K .a. Joint Force Initiates Forcible Entry Operations
Planning
Subdomain ll.K .b . UAV Platform Navigation Programmed
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Subdomain 11.K.C. Joint Force Coordinates PLSS Operations Among
Force Elements
Subdomain ll.K .d . Joint Force Governs PLSS Flight Operations from
Launch Through Recovery
Subdomain ll.K .e. Joint Force Governs Post-Mission Analysis and
Processed Data Dissemination
Domain ll.L . Weather and Environmental Influences
Domain ll.M . System Usability
Domain ll.N . Operator Staffing and Proficiency
Domain 11.0. System Availability, Reliability, and Maintainability
Domain 11.P. Maintenance Personnel Staffing and Proficiency
Perspective 12. Adversary Threats to OMD Operations
Domain 12.A. Anti-Aircraft Weapons
Domain 12.B. Small Arms Fire
Domain 12.C. Anti-Ship Kinetic Weapons
Subdomain 12.C.a. Surface Kinetic Weapons
Subdomain 12.C.b. Subsurface Kinetic Weapons
Domain 12.D. Anti-Satellite Weapons
Subdomain 12.D.a. Kinetic Weapons
Subdomain 12.D.b. Non-Kinetic Weapons
Domain 12.E. Electronic Warfare
Subdomain 12.E.a. Onboard PLSS Communication System Disruption
Subdomain 12.E.b. Offboard PLSS Communication System Disruption
Subdomain 12.E.C. PLSS Surveillance System Disruption
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Subdomain 12.E.d. PLSS Navigation System Disruption
Subdomain 12.E.e. Onboard RLSS Communication System Disruption
Subdomain 12.E.f. Offboard RLSS Communication System Disruption
Subdomain 12.E.g. RLSS Surveillance System Disruption
Subdomain 12.E.h. RLSS Navigation System Disruption
Domain 12.F. Passive Mine Protection Tactics
Subdomain 12.F.a. Camouflage
Subdomain 12.F.b. Concealment
Subdomain 12.F.C. Deception
Subdomain 12.F.d. Stealth
Perspective 13. Temporal Aspects of OMD ACTD
Domain 13.A. Demonstration Preparation Phase
Domain 13.B. Demonstration Phase
Domain 13.C. Residual Phase
Domain 13.D. Acquisition Phase
Domain 13.E. Deployment Phase
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SIMULATED ACTD METASYSTEM RISKS

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153
The Operational Mine Detection ACTD hierarchical holographic, or
metasystem, model identified in research Phase 1 was the fundamental element of the
deployment phase of this research. The model stimulated the research Phase 2
identification of risks - shown following - that it represented to the operations expert
group. As with Phase 1, Phase 2 processes utilized portions of the RFRM convention
practiced extensively by Haimes (1998, 2004) and others (Haimes et al., 2002; Haimes
et al., 2004; Horowitz & Haimes, 2003; Jones et al., 2003; Lambert et al., 2001; Leung
et al., 2004; Pennock & Haimes, 2002).

(1) OMD system yields false positive indications of mines or minefields.
(2) OMD system yields false negative indications of mines or minefields.
(3)

Mines are buried too deeply beneath (dry or submerged) surfaces to detect.
'y

(4) Mines present visible areas of less than 113 inches to PLSS system optics.
(5) Mine coatings lessen visible signature available to OMD system optics.
(6) Mine coatings lessen infrared signature available to OMD system optics.
(7)

Glare or other natural mechanisms of visible spectrum saturation impair OMD
system optical sensors.

(8)

Noise equivalent temperature differences (NETD) between mines and mine
surroundings are less than the thermal resolution capabilities of OMD system
infrared sensors.

(9)

Mine thermal characteristics and spacing impose minimum resolvable temperature
(MRT) differences confounding OMD system infrared sensors.

(10) Mine designs incorporating acoustic fusing or floating contact fuses would present
little to no visible area to OMD system sensors.
(11) Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to be
seen within surf and beach zones.
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(12) Near-shore currents cause mines to migrate along the beach, confounding OMD
system sensors and algorithms
(13) Precipitation confounds OMD system sensors.
(14) Beach or surf zone ice confounds OMD system sensors.
(15) Air temperature and humidity adversely affects PLSS UAV endurance.
(16) Clouds or other spectral attenuation mechanisms degrade OMD sensor capability.
(17) Excessive low-level winds or turbulence adversely affect or altogether preclude
PLSS UAV launch, recovery, or flight stability necessary for sensor operations.
(18) Water clarity or turbidity adversely affects OMD system sensor capability.
(19) Water temperature may adversely affect OMD system sensor capability.
(20) Fall and winter season restrictions of available daylight impair OMD system utility.
(21) When fielded, the OMD system will no longer resolve the critical (mine
surveillance) problem it is intended to resolve.
(22) PLSS UAV operations interfere with other operations preliminary to forcible entry
operations.
(23) Neither joint task forces nor their higher headquarters control the national-level
systems providing data to the RLSS.
(24) Operators do not sufficiently trust the OMD system and will therefore not take
optimal advantage of its capabilities.
(25) PLSS employment impairs other joint task force operations, such as frequency
spectrum usage or flight operations other than those of the PLSS UAV.
(26) Times required for OMD system and, particularly, PLSS employment, prove too
lengthy for unplanned missions of immediate precedence.
(27) Tidal or current conditions demand search patterns of course or duration infeasible
under operational constraints
(28) OMD system employment precipitates system-level issues of interoperability
among joint task forces and senior, subordinate, or coordinating military forces or
organizations.
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(29) RLSS and PLSS operations in widely separated time zones precipitate operational
coordination problems.
(30) RLSS communications impair other joint task force operations, such as frequency
spectrum usage.
(31) Coordinating OMD system operations with allied forces poses operational security
risks.
(32) Competing priorities of higher headquarters or other responsible organizations slow
delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task forces.
(33) Inadequate operations personnel staffing of higher headquarters or other responsible
organizations slows delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task forces.
(34) Inadequate training of higher headquarters or other responsible organization
operations staffs slows delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task forces.
(35) Rules of engagement impede or preclude PLSS employment in certain geographical
areas.
(36) Inadequate intelligence regarding adversary mining capabilities or techniques
impairs OMD system utility.
(37) Neutral force or population use of OMD system frequencies in joint task force
operating areas impairs OMD system capabilities.
(38) Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities.
(39) Adversary or neutral concerns make political or diplomatic case that RLSS
represents militarization of space, forcing cessation of RLSS operations.
(40) Deliberate or accidental PLSS operations in neutral territory proximate to joint task
force operations areas precipitate political or diplomatic pressure halting PLSS
operations.
’
(41) OMD system optimization for clear-day surveillance limits system utility for
nighttime operations.
(42) RLSS data feed system is degraded or inoperative.
(43) RLSS computing system is degraded or inoperative.
(44) RLSS processed data transmission system is degraded or lost.
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(45) RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information regarding
areas of operational interest.
(46) An insufficiently developed concept of operations (CONOPS) impairs RLSS utility.
(47) RAM (reliability, availability, and maintainability) issues impair RLSS utility.
(48) Inadequate maintenance personnel staffing of higher headquarters or other
responsible organizations slows delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task
forces.
(49) Inadequate training of higher headquarters or other responsible organization
maintenance personnel slows delivery of RLSS products requested by joint task
forces.
(50) PLSS UAV size and operating airspeed and altitude render it susceptible to
adversary targeting.
(51) PLSS UAV airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and tactics,
including small arms fire.
(52) PLSS UAV launch and recovery parameters of wind speed and direction are
difficult to attain or maintain under routine, host vessel operating conditions.
(53) Preprogrammed navigation restriction impairs PLSS utility.
(54) Four-hour PLSS UAV endurance insufficiently supports numerous combinations of
missions and operating environments.
(55) PLSS deployment concept of one system per host vessel insufficiently supports
operational needs.
(56) The PLSS ITR two-hour optical data storage capacity is insufficient for numerous
combinations of missions and operating environments.
(57) Dependence on RLSS cuing jeopardizes PLSS utility.
(58) Competing priorities of host vessel slow transmission of joint task force requests for
RLSS products.
(59) Inadequate operations personnel staffing of host vessels slows transmission of joint
task force requests for RLSS products.
(60) Inadequate training of host vessel operations staffs slows transmission of joint task
requests for RLSS products.
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(61) Inadequate PLSS operations personnel staffing slows PLSS operations.
(62) Inadequate training of PLSS operations personnel slows PLSS operations.
(63) Inadequate operations personnel staffing of host vessels slow PLSS operations.
(64) Inadequate training of host vessel operations staffs slows PLSS operations.
(65) ITR-processed data link from PLSS UAV to host vessel is degraded or inoperative.
(66) PLSS host vessel post-mission processing capability is degraded or lost.
(67) Degraded or inoperative communication links render host vessel unable to transmit
PLSS-processed data to joint task force planners.
(68) ITR algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information regarding
areas of operational interest.
(69) An insufficiently developed concept of operations (CONOPS) impairs PLSS utility.
(70) RAM (reliability, availability, and maintainability) issues impair PLSS utility.
(71) Inadequate PLSS maintenance personnel staffing slows PLSS operations.
(72) Inadequate training of PLSS maintenance personnel slows PLSS operations.
(73) Inadequate host vessel maintenance personnel staffing slows PLSS operations.
(74) Inadequate training of host vessel maintenance personnel slows PLSS operations.
(75) PLSS UAV does not properly respond to retum-to-host vessel command, impeding
joint task force operations.
(76) PLSS UAV self-destruct does not occur when commanded and errant vehicle flies
into enemy or neutral force airspace.
(77) PLSS UAV executes uncommanded self-destruct.
(78) Doctrine, operations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, or
facilities (DOTMLPF) change process will not accommodate OMD system fielding
requirements.
(79) PLSS UAV platform is damaged during launch or recovery.
(80) Host vessel offensive or defensive posture impedes OMD-, and particularly
PLSS-related operations.
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(81) Adversary anti-satellite tactics disrupt RLSS operations.
(82) Adversary electronic attacks impair communications between PLSS UAVs and host
vessels.
(83) Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.
(84) Friendly force electronic emissions impair PLSS UAV navigational or other
flight-related functions.
(85) Friendly force electronic emissions impair PLSS optical sensing, optical data
processing, processed data transmission, or other surveillance-related functions.
(86) When fielded, the mining threat for which the OMD system would be produced will
no longer be of concern to joint military forces.
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APPENDIX G
HIGH RISK PRIORITIZATION QUESTIONNAIRE
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Operational Mine Detection
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

High Risk Prioritization Questionnaire

Participant Identifier:
Date:

December

A

D

B

O

C

I I

, 2006

Your operations expert group has determined eight high risks evident in the
hierarchical holographic model earlier developed to characterize the Operational Mine
Detection Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration system deployed within a joint
military operations metasystem of relevance. Moreover, your group used a
DoD-Conventional Matrix of Risk Consequence and Likelihood to describe each of those
DoD-Conventional Matrix of Risk Consequence and Likelihood
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE
Unacceptable

Minimally Acceptable

Remote

Unlikely

Likely

M o d e ra te

H ig h
( 5 ,2 )

(5 , 3 )

( 5 ,1 )
L ow
( 4 ,1 )

Acceptable with
Significant Utility Loss

(3 , 1)

Acceptable with Slight
Utility Loss

( 2 ,1 )

Little or None

L ow

L ow

H ig h

M o d e ra te
( 4 ,2 )

M o d e ra te

L ow
( 3 ,2 )

M o d e ra te

L ow
( 2 ,2 )

(4 , 3 )

( 3 ,3 )
L ow
(2 , 3 )

L ow

L ow

L ow

( 1 ,1 )

( 1 ,2 )

( 1 ,3 )

Highly
Likely

Frequent

H ig h
( 5 ,4 )

(5 , 5 )

H ig h

H ig h
( 4 ,4 )

(4 , 5 )

M o d e ra te
( 3 ,4 )

H ig h
( 3 ,5 )

M o d e ra te
( 2 ,4 )

M o d e ra te

L ow
0 ,4 )

M o d e ra te
( 1 ,5 )

H ig h

(2 , 5 )

eight high risks in terms of consequence and likelihood. The group assessed the
(consequence, likelihood) components of two risks as (5, 4) and agreed that these two
constituted the most serious of the eight:
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Risk:

PLSS deployment concept o f one system per host vessel insufficiently supports
operational needs.

Risk:

Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities.

The group assessed the (consequence, likelihood) components of four risks as (5, 3) and
agreed that these constituted a high-risk grouping of intermediate significance, third
through sixth most serious of the eight:
Risk:

Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.

Risk:

OMD system yields false negative indications o f mines or minefields.

Risk:

Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected
to be seen within su rf and beach zones.

Risk:

OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.

The group assessed the (consequence, likelihood) components of two other risks as (4, 4),
agreeing these to be the least serious the eight high-risk scenarios identified:
Risk:

PLSS UA V airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and
tactics, including small arms fire.

Risk:

RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information
regarding areas o f operational interest.

A group preference regarding overall prioritization of the eight risks may now be
achieved by soliciting individual (operations expert group member) prioritizations of
risks associated with each of the (5, 4), (5, 3), and (4, 4) component categories of relative
seriousness already determined.
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Given each of the following eight pairings of risks, please check the block beside
the risk you consider the more serious. You should check only one block per pairing and
identify your preference for every pairing; no “ties” are allowed. Please also attempt to
maintain ranking consistency; that is, if you identify risk ^4 as more serious than risk B
and risk B as more serious than risk C, please attempt to ensure you have also identified
risk .4 as more serious than risk C.

Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I

PLSS UA V airframe is vulnerable to adversary anti-aircraft weapons and tactics,
including small arms fire.

I I

RLSS algorithms are not sufficiently robust to provide useful information
regarding areas o f operational interest.

Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I

PLSS deployment concept o f one system per host vessel insufficiently supports
operational needs.

I I

Adversaries use various means to counter OMD system detection capabilities.

Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
□

Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.

I I

OMD system yields false negative indications o f mines or minefields.

Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.
I I

Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to
be seen within surf and beach zones.
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Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
□

Adversary electronic attacks impair PLSS navigation or surveillance functions.

□

OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.

Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I

OMD system yields false negative indications o f mines or minefields.

I I

Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to
be seen within su rf and beach zones.

Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
I I

OMD system yields false negative indications o f mines or minefields.

□

OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.

Please check the block beside the risk you consider the more serious of the two:
□

Mines are concealed or camouflaged by natural or manmade objects expected to
be seen within su rf and beach zones.

□

OMD system yields false positive indications o f mines or minefields.

THANK YOU
For Participating as a Volunteer Member of the
Operations Expert Group

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX H
ACTD EXPERT REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165
The final phase of five phases of research synthesized judgments of a group of 20
purposively selected volunteers collectively expert in ACTD management and MUA
design. Research Phase 5 employed a single, single-stage, cross-sectional, primarily
Likert scale survey instrument structurally similar to those used by Monroe (1997), Yeh
(1998), Morgan (1999), and Chytka (2003) and topically related to survey structures used
for related research in: (a) decision making (Yeh, 1998), (b) design performance
evaluation (Sun, 2000); (c) risk and uncertainty assessment, including risk ranking
(Chytka, 2003; Hampton, 2001; Monroe, 1997; Morgan, 1999; Wells, 1997); (d)
technology adoption impact (Conway, 2003); and (e) evaluation of commercial product
customer preferences (Liu, 1996). The instrument used to survey the ACTD expert group
of 20 follows:

You are one o f a group o f advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) experts who
have volunteered to judge the researcher’s proposed methodology for ACTD military utility
assessment (MUA) design. Your participation owes to your education as well as your experience
with ACTD program management, ACTD management, or M UA design and conduct.
Please answer all questions o f all sections as accurately and completely as possible. Unless
otherwise indicated, please select only one response for questions prompting checkbox-type
responses. For questions prompting free form responses, please answer using the (unlimited length)
fields provided. The questionnaire should take no more than one hour to complete.
RESPONSES W ILL REM AIN CONFIDENTIAL TO ALL BUT THE RESEARCHER.
SECTION 1. PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
(1) Select the description or descriptions (select all applicable) best characterizing your experience
with advanced concept technology demonstrations:
A C T D P ro g ram M a n ag e m en t

Id

A C T D M anagem ent

Id

M U A D e s ig n o r C o n d u c t

N o te th a t: p r o g ra m m a n a g e m e n t in d ic a te s n o le s s th a n o n e y e a r o f c o m p re h e n s iv e r e s p o n
m ilita ry c o m m a n d s ’ o r D e p a rtm e n t o f D e fe n s e (D o D ) a g e n c ie s ’ A C T D p o lic ie s p o s s ib ly
m u ltip le A C T D s ; A C T D m a n a g e m e n t in d ic a te s n o le s s th a n o n e y e a r o f e x p e r ie n c e a s a n
o p e ra tio n a l o r d e p u ty o p e ra tio n a l m a n a g e r, a n d M U A d e s ig n o r c o n d u c t in d ic a te s n o le s s
e x p e rie n c e a s a n a n a ly s t d e s ig n in g o r c o n d u c tin g A C T D m ilita ry u tility a s s e s s m e n ts .
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(2) Identify your combined years o f experience as an ACTD program manager, an ACTD
operational manager or deputy operational manager, or an analyst pursuing ACTD M UA design or
conduct.
1 -2 Y e a rs Q

2 -5 Y e a rs Q

M o re T h a n 5 Y e a rs Q

(3) Identify your highest level o f education as:
B a c h e l o r ’s D e g r e e C H

M a s te r ’s D e g re e d

P h .D . o r O th e r T e r m in a l D e g r e e I

I

SECTION 2. ACTD GENERAL GUIDANCE
(1)

ACTDs are intended as precursors to formal acquisition processes.

□

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(2) ACTDs offer military users opportunities to “try before buy.”

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(3) Concept o f operations (CONOPS) development is an indispensable component o f ACTDs.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(4) The most important aspect o f ACTDs is user assessment o f military utility.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(5) The most important aspect o f ACTDs is transition to acquisition or fielding.

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□

□

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(6) User assessment o f military utility is more important to the ACTD process than transition to
acquisition or fielding.

□

□

□

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(7) If you believe there to be some aspect (or aspects) o f the ACTD process more important than
either o f (a) utility assessment; or (b) transition to acquisition or fielding, please identify and describe
it (or them):

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

167
SECTION 3. ACTD MUA GUIDANCE
(1) M ilitary utility assessments are intended as the principal mechanism by which ACTDs’ potential
value to military users may be gauged.

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(2) M ilitary utility assessments are intended to be highly dependent on user judgment.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□

□

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(3) The ACTD MUA design process begins with the identification o f critical operational issues (COI)
the demonstration is intended to address.

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(4) Appropriate, military users hold ultimate responsibility for approving COI.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□

□

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(5) COI are “show stoppers” that must be addressed to users’ satisfaction if ACTDs are to move to
acquisition or fielding.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(6) COI are indispensable to MUA design.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(7) Measures o f effectiveness (M OE) are derived from critical operational issues.

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(8) MOE selection is a responsibility shared by appropriate military users and analysts charged with
MUA design and conduct.

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(9) ACTD program guidance intends MOE as primary indicators o f whether or not ACTDs have
satisfactorily addressed COI established for demonstrations.

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e
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(10)

MOE are indispensable to MUA design.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□

□

D is a g re e

D o

□

N ot K now

A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

SECTION 4. ACTD M UA DESIGN PRACTICE
(1) COI should be employed for all ACTD M U As.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□

□

D is a g re e

D o

□

N ot K now

A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(2) MOE should be employed for every COI used for ACTD MU As.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□

□

D is a g re e

D o

□

N ot K now

A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(3) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed COI as part o f the MUA.

□
N ever

□
O c c a s io n a lly

□
O fte n

□
A lw a y s

(4) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE as part o f the MUA.

□
N ever

□
O c c a s io n a lly

□
O fte n

□
A lw a y s

(5) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed COI approved by military users.

□
N ever

□
O c c a s io n a lly

□
O fte n

□
A lw a y s

(6) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE developed with cooperation of
military users.

□
N ever

□
O c c a s io n a lly

□
O fte n

□
A lw a y s

(7) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE developed with cooperation of
analysts charged with M UA design and conduct.

□
N ever

□
O c c a s io n a lly

□
O fte n

□
A lw a y s

(8) ACTD M U As about which I have knowledge have greatly depended on user judgment.

□
N ever

□
O c c a s io n a lly

□
O fte n
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(9) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied risk assessment methods to MUA design.

□

□

N ever

□

O c c a s io n a lly

□

O fte n

A lw a y s

(10) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied fuzzy set theory to M UA design.

□

□

N ever

□

O c c a s io n a lly

□

O fte n

A lw a y s

(11) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied Phases I-III o f Haim es’ Risk Filtering,
Ranking and Management (RFRM ) convention to MUA design.

□

□

N ever

□

□

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(12) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied the fuzzy prioritization method o f Blin and
W hinston to MUA design.

□

□

□

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

□

O fte n

A lw a y s

SECTION 5. METHODOLOGY REVIEW
(1)

There exists no rigorous methodology for ACTD MUA design.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

(2)

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

The Department o f Defense has suggested no rigorous methodology for ACTD M UA design.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(3) There is a need for more rigor in ACTD MUA design.

□

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(4) ACTD guidance endorsing demonstrations o f minimum technical risk should be extended to
include operational or other risks associated with dem onstrations’ intended uses.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□

□

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

□

□

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(5) M U As should emphasize user judgment.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now
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(6) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE by prioritizing user-perceived risks
associated with fielding demonstrations or their derivatives.

□

□

□

□

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(7) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE by developing metasystem models
like that proposed with this methodology.

□

□

□

□

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(8) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE using metasystem models to
identify and assess risks in a manner like that proposed with this methodology.

□

□

□

□

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(9) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE using risk prioritization schemes
like that proposed with this methodology.

□

□

N ever

□

O c c a s io n a lly

□

O fte n

A lw a y s

(10) This methodology promotes a degree of MUA rigor appropriate for ACTDs.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(11) This methodology respects user judgment to a degree appropriate for MU As.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□

□
A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(12) This m ethodology’s treatment of joint military operations metasystems is appropriate for
ACTDs

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□

□
A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(13) This m ethodology’s treatment o f risk is appropriate for ACTDs

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□

□
A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(14) This m ethodology’s treatment o f the ambiguities associated with human judgm ent is
appropriate for ACTDs.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e
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(15) This methodology could be applied by persons assigned to ACTD MUA design.

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

□
D o N otK now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(16) The application o f this methodology could be managed by ACTD operational managers or their
deputies.

□

□

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

□
D o N otK now

□

□

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(17) This methodology could promote the identification o f MOE used for ACTD MU As.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N ot K now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(18) This methodology fills a gap in the ACTD M UA design process.

□
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

□
D is a g re e

□
D o N otK now

□
A g re e

□
S tro n g ly A g re e

(19) Please conclude this questionnaire by submitting any additional thoughts you wish regarding the
proposed methodology or its value to ACTD MUA design.

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
and for
Your Participation as a Volunteer Member o f the
ACTD Expert Group.
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APPENDIX I
ACTD EXPERT REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
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Nineteen of twenty ACTD experts who reviewed the methodology development
and deployment responded to the questionnaire offered to capture their views of those
proceedings and associated topics such as ACTD program intent and deficiencies.
Responses are summarized below.

You are one o f a group o f advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) experts who
have volunteered to judge the researcher’s proposed methodology for ACTD military utility
assessment (M UA) design. Your participation owes to your education as well as your experience
with ACTD program management, ACTD management, or MUA design and conduct.
Please answer all questions o f all sections as accurately and completely as possible. Unless
otherwise indicated, please select only one response for questions prompting checkbox-type
responses. For questions prompting free form responses, please answer using the (unlimited length)
fields provided. The questionnaire should take no more than one hour to complete.
RESPONSES W ILL REM AIN CONFIDENTIAL TO ALL BUT THE RESEARCHER.
SECTION 1. PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
(1) Select the description or descriptions (select all applicable) best characterizing your experience
with advanced concept technology demonstrations:
A C T D P ro g ram M a n ag e m en t 3

A C T D M anagem ent 8

M U A D e s ig n o r C o n d u c t 8

N o te th a t: p r o g ra m m a n a g e m e n t in d ic a te s n o le s s th a n o n e y e a r o f c o m p re h e n s iv e r e s p o n
m ilita ry c o m m a n d s ’ o r D e p a rtm e n t o f D e fe n s e (D o D ) a g e n c ie s ’ A C T D p o lic ie s p o s s ib ly
m u ltip le A C T D s ; A C T D m a n a g e m e n t in d ic a te s n o le s s th a n o n e y e a r o f e x p e r ie n c e a s a n
o p e ra tio n a l o r d e p u ty o p e ra tio n a l m a n a g e r, a n d M U A d e s ig n o r c o n d u c t in d ic a te s n o le s s
e x p e rie n c e a s a n a n a ly s t d e s ig n in g o r c o n d u c tin g A C T D m ilita ry u tility a s s e s s m e n ts .

s ib ility fo r m a jo r
g o v e rn in g
A C T D
th a n o n e y e a r o f

(2) Identify your combined years o f experience as an ACTD program manager, an ACTD
operational manager or deputy operational manager, or an analyst pursuing ACTD MUA design or
conduct.
1 -2 Y e a rs 3

2 -5 Y e a rs 9

M o re T h a n 5 Y e a rs 7

( 3 ) Identify your highest level o f education as:
B a c h e lo r ’s D e g re e

4

M a s te r ’s D e g re e

15

P h .D . o r O th e r T e r m in a l D e g r e e

SECTION 2. ACTD GENERAL GUIDANCE
(1) ACTDs are intended as precursors to formal acquisition processes.

1
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

11

7

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e
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(2) ACTDs offer military users opportunities to “try before buy.”

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o

N ot K now

9

10

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(3) Concept o f operations (CONOPS) development is an indispensable component of ACTDs.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o

N ot K now

7

12

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(4) The most important aspect o f ACTDs is user assessment o f military utility.
3
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

2
D o

N ot K now

A g re e

14
S tro n g ly A g re e

(5) The most important aspect o f ACTDs is transition to acquisition or fielding.
7
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

10
D o

N ot K now

A g re e

2
S tro n g ly A g re e

(6) User assessment o f military utility is more important to the ACTD process than transition to
acquisition or fielding.
3
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

11
D o

N ot K now

A g re e

5
S tro n g ly A g re e

(7) If you believe there to be some aspect (or aspects) o f the ACTD process more important than
either o f (a) utility assessment; or (b) transition to acquisition or fielding, please identify and describe
it (or them):
R e s p o n s e s u m m a r ie s in c lu d e :
(A ) It w o u ld b e n o n s e n s ic a l to tra n s itio n in g A C T D s w ith o u t a d e q u a te a s s e s s m e n t o p p o rtu n itie s a n d re s u lts .
(B ) T ra n s itio n a s s u m e s th a t m ilita ry u tility h a s b e e n d e te r m in e d .
( C ) T h e y a re b o th im p o r ta n t b u t m ilita ry u tility is p a ra m o u n t.

SECTION 3. ACTD MUA GUIDANCE
(1) M ilitary utility assessments are intended as the principal mechanism by which ACTDs’ potential
value to military users may be gauged.

8
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

A g re e

11
S tro n g ly A g re e

(2) M ilitary utility assessments are intended to be highly dependent on user judgment.
6
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

1
D o N ot K now

8

4
A g re e
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(3) The ACTD M UA design process begins with the identification o f critical operational issues (COI)
the demonstration is intended to address.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

10

9

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(4) Appropriate, military users hold ultimate responsibility for approving COI.

2
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

11

6

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(5) COI are “show stoppers” that must be addressed to users’ satisfaction if ACTDs are to move to
acquisition or fielding.
3
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

12

4

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

7

12

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(6) COI are indispensable to M UA design.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

(7) Measures o f effectiveness (MOE) are derived from critical operational issues.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

12

7

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(8) MOE selection is a responsibility shared by appropriate military users and analysts charged with
MUA design and conduct.
1
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

13

5

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(9) ACTD program guidance intends MOE as primary indicators o f whether or not ACTDs have
satisfactorily addressed COI established for demonstrations.
2
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

14

3

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

12

7

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

6

13

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(10) MOE are indispensable to M UA design.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

SECTION 4. ACTD M UA DESIGN PRACTICE
(1)

COI should be employed for all ACTD M U As.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now
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(2) MOE should be employed for every COI used for ACTD MU As.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

3

1

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

9

6
A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(3) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed COI as part o f the MUA.

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

4

15

O fte n

A lw a y s

(4) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE as part o f the MUA.

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

6

13

O fte n

A lw a y s

(5) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed COI approved by military users.

N ever

2

8

9

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(6) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE developed with cooperation of
military users.
1
N ever

4
O c c a s io n a lly

9

5

O fte n

A lw a y s

(7) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have employed MOE developed with cooperation of
analysts charged with M UA design and conduct.

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

9

10

O fte n

A lw a y s

(8) ACTD M U As about which I have knowledge have greatly depended on user judgment.

N ever

2

12

5

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(9) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied risk assessment methods to MUA design.
1

11

5

2

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(10) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied fuzzy set theory to M UA design.
14

5

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n
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(11) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied Phases I-III o f Haim es’ Risk Filtering,
Ranking and Management (RFRM) convention to MUA design.
15

3

1

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(12) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have applied the fuzzy prioritization method o f Biin and
Whinston to MUA design.
15

4

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

SECTION 5. METHODOLOGY REVIEW
(1) There exists no rigorous methodology for ACTD MUA design.
2

5

1

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

11

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(2) The Department o f Defense has suggested no rigorous methodology for ACTD MUA design.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

2

2

15

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(3) There is a need for more rigor in ACTD MUA design.

1

14

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

A g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

S tro n g ly A g re e

(4) ACTD guidance endorsing demonstrations o f minimum technical risk should be extended to
include operational or other risks associated with dem onstrations’ intended uses.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

1

4

14

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(5) MUAs should emphasize user judgment.

1

3

1

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

11
A g re e

D o N ot K now

S tro n g ly A g re e

(6) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE by prioritizing user-perceived risks
associated with fielding demonstrations or their derivatives.

2

10

6

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n

A lw a y s

(7) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE by developing metasystem models
like that proposed with this methodology.
11

8

N ever

O c c a s io n a lly

O fte n
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(8) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE using metasystem models to
identify and assess risks in a manner like that proposed with this methodology.

1

12
N ever

O fte n

O c c a s io n a lly

A lw a y s

(9) ACTDs about which I have knowledge have determined MOE using risk prioritization schemes
like that proposed with this methodology.

2

12
N ever

O fte n

O c c a s io n a lly

A lw a y s

(10) This methodology promotes a degree o f M UA rigor appropriate for ACTDs.

1
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

1
D o N ot K now

12
A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(11) This methodology respects user judgment to a degree appropriate for MU As.

1
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

12
A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(12) This m ethodology’s treatment o f joint military operations metasystems is appropriate for
ACTDs
14
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(13) This methodology’s treatment o f risk is appropriate for ACTDs

1
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

13
A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(14) This m ethodology’s treatment o f the ambiguities associated with human judgment is
appropriate for ACTDs.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

3

13

3

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(15) This methodology could be applied by persons assigned to ACTD M UA design.
11
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(16) The application o f this methodology could be managed by ACTD operational managers or their
deputies.

1
S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

D o N ot K now

13
A g re e
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(17)

This methodology could promote the identification o f MOE used for ACTD M U As.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

(18)

D is a g re e

3

10

5

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

This methodology fills a gap in the ACTD M UA design process.

S tro n g ly D is a g re e

D is a g re e

5

8

6

D o N ot K now

A g re e

S tro n g ly A g re e

(19) Please conclude this questionnaire by submitting any additional thoughts you wish regarding the
proposed methodology or its value to ACTD M UA design.
R e s p o n s e s u m m a r ie s in c lu d e :
( A ) W o u ld lik e to s e e th e p r o c e s s a p p lie d to a n a c tu a l A C T D .
( B ) T h is is a r e a s o n a b le a p p r o a c h th a t a d d r e s s e s a g a p in th e c u r r e n t M U A p r o c e s s .
( C ) T h is m e th o d o lo g y h a s th e p o te n tia l to in s till r ig o r in r is k a s s e s s m e n t p r o c e s s e s th a t c o u ld in flu e n c e
M U A s.
( D ) T h e m e th o d o lo g y h o ld s p o te n tia l v a lu e f o r M U A d e s ig n .
( E ) T h is m e th o d o lo g y c o u ld m a k e m o re r o b u s t a n d o th e rw is e g r e a tly b e n e f it th e M U A d e s ig n p r a c tic e s o f
A C T D sp o n so rs.
( F ) T h is m e th o d o lo g y s h o u ld b e v a lid a te d w ith a p p lic a tio n to a c tu a l A C T D s .
( G ) T h e r e is v e ry little s c ie n c e b e h in d th e M O E d e v e lo p m e n t p r o c e s s e s u s e d b y A C T D a n d s im ila r
p r o g ra m a g e n ts . T h is m e th o d o lo g y c o u ld p ro v id e th a t s c ie n c e .
(H ) M O E d e v e lo p m e n t s h o u ld b e s ta n d a r d iz e d in a f a s h io n s u p p o r te d b y th is m e th o d o lo g y .
( I) T h is m e th o d o lo g y c a n p r o v id e a r ig o r o u s a p p ro a c h to th e m a n y A C T D M U A d e s ig n s th a t la c k r ig o r. It
o ffe rs re s u lts w ith c re d ib ility .

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
and for
Your Participation as a Volunteer Member o f the
ACTD Expert Group.
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APPENDIX J
ACTD ASSESSMENT GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS
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Advanced concept technology and joint capability technology demonstration
operational managers should understand the primary importance assigned military utility
assessments under ACTD and JCTD program guidance, and those managers should
pursue their demonstration’s assessment designs in concert with supporting analysts and
the supported community of potential users. Operational managers should ensure their
assessment designs account for:
■ risks derived from incorporating ACTD systems within larger systems of military
systems and operational processes; and
■ the ambiguities of human cognition and language used to identify risks associated
with complex, military systems.
The following practitioner’s guide should promote such accounting. It is intended to be a
brief, non-prescriptive, and largely iterative guide for operational managers, assessment
designers supporting operational managers, and others supporting MUA design. It
should be used precisely as intended - as a guide to meeting the critical military needs
that demonstrations can represent.

(1) Operational managers must identify to MUA designers the critical operational need
their demonstration is expected to satisfy.
(2) Operational managers must identify to MUA designers their demonstration’s
purpose or, equivalently, the capabilities it is expected to provide in satisfying some
critical need.
(3) Operational managers must elicit from their demonstration’s potential user
community and provide to MUA designers the critical operational issues the user
community wishes addressed with a military utility assessment.
(4) Operational managers must develop or elicit from their demonstration’s potential
user community an initial concept of operations for governing the demonstration’s
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deployment as part of relevant, existing military and possibly non-military systems
and procedures. They must provide that concept of operations to MUA designers.
(5) Operational managers must elicit from their demonstration’s system developers and
provide to MUA designers an initial understanding of the demonstration’s primary,
technical elements.
(6) Operational managers must elicit from their demonstration’s system developers and
provide to MUA designers an initial understanding of the demonstration’s primary,
operational elements.
(7) Assessment designers must consider initial information provided them by the
operational manager and draw from that information a recommendation regarding
composition of an operations expert group of purpose like that pursued by the
operations group of this research. Assessment designers should advance their
recommendation to the operational manager, soliciting that individual’s support in
forming an operations expert group.
(8) Assessment designers must identify an analyst of their own group to serve as study
leader of the operations expert group. The study leader should meet selection
requirements criteria developed a priori by the assessment designers and comprising
criteria regarding analytical skill and appropriate, operational experience.
(9) The operations experts should use Phases I-II of Haimes’ (1998, 2004) Risk
Filtering, Ranking, and Management method to develop a hierarchical holographic
model of their demonstration of interest, together with relevant aspects of other
systems and processes with which the demonstration systems and processes are to be
incorporated. The HHM must include user-provided, critical operational issues
together with system developer-provided information regarding a demonstration
system’s technical and operational attributes.
(10) In developing a HHM, the operations experts may wish to first identify its major
category, perspectives and follow that by identifying perspective-subordinate
domains and subdomains to whatever level of hierarchy the group believes needed.
(11) The HHM development process should conclude when operations expert group
members agree upon a final model.
(12) The operations expert group should use Phase III of Haimes’ (1998, 2004) Risk
Filtering, Ranking, and Management method to identify the risks to military
operations utility that the HHM represents to it. Risks should be understood as
functions of consequence and likelihood.
(13) The group may find that they are able to transcribe directly as risks any subdomain
or lower-level HHM constructs earlier identified.
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(14) The risk identification process should conclude when operations expert group
members agree upon a final set of risks.
(15) The experts should next again use RFRM Phase III procedures to categorize
elements of their final risk set in terms of high, moderate, or low. Experts may
identify high-moderate-low graduations based on analytical considerations of
consequence and likelihood, but they should not be bound by a false sense of rigor
assigned such a “risk as analysis” (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 311) approach. Experts
may, instead, address “risk as feelings” (p. 311) by depending on their “experiential
system” to guide them toward plausible, risk assessments.
(16) The experts should refine their high-moderate-low categorizations by associating
with each risk an ordered pairing of consequence and likelihood, (consequence,
likelihood), like that demonstrated with this research. These associations may be
made in concert with or in lieu of the high-moderate-low categorizations described
in (14). As with any broader categorizations pursued under the guidance of (15),
operations experts should concede the equivalent credence of “risk as feelings” and
“risk as analysis” (Slovic et al., 2004).
(17) Based on an assessment of resources available to pursue a demonstration,
operational managers may request the operational expert group to assess in terms of
(consequence, likelihood) only those risks identified by the group as high. Those
most serious risks would then be the only ones subjected to an ensuing prioritization
based on the fuzzy group preference method of Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin
(1974) and so the only ones from which would be derived the measures of
effectiveness upon which a military utility assessment would be founded. Such a
process could ensure that an assessment executed under conditions of limited
resources would address user-prescribed COIs as optimally as possible.
(18) Operational managers may instead request that all identified risks (or, at least a set
of risks larger than that comprising only of those considered as high) be associated
with ordered pairings of consequence and likelihood. In that case the following
prioritization process would remain the same as for the more restrictive case
described in (17).
(19) Once the domain of prioritization is determined by the operational manager, the
operations expert group must decide to pursue one of two prioritization schemes:
(a) one that treats as equivalent all elements of sets of risks assigned to the three
categories of high, moderate, or low; or (b) one that first prioritizes within each risk
category the distinct groupings of (consequence, likelihood) and then prioritizes the
risks within each grouping. The latter scheme will normally be easier to execute in
terms of operations group deliberations needed and the fuzzy mathematics
computations to follow those deliberations.
(20) Once a particular prioritization scheme is determined, the leader of the operations
expert group leader must develop a questionnaire to portray to group members the
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pairwise comparisons of risks of interest required for the Blin and Whinston (1973)
and Blin (1974) method.
(21) Operations expert group members must individually complete the questionnaire
developed by their study leader. The study leader may participate in the survey but
must most importantly ensure the completeness and accuracy of all questionnaire
responses. Completeness and accuracy may be ensured by measures addressed in
this research
(22) Observing the prioritization scheme selected from the two options of (19), the study
leader must apply the Blin and Whinston (1973) and Blin (1974) fuzzy group
preference method to determine from independent, operations group member
responses: (a) a single group preference of prioritized risks; and (b) the level of
agreement associated with that single preference.
(23) The group leader must then apprise the operational manager of the operations expert
group preference regarding identified risks. The group leader must also apprise the
operational manager of the level of agreement associated with that preference.
(24) The operational manager and operations group leader should together analyze the
implications of the group preference and level of agreement determined. Given the
analysis, they may determine that the preference and agreement level support the
immediate development of MOEs from identified risks. They might alternately
determine that the operations expert group should reconsider certain elements of
their proceedings before a transition from identified risks to MOEs is made.
(25) Whatever the implications of the group preference and agreement level to the
operational manager and operations expert group study leader, neither should
consider MUA design complete until the demonstration’s end. The entire or
elements of the process described by (1) through (24) can and should be repeated
whenever during the course of a demonstration such repetition seems of value to the
MUA.
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